Fredrickson v. New York City Housing Authority
Cases that cite this one
15 later published cases cite this decision.
- Matter of Richardson v. New York City Hous. Auth. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- Matter of Corwin v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- Friedman v. New York City Tr. Auth. (New York Supreme Court, New York County 2025)
- Matter of Sollecito v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth. (New York Supreme Court, New York County 2025)
- Maldari v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth. (New York Supreme Court, New York County 2025)
- Carter v. New York City Tr. Auth. (New York Supreme Court, New York County 2025)
- Martell v. City of New York (New York Supreme Court, New York County 2024)
- Sapini v. Ferrara (New York Supreme Court, New York County 2024)
- Charlemagne v. New York City Tr. Auth. (New York Supreme Court, New York County 2024)
- Abreu v. Metropolitan Tr. Auth. (New York Supreme Court, New York County 2024)
- Ky Tong Tang v. New York City Tr. Auth. (New York Supreme Court, New York County 2024)
- Kearse v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth. (New York Supreme Court, New York County 2024)
- Pendley v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- McLeod v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- McLeod v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Although petitioner failed to submit medical evidence to support her contention of physical incapacitation, the lack of a reasonable excuse for failing to serve a timely notice of claim is not determinative (see Matter of Ansong v City of New York, 308 AD2d 333, 334 [2003]). Petitioner averred that she reported the essential facts of her accident to respondent’s management office within three days of her trip and fall. Accordingly, the court had a basis for finding that respondent acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within the statutorily prescribed time period or a reasonable time thereafter (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]). Further, respondent has not shown that it was prejudiced by petitioner’s eight-month delay in seeking leave to serve a late notice of claim (see Laguna v New York City Hous. Auth., 74 AD3d 498, 499 [2010]). Indeed, there is no evidence of any witnesses to petitioner’s accident. Nor is there any contention that the step upon which petitioner allegedly tripped has changed from the date of her accident. Concur — Sweeny, Freedman and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.
Dissenting Opinion
dissent in a memorandum by Catterson, J., as follows: I concur with the majority that the rec
Petitioner’s vague and unsubstantiated allegation that she reported her accident to “the woman behind the window” is plainly insufficient to satisfy plaintiffs burden of proving that respondent acquired actual knowledge. (Matter of Barzaga v New York City Hous. Auth., 204 AD2d 163, 164 [1st Dept 1994] [“(t)he vague and unsubstantiated allegation that the condition was reported to the building superintendent some days after the accident is insufficient to warrant granting the relief sought”]; see Lopez v New York City Hous. Auth., 193 AD2d 473 [1st Dept 1993].) Even if one were to credit petitioner’s claimed reporting, there is nothing on the record that establishes that respondent had sufficient information that put respondent on notice that a claim would be filed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.