Eckardt v. City of White Plains
Cases that cite this one
22 later published cases cite this decision.
- Holland v. City of Poughkeepsie (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- Lepore v. Town of Greenburgh (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- Rodgers v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- Rodgers v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- Linson v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Linson v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Lawhorn v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2020)
- Combs v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2015)
- Combs v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2015)
- Scott v. City of New Rochelle (New York Supreme Court 2014)
- RDK NY Inc. v. The City of New York (District Court, E.D. New York 2024)
- Durr v. Slator (District Court, N.D. New York 2021)
- Rapuzzi v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2020)
- Acosta v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- Shahid v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- Conroy v. Incorporated Village (New York Supreme Court 2014)
- Marcano v. City of Schenectady (District Court, N.D. New York 2014)
- Tompkins v. City of New York (District Court, S.D. New York 2014)
- Afifi v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- Afifi v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- Claims of Torres v. City of New York (New York Supreme Court 2013)
- Graham v. City of New York (District Court, E.D. New York 2013)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant City of White Plains, the White Plains Police Department, and several police officers, including the defendant Police Officer Aragon No. 64 (hereinafter Officer Aragon), asserting causes of action to recover damages for assault and battery (the first cause of action), intentional infliction of emotional distress (the second cause of action), negligent hiring and supervision (the third cause of action), and civil rights violations pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (the fourth cause of action). The City, the White Plains Police Department, and Officer Aragon moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. The Supreme Court, inter alia, denied those branches of the motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the City
The appellants failed to make a prima facie showing of their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the first cause of action insofar as asserted against them. We note that, unlike a claim pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, a municipality may be vicariously liable on a state law assault and battery claim for torts committed by a police officer under a theory of respondeat superior (see Williams v City of White Plains, 718 F Supp 2d 374, 381 [2010]; see also Merritt v Village of Mamaroneck, 233 AD2d 303, 304 [1996]).
The appellants did, however, establish the City’s entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action insofar as asserted against it, as “ ‘[p]ublic policy bars claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against a governmental entity’ ” (Ellison v City of New Rochelle, 62 AD3d 830, 833 [2009], quoting Liranzo v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 300 AD2d 548 [2002]). The appellants failed to make a prima facie showing of Officer Aragon’s entitlement to summary judgment dismissing this cause of action insofar as asserted against him.
With regard to the third cause of action asserted under New York common law, generally, an employer will be held liable for torts committed by an employee who is acting within the scope of his or her employment under a theory of respondeat superior, and “no claim may proceed against the employer for negligent hiring, retention, supervision or training” (Talavera v Arbit, 18 AD3d 738, 738 [2005]; see Karoon v New York City Tr. Auth., 241 AD2d 323 [1997]). Here, the actions complained of occurred during the arrest and detention of the plaintiff by several police officers, including Officer Aragon. It is beyond dispute that these actions were performed by the officers in the scope of their employment with the City. Accordingly, the plaintiff may not properly proceed with a cause of action to recover damages for negligent hiring and supervision, and the Supreme Court should have granted those branches of the motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the third cause of action insofar as asserted against the appellants. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the exception to this general rule (see generally Karoon v New York City Tr. Auth., 241 AD2d 323 [1997]) is inapplicable to the circumstances of this case based on the record before the Supreme Court.
As for the fourth cause of action, “42 USC § 1983 provides that ‘[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage . . . subjects, or causes to be
Here, the appellants established the City’s prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the fourth cause of action insofar as asserted against it. The appellants made a prima facie showing that the police officers were adequately trained by the City with regard to the use of tasers (see Mays v City of Middletown, 70 AD3d 900 [2010]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. However, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the fourth cause of action insofar as asserted against Officer Aragon. “Claims that law enforcement personnel used excessive force in the course of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its standard of
The parties’ remaining contentions are without merit. Dillon, J.E, Angiolillo, Dickerson and Cohen, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.