Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2011

In re Aliyah Careema D.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York · Decided October 18, 2011

88 A.D.3d 529; 930 N.Y.2d 579

Cases that cite this one

10 later published cases cite this decision.

In re Steven A. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
In re Steven A. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
Matter of Madisynn W. (Esprit L.) (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2020)
Matter of Armoni M.K.I. (Jasmine M.W.) (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2018)
Matter of Kaniya D. (Queleen D.) (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2018)
Matter of Davontay Peter H. v. Makeba H. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2015)
In re Serenity A. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
In re Serenity A. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
In re Wayne S. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
In re Wayne S. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion of the Court

The finding that respondent violated the terms of the suspended judgment is supported by a preponderance of the evidence (see e.g. Matter of Kendra C.R. [Charles R.], 68 AD3d 467 [2009], lv dismissed and denied 14 NY3d 870 [2010]). Respondent was required, inter alia, to submit to random drug testing and remain free of illicit substances, maintain regular and consistent supervised visitation, and obtain and maintain a source of income and suitable housing for herself and the child. Shortly after the suspended judgment was granted, respondent was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, and sentenced to 2V2 years’ incarceration. Moreover, respondent failed to maintain contact with the child for four months after she was incarcerated, which failure is not excused by her incarceration (see Matter of Anthony M., 195 AD2d 315, 316 [1993]).

The finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests is supported by a preponderance of the evidence showing that respondent would remain incarcerated until after the period of the suspended judgment had expired, and that the child’s kinship foster mother has been providing quality care for the child, wants to adopt her, and has *530been trained to handle her special needs (see e.g. Matter of David J., 260 AD2d 279 [1999]). Concur — Mazzarelli, J.E, Moskowitz, Acosta, Renwick and DeGrasse, JJ.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.