People v. Miller
Opinion of the Court
Here, the Supreme Court properly considered, inter alia, the defendant’s criminal history, including his juvenile delinquency adjudication for acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of manslaughter in the second degree (see Family Ct Act § 381.2 [2]; see also People v Sapp, 169 AD2d 659, 660 [1991]), his history of violating the terms of his probation, the severity of the instant offense, and his institutional record of confinement, which included two tier III and four tier II disciplinary infractions for, among other things, arson and fighting (cf. People v Hickman, 85 AD3d 1057, 1057-1058 [2011]). Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in concluding that substantial justice dictated the denial of the defendant’s motion to be resentenced pursuant to CPL 440.46 (see People v Karim, 85 AD3d 943, 943-944 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 818 [2011]; People v Colon, 77 AD3d 849, 850 [2010]; People v Curry, 52 AD3d 732 [2008]; People v Flores, 50 AD3d 1156, 1157 [2008]; People v Sanders, 36 AD3d 944, 946-947 [2007]). Skelos, J.P, Chambers, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 2010 NY Slip Op 32904(U).]
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.