Goldman v. A&E Club Properties, LLC
Cases that cite this one
9 later published cases cite this decision.
- McWhinney v. Rockland Cider Works, LLC (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2024)
- Gershon v. Cunningham (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- Cioffi v. Klein (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- St. Catherine of Sienna Roman Catholic Church v. 118 Convent Associates, LLC (Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York 2014)
- Liriano v. Eveready Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Solutions Economics, LLC v. Long Island Power Authority (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Solutions Economics, LLC v. Long Island Power Authority (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- M.V.B. Collision, Inc. v. Rovt (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- M.V.B. Collision, Inc. v. Rovt (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
In support of that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the complaint, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (3), the defendants failed to demonstrate that the plaintiffs lacked the legal capacity to sue on the ground that they were not aggrieved by the alleged violations of the special use permit
In support of that branch of their motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4), the defendants failed to demonstrate that the relief sought in an alleged prior pending action was the same or substantially the same such that dismissal of this action was appropriate (see CPLR 3211 [a] [4]; Kent Dev. Co. v Liccione, 37 NY2d 899 [1975]; Jin Sheng He v Sing Huei Chang, 83 AD3d 788, 790 [2011]; Wharry v Lindenhurst Union Free School Dist., 65 AD3d 1035 [2009]; cf. DAIJ, Inc. v Roth, 85 AD3d 959 [2011]; Cherico, Cherico & Assoc. v Midollo, 67 AD3d 622 [2009]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4).
The defendants failed to demonstrate their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that they did not commit any of the alleged violations of the conditions of the special use permit (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). Since the defendants failed to meet their initial burden, we need not consider the sufficiency of the papers submitted by the plaintiffs in opposition (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
We do not consider the defendants’ contention that the complaint should be dismissed based on the doctrine of res judicata since it was improperly raised for the first time in their reply papers before the Supreme Court (see Kearns v Thilburg, 76 AD3d 705, 708 [2010]; Djoganopoulos v Polkes, 67 AD3d 726, 727 [2009]; Crummell v Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 62 AD3d 825 [2009]).
The defendants’ remaining contentions are without merit. Mastro, J.E, Angiolillo, Belen and Lott, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.