People v. Iverson
Cases that cite this one
12 later published cases cite this decision.
- People v. Burgess (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2021)
- People v. Smith (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2021)
- People v. Uerkvitz (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2019)
- ASKINS, ANDREW J., PEOPLE v (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- People v. Askins (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- People v. Askins (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- MOSS, DWIGHT, PEOPLE v (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- BROWNLEE, ERIC, PEOPLE v (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- People v. Brownlee (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- People v. Brownlee (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- People v. Moss (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- People v. Moss (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Defendant appeals from an order determining that he is a level three risk pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act ([SORA] Correction Law § 168 et seq.). Defendant was previously classified a level one risk pursuant to SORA, and he contends that the Feople were required to file a petition seeking modification of his risk level pursuant to Correction Law § 168-0 (3). Defendant failed to preserve that contention for our review (see generally People v Windham, 10 NY3d 801 [2008]; People v Charache, 9 NY3d 829, 830 [2007]; People v Daniels, 86 AD3d 921, 922 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 715 [2011]) and, in any event, that contention is without merit. Correction Law § 168-o (3) does not require the filing of a petition to modify the classification of a sex offender convicted of a new qualifying sex offense (see § 168-a [2] [a]).
Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that he was entitled to a downward departure from his presumptive risk level on the ground that both the present and prior sex offenses were nonviolent (see Gilbert, 78 AD3d at 1585-1586; Ratcliff, 53 AD3d 1110). In any event, “defendant’s multiple convictions of sexual crimes constitute ‘compelling evidence that [he] poses a serious risk to public safety’ . . . , and thus a downward departure from the presumptive risk level is not warranted” (Gilbert, 78 AD3d at 1586). Present — Smith, J.P, Fahey, Garni, Sconiers and Gorski, JJ.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.