Madison Park Owner LLC v. Schneiderman
Opinion of the Court
Petitioner’s threshold assertion that the court should review the Attorney General’s interpretation of the purchase agreement de novo is incorrect. Courts review determinations of the Attorney General concerning down payments, which frequently turn on contract interpretation questions, using the “rational basis” standard (see Dunlop Dev. Corp. v Spitzer, 26 AD3d 180 [2006]).
The CPLR article 78 court correctly held that the Attorney General’s determination was not arbitrary or capricious. The result reached by the Attorney General was that, since neither relied-upon contractual provision was applicable to the facts presented, a common-law analysis was warranted, and pursuant thereto, Krouk was entitled to return of the down payment. Such result was correct under the common law. Where, as here, the original contract does not make the designated closing date “time of the essence,” either party may set a reasonable closing date after the initially scheduled closing date has passed, and declare that the newly scheduled date is “time of the essence,” and that failure to perform on such date will be considered a default (see Liba Estates v Edryn Corp., 178 AD2d 152 [1991]). As the Attorney General properly applied the common law (since neither of the two cited contractual provisions was applicable), his determination was not clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious. Concur — Tom J.P., Friedman, Acosta, DeGrasse and Román, JJ. [Prior Case History: 2011 NY Slip Op 32109(U).]
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.