People v. Rogowski
Opinion of the Court
Appeal from an order of the County Court of Schenectady County (Drago, J.), entered January 18, 2012, which classified defendant as a risk level III sex offender, a sexually violent offender and a predicate sex offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act.
Defendant was convicted of two counts of rape in the first degree and one count of endangering the welfare of a child, stemming from the rape of his niece who, at the time, was under the age of 11. Prior to defendant’s scheduled release from prison, County Court conducted a risk level assessment hearing pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law art 6-C), assigned him a total risk factor score of 125, resulting in a risk level III assessment, and designated him as a sexually violent offender and a predicate sex offender. Defendant now appeals and we affirm.
Defendant contends that County Court improperly allocated 10 points for failure to accept responsibility and 20 points for
We likewise find that clear and convincing evidence — including the presentence investigation report, case summary, victim’s statement and the grand jury testimony of the victim’s grandmother — supports County Court’s assessment of points for engaging in a continuing course of sexual misconduct. The statement of defendant’s niece, together with her grandmother’s testimony, clearly indicate that defendant engaged in sexual conduct with his niece on more than one occasion. In addition, the record indicates that defendant was previously convicted of sexual abuse in the second degree with respect to a different victim (see People v Wizes, 79 AD3d 1543, 1543-1544 [2010]; People v Willette, 67 AD3d 1259, 1260-1261 [2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 704 [2010]; People v Wright, 53 AD3d 963, 964 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 710 [2008]).
Rose, J.P., Malone Jr., Garry and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.
Although County Court executed the standardized form designating defendant’s risk level classification (see People v Kennedy, 79 AD3d 1470 [2010]), which is neither identified as an order nor contains “so ordered” language (see People v Joslyn, 27 AD3d 1033, 1035 [2006]), an actual order was not entered until January 2012. Therefore, defendant’s January 2011 notice of appeal is premature. Nevertheless, in the interest of judicial economy, we will excuse this defect, treat the notice of appeal as valid and address the merits (see CPLR 5520 [c]; Signature Health Ctr., LLC v State of New York, 92 AD3d 11, 13 n [2011]; Davis v Wyeth Pharms., Inc., 86 AD3d 907, 908 n 2 [2011]).
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.