Ng v. Neng
Opinion of the Court
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion when it denied the defendants’ application, made at the commencement of the trial, in effect, to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c) (see Gilmore v Gilmore, 286 AD2d 416, 416 [2001]; Sutter v Rosenbaum, 166 AD2d 644, 645 [1990]; Ambers v C.T. Indus., 161 AD2d 256, 256-257 [1990]; Cutrone v General Motors Corp., 157 AD2d 648, 648-649 [1990]; DiMartino v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 150 AD2d 633, 634-635 [1989]; Myers v Slutsky, 139 AD2d 709, 710 [1988]; cf. Jones v Corley, 35 AD3d 381, 382 [2006]; Wilson v Massapequa Gen. Hosp., 180 AD2d 791, 791 [1992]).
The defendants’ contention that the complaint should be dismissed on legal sufficiency grounds since the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the existence of damages is unpreserved for ap
We decline the plaintiffs’ request for the imposition of sanctions against the defendants in connection with this appeal (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1). Skelos, J.E, Florio, Roman and Miller, JJ., concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.