People v. Driscoll
Cases that cite this one
13 later published cases cite this decision.
- People v. Carey (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2018)
- People v. Roberts (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2026)
- People v. Smith (New York Supreme Court, Kings County 2024)
- People v. Smith (New York Supreme Court, Kings County 2024)
- People v. Wideman (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2021)
- People v. Richards (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- People v. Banks (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- People v. Banks (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2017)
- FORD, ANTHONY, PEOPLE v (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- People v. Ford (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- People v. Ford (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- People v. Bermudez (New York County Courts 2015)
- Ligon v. City of New York (District Court, S.D. New York 2013)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
First, this frisk was not authorized as incident to a lawful arrest for a noise violation given the absence of any evidence that the officers arrested defendant prior to frisking him (see People v Howell, 49 NY2d 778, 779 [1980]; People v Hoffman, 135 AD2d 299, 301 [1988]; compare People ex rel. Johnson v New York State Div. of Parole, 299 AD2d 832, 834 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 508 [2003] [where the search was incident to an announced and lawful arrest]). Next, while defendant’s parole status may generally be considered as a relevant factor in determining the reasonableness of a search (see People v Nelson, 257 AD2d 765, 766 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 975 [1999]), there is no indication here that the frisk was related to his parole status (see People v LaFontant, 46 AD3d 840, 841 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 841 [2008]). It is true that the officers were aware of defendant’s parole status and had been asked to detain him for questioning by the parole officer, but the parole officer did not conduct the frisk, request it or tell the officers he intended to conduct one (see e.g. People v Porter, 101 AD3d 44, 46-48 [2012]). Finally, although County Court determined that defendant’s initial refusal to exit his vehicle was suspicious, there is no evidence of defendant’s demeanor or the circumstances surrounding his refusal to exit the vehicle sufficient to support a conclusion that the officers had a reasonable suspicion
Mercure, J.P., Kavanagh, Stein and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, motion to suppress granted, and matter remitted to the County Court of Chemung County for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court’s decision.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.