People v. Gadley
Opinion of the Court
Appeal from a judgment of the Erie County Court (Kenneth F. Case, J.), rendered December 18, 2012. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]), defendant contends that County Court erred in denying his suppression motion. We
Although defendant correctly concedes that the officer’s initial approach and inquiry of him was lawful, he contends that the officer’s pursuit of him was unlawful inasmuch as the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that he had committed or was about to commit a crime. We reject that contention. It is well settled that a “defendant’s flight in response to an approach by the police, combined with other specific circumstances indicating that [he] may be engaged in criminal activity, may give rise to reasonable suspicion, the necessary predicate for police pursuit” (People v Sierra, 83 NY2d 928, 929 [1994]; see People v Price, 109 AD3d 1189, 1190 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1043 [2013]). Here, defendant’s flight, which commenced immediately after his companion informed the officer that they were about to smoke “[s]ome weed,” furnished the requisite reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant unlawfully possessed marihuana in violation of Penal Law § 221.05, thereby justifying the subsequent police pursuit (cf. People v Cady, 103 AD3d 1155, 1156 [2013]; see generally People v Rainey, 110 AD3d 1464, 1465 [2013]; People v McKinley, 101 AD3d 1747, 1748-1749 [2012], lv denied 21 NY3d 1017 [2013]).
Defendant failed to preserve for our review his alternative contention that “the simple possession of marijuana, even in public, is not a crime,” and that the police cannot pursue someone suspected of committing a mere violation (see generally CPL 470.05 [2]). In any event, the fact that a perpetrator’s conduct may have constituted only a violation, as opposed to a
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.