Villar v. County of Erie
Opinion of the Court
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Shirley Troutman, J.), entered April 3, 2013. The order granted the motion of defendant to dismiss the complaint.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by denying defendant’s motion in part and reinstating the complaint insofar as the first cause of action alleges that defendant breached its duty to protect plaintiff from foreseeable harm caused to him by other inmates at the Erie County Correctional Facility, and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries he sustained as a result of having been sexually assaulted twice by another inmate at the Erie County Cor
We agree with plaintiff in appeal No. 1 that the court erred in granting defendant’s motion and dismissing the complaint in its entirety on the ground that it owed no duty of care to plaintiff, who was being held in jail on a pending criminal charge at the time of the assaults. It is well settled that “[a] municipality owes a duty to inmates in correctional facilities to safeguard them from foreseeable assaults [by] other inmates” (Brown v City of New York, 95 AD3d 1051, 1052 [2012]; see Smith v County of Albany, 12 AD3d 912, 913 [2004]; see generally Sanchez v State of New York, 99 NY2d 247, 252-253 [2002]). “[T]his duty does not render the municipality an insurer of inmate safety, and negligence cannot be established by the mere occurrence of an inmate assault . . . Rather, ‘the scope of the [municipality’s] duty to protect inmates is limited to risks of harm that are reasonably foreseeable’ ” (Barnette v City of New York, 96 AD3d 700, 701 [2012], quoting Sanchez, 99 NY2d at 253). We therefore modify the order in appeal No. 1 by denying defendant’s motion in part and reinstating that part of the first cause of action alleging that defendant breached the duty it owed to plaintiff to protect him from foreseeable assaults committed by other inmates.
We further conclude, for the reasons set forth in the companion case, that the court erred at this juncture in determining as a matter of law that defendant is immune from liability because its alleged negligence arises from discretionary acts for which it is entitled to governmental immunity (see Villar, 126 AD3d at 1299.
The court, however, properly granted those parts of defendant’s motion to dismiss the second cause of action and that part of the first cause of action seeking to hold defendant vicariously liable for the negligence of the Sheriff or the Sheriffs deputies. Defendant “may not be held responsible for the
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.