Goodyear v. Young
Opinion of the Court
Appeal from an order of the Surrogate’s Court, Erie County (Barbara Howe, S.), entered August 2, 2016. The order, among other things, denied respondents’ motion to dismiss the proceeding.
It is hereby ordered that said appeal by respondent SWEPI, LP is unanimously dismissed and the order is affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Petitioners, decedent’s children, were issued letters of administration CTA in order to commence this construction proceeding with respect to a provision in decedent’s last will and testament that gave “all of [his] interest in any mineral rights in Pennsylvania or elsewhere to the King Partnership,” of which petitioners are members. It is undisputed that subsurface rights owned by decedent in several properties in Pennsylvania were sold at a tax sale in 1994 to respondent Frederick Young (hereafter, Young), before decedent’s death in 1995. Following decedent’s death, at Young’s request and with the understanding based upon Young’s assertion that he purchased “all the properties assessed to [decedent],” the executors issued a quit claim deed “covering all oil, gas and mineral properties belonging to the Estate.” In this proceeding, petitioners seek a determination that the quit claim
With respect to the Young respondents, we conclude that the Surrogate properly determined that, because each of those respondents was in receipt of property interests conveyed by the estate, the Surrogate had personal jurisdiction over them pursuant to SCPA 210 (2) (b) (see Matter of Casey, 145 AD2d 632, 633 [1988]; Matter of Schreiter, 169 Misc 2d 706, 711 [Sur Ct, NY County 1996]). Although the Surrogate did not explicitly address whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Young respondents “ ‘offend [s] traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ ” (Rushaid v Pictet & Cie, 28 NY3d 316, 330-331 [2016], rearg denied 28 NY3d 1161 [2017]; see generally Casey, 145 AD2d at 633; Schreiter, 169 Misc 2d at 711), we conclude that it does not (see Rushaid, 28 NY3d at 331). Even assuming, arguendo, that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Young partnerships and thus that jurisdiction can be obtained only by their consent or appearance, we nevertheless conclude that dismissal of the petition is not warranted (see generally CPLR 1001 [b]). We will “not permit the . . . voluntary absence [of the Young partnerships] to deprive these [petitioners]” of the determination sought herein
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.