Sigal v. Frank E. Hatch Co.
Cases that cite this one
11 later published cases cite this decision.
- Crump v. Wissner (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1914)
- Genauer v. Bac Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1950)
- Fisk Discount Corp. v. Brooklyn Taxicab Trans. Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1946)
- W. F. & R. Boat Builders, Inc. v. Hammond (New York Supreme Court 1931)
- The American Law Book v. Brewer and Casey (Mo. Ct. App. 1919)
- Mathushek & Son Piano Co. v. Weld (Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York 1916)
- Lowy v. Hardman, Peck & Co. (Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York 1916)
- Spitaleri v. Brown (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1914)
- Quattrone v. Simon (Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York 1914)
- Breakstone v. Buffalo Foundry & Machine Co. (New York Supreme Court 1913)
- Quattrone v. Simon (City of New York Municipal Court 1913)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The' sole question to be determined is whether the taking of the property by the marshal in replevin at the suit of the defendant, the vendor, on the tenth day of December, 1907, was a taking by the vendor within the meaning of section 116 of the Lien Law. If it was, it clearly establishes the plaintiff’s right to recover the amount
The taking by the marshal was not a taking by the defendant. The marshal was an officer of the court executing a writ issued out of the court. His taking placed the property in custodia, legis, and not in the custody of the vendor, who had given a bond for the return of the property in the event of a judgment against him. Milliken v. Selye, 6 Hill, 623; First National Bank of Oswego v. Dunn, 97 N. Y. 149; Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. 404; Commerce Ex. Nat. Bank v. Blye, 123 N. Y. 132; McCarthy v. Ackerman, 154 id. 565. In Roach v. Curtis, 191 N. Y. 387, relied upon by the respondent, the vendors had sued in replevin and “ had obtained possession of the property by virtue of the execution issued on the judgment in the replevin suit,” and they then retained such possession beyond the time limited. In the case at bar the taking by the marshal was merely to hold the property pending the final judgment determining the rights of the parties and the defendant’s possession dated from that time. The vendor could not sell and deliver pending such custody. It was only when the judgment of the court established its title to the property that defendant’s possession began, and the sale on the first day of April, 1908, after due notice, was a compliance with the provisions of the statute.
Giegerich and Ford, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed and complaint dismissed, with costs.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.