Dana v. Thaw
Opinion of the Court
The action is for professional services as expert alienist. On October 11, 1907, judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff upon inquest. Motion was made to open defendants’ default and vacate the judgment. The motion was granted, and appeal taken to this court, and heard at December term, 1907. We reversed the order, and directed that motion be denied, with leave to renew on proper papers. See opinion by Ford, J., page 22 of record. A second motion to vacate the judgment was heard by Mr. Justice Conlan, and denied, with leave to renew.
The fatal obstacle to defendants’ efforts to vacate the judgment is the absence from all the papers, now or heretofore before the court, of any real or meritorious defense. The court might very well have excused the default, but the failure to disclose any defense prohibited the court from extending any favor to the defendants. Clews v. Peper, 112 App. Div. 430, 98 N. Y. Supp. 404. The order should be affirmed, with $10 costs, except as to the provision granting leave to make a third motion, which should be stricken out.
Order modified, by striking out the provision for renewal, and, as modified, affirmed with $10 costs and disbursements.
Dissenting Opinion
The complaint alleges plaintiff’s employment, the payment of a $500 retainer, and the performance of services “of the reasonable value and agreed price of $1,000.” Plaintiff took an inquest, and on his motion his demand was increased from $1,-000 to $1,500, making a total of $2,000. The testimony taken at the
Under the issues the defendants have the right to disprove the authority of the attorney to employ the plaintiff generally, or for an agreed sum. The affidavit of Mr. Hartridge shows that the defendant Harry K. Thaw refused to receive the plaintiff at the Tombs and told him that his services were not wanted. If this statement be the fact, a jury might find either that there was no employment, or, if there was, that the $500 retainer was ample compensation. The learned City Court judge at Special Term, in denying the motion to open the default, followed the former decision of the Appellate Term in this case, because of the failure of Harry K. Thaw to specifically deny Mr. Olcott’s authority to employ the plaintiff. Without questioning the strict rule laid down in that former decision, which the learned Special Term judge in strictness doubtless felt bound to follow, it nevertheless seems to me that the defendants are entitled to their day in court. I agree with the expression in the prevailing opinion, to wit, “The court might very well have excused the default.” But I am of opinion that there “is not a failure to disclose any defense.” The record does not show that any reason was given for increasing the demand $500. Whether the plaintiff should have $2,000 as the “reasonable value” or the “agreed price” for his services, in view of the practically unchallenged facts set forth in the record, should be determined upon a trial. “Certain forms are needful to be preserved, but they must not obstruct the path to exact justice, and, if they do, they will be swept away.” Wright v. Wright, 54 N. Y., at page 444.
It may be that plaintiff is entitled to recover all he asks, but only after the defendants have been heard, as they would have been, but for the reasons stated in the moving papers.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.