Lyon v. Barrett
Opinion of the Court
The record in this action shows that the plaintiff delivered to the defendant company a diamond ring to be transported to Birmingham, Ala., consigned to one J. A. Gooch, C. O. D. $405, with instructions printed upon the package directing the carrier to allow an examination of the contents before payment. The package was carried to its destination and was' there examined by a person who claimed to be the consignee. The alleged consignee stated that he would return with an expert jeweler to determine whether the diamond was genuine. He never called again for it, however, and after due notice had been
Assuming, as claimed by the plaintiff, that this agreement did not and could not lawfully operate as a release of any claim for damages to the shipment in suit arising out of the negligence of the defendant, the question to be determined upon this appeal is whether the plaintiff has shown such negligence. The defendant showed by the testimony of the three clerks of the Southern Express Company at Birmingham, Ala., who had the package in charge, that a man claiming to be Gooch, the consignee, inquired for the package the day before it arrived and called again on the day after its arrival to examine it. The package was then taken out of an iron safe by Vance, the on-hand clerk for the Southern Express Company, who was the only man who knew the combination of the safe. Vance handed the package to Atcheson, assistant, on-hand clerk, who waited on the consignee at a broad counter behind which the clerks were employed. Before Vance gave the package to Atcheson, he informed Ould, secretary to the agent of the Southern Express Company at Birmingham, that a $400 C. O. D. package was about to be examined and Vance and Ould stood a few feet away and watched the transaction while Atcheson waited upon Gooch. Vance was compelled to turn away for a few minutes, but Ould did nothing during the examination of the package by Gooch but watch him closely. Both Ould and Atcheson testified that Gooch pushed the button which sprung the box open and took the ring in two fingers, examined it, said it was a pretty stone and returned it to the box. He then said he would return later with a jeweler to appraise the stone before he accepted it. Ould and Atcheson both kept their sight fixed upon the ring until it was returned to the box, at which point Vance returned, took the ring and
Upon this uncontradicted evidence the learned trial justice found “asa fact that the defendant was negligent in so permitting an inspection of the jewelry in question, that the consignee was enabled to appropriate the genuine and substitute an imitation diamond.” I am of the opinion that this finding is unsupported by the evidence. The defendant was compelled by the terms of its contract with the plaintiff to allow the consignee to inspect the ring before delivery. Just what precaution it or its clerks or agents could have taken to prevent substitution, which they did not take, is not apparent. They did not depend upon the vigilance alone of the clerk who waited on the consignee but two other men stood by and watched the transaction with fixed attention. If the substitution was made it must have been done by a person so skilled in the art that no amount of vigilance would have detected the trick. Furthermore the plaintiff testified that the stone was ordered by .mail from an advertisement and was not exactly like the one pictured in the advertisement, but as near to it as he could find for the price offered. It would have been difficult, therefore, for the consignee, Gooch, to have on hand for the purposes of substitution a bogus ring exactly like the one shipped in size, color and setting unless he had advance knowledge from New York as to the exact ring which was sent.
There was no evidence of negligence in the defendant or its connecting carrier in keeping the package. The evidence shows that it arrived with unbroken seal
Guy and Philbin, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed, and new trial granted, with thirty dollars costs to appellant to abide event.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.