McNamara v. United Distillers Co.
Opinion of the Court
Defendant appeals from a judgment in favor of plaintiff in an action brought to recover money paid for five barrels of whiskey purchased by plaintiff from an agent of the defendant, which whiskey defendant subsequently refused to deliver to plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s evidence established that plaintiff purchased the whiskey from one Boser, an agent of the defendant, at Deadwood, S. D., receiving from said agent a duplicate copy of an order therefor, written
This certificate was offered in evidence by plaintiff, and constituted notice to plaintiff that defendant’s agent had no authority to receive cash payment, and that title to the whiskey would only pass to the purchaser upon payment of the purchase price in cash at the executive office of the defendant company.
Subsequently plaintiff demanded delivery of the whiskey from defendant and defendant demanded payment therefor at the executive office of the defendant. Upon being informed that plaintiff had paid defendant’s agent in cash the purchase price of the whiskey in Dakota, defendant repudiated such payment and stated that said agent had no authority to receive cash payments. Defendant, on the trial, offered further proof that Boser had no authority to receive payments in cash, but was limited in his authority to receive notes payable at the office of the company. In view of such notice to plaintiff there is no force in the contention of the plaintiff-respondent that defendant’s agent, Boser, having authority to convey title, had implied authority to receive cash in payment thereof. Implied authority on the part of an agent to do a particular thing cannot exist where there is express notification that the agent has no such authority.
Judgment must, therefore, be reversed, with thirty dollars costs, and the complaint dismissed, with costs.
Philbin, J., concurs.
Dissenting Opinion
I dissent. In the first place the inscription quoted in the opinion of Mr. Justice Guy is comparatively in very small type on the “ warehouse receipt ” of defendant, and I have grave doubt whether the plaintiff can be chargeable, as matter of law, with notice thereof under familiar principles. But assuming that he had read it, I do not agree that it constitutes notice that no title to the goods sold is passed until payment in cash exclusively at the office of defendant. The language, to my mind, is quite capable of the construction that no title passed until payment of. the purchase price, the stress being on the fact of payment and not that it should be made at the company’s executive offices rather than to its apparently duly authorized agent. Even, however, if the inscription standing by itself is not open to that doubt, it surely ceases to have the effect claimed by the defendant in view of the other facts disclosed by the evidence. Thus, the salesman, Roser, delivered to plaintiff a purchase slip furnished by the defendant as part of its regular course of business. After the recital of a purchase—to be signed by the purchaser—with descrip
In my opinion the agent, having been intrusted by the defendant with all the indicia of title and with papers containing the plain intimation that the agent was authorized to receive payment in cash on defendant’s behalf, the inscription on the. warehouse receipt was quite insufficient to give notice to the contrary, or even to put a purchaser of reasonable intelligence on notice or inquiry.
The judgment should be affirmed.
judgment reversed, with thirty dollars costs.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.