German v. Suburban Rapid-Transit Co.
Opinion of the Court
This is an appeal by the defendant, the Suburban Rapid Transit Company, from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, entered upon the verdict of the jury for the sum of $5,500, awarded for personal injuries sustained through the alleged negligence of the defendant, and from an order denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial. The accident to theplaintiff occurred at the then terminus of the defendant’s-road at 170th street and Third avenue in the city of Hew York, where the defendant had a station elevated above the street, which station was then in process of erection or completion, the work upon it being performed by one Gustavesson, under a contract with the railroad company. The plaintiff was a journeyman carpenter, employed by Gustavesson in the said work, and had been engaged upon it at said place five or six weeks, with others, in the same employment. Trains were arriving and departing at this terminus at intervals of five minutes, and the work by the mechanics there was done “by fits and snatches,” as “they had to wait their opportunity to jump in between trains all the time. ” There was but a single track, and when a locomotive brought a train to the station it left it there, and went a few feet beyond the end of the station platform; another engine came up and took the train out for the next trip; and then the first engine backed down after the outgoing train, and went down the track, and was switched off to wait for the next train, to take it out for the succeeding trip. The single track at the station was so close to the station platform that the locomotive tender and cars, when along-side the platform, were not
The jury found by their verdict that, as between the plaintiff and the company, the latter, in the operation of its locomotives and trains at that point, was the sole cause of the accident, and the evidence is sufficient to sustain its finding. There was no negligence on the part of the plaintiff which the jury were bound to find contributed to the injury. He was lawfully upon defendant’s railroad structure in the performance of his duty in assisting to build a station, by defendant’s authority, and under the direction of his employer/ The work had to be done, as described, “by fits and starts,” as the coming or going of trains permitted, and the men “had to watch their opportunity to jump in between trains all the time.” It would have been negligence to have crossed in front of a moving train approaching so near as to render a collision probable, but it was not negligence to cross in front of a train which was standing still, in order to stand beside it; and it was a fair question for the jury whether, the train being at a stand-still, it was negligence for the plaintiff to stoop down and attempt to creep under the steps in such a position that if the train moved it would be certain to strike him. What conduct on the plaintiff’s part was prudent, tested by the standard of ordinary care wiiich he was bound to exercise, depended upon the circumstances. He saw that he was observed by the engineer when he was called to cross in front of the tender, and after he stood beside the steps; and he might have the right to rely upon the exercise of ordinary prudence on the part of the engineer in looking to see whether he had gotten out of the way. There was evidence to sustain the finding of negligence on the part of the engineer of the locomotive. He knew that the carpenters were working there on and about the platform all the time at that time. He had warned this plaintiff that day, or the day before. He saw him cross before the tender op
There is one exception which has not been disposed of by the foregoing considerations,—the admission of the evidence by the physician as to the effect of the plaintiff’s injury. It is claimed to be error, on the ground that the doctor had not examined the plaintiff since about 6 weeks after the injury, and had not seen the plaintiff in 18 months before the trial. The evidence is, however, that the doctor examined him 6 or 7 months before the trial, and while he had attended him continuously for the first 6 weeks after the injury, he had since that time treated him 12 or 15 times.
It is claimed that the damages were excessive, because the plaintiff was enabled to continue his work at the end of six months after his injury, and there was not sufficient proof to show that his injury would be permanent. The plaintiff at the trial—two years after the injury—testified that the pains in his lung were as severe as they were in the beginning; that he could not lie on his back because of the pain in his lung. He is 55-years old. The injury was the breaking of two ribs and the laceration of the pleura of the left lung; and the reasonable.certainty, according to the testimony of the physician, was that there would be permanent adhesion of the pleura to the lung tissue. He was unable to work for six months after the accident. His earnings had been $2.50 to $3.50 per day, and he could work every day in the week before the accident. How he can only work a few days in the week sometimes. A verdict for $5,500 is not-excessive. I do not think the injuries were exaggerated by the.plaintiff, or that the jury were misled and overrated them, or awarded anything from passion or prejudice. The judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed. All concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.