Robinson v. Gilroy
Opinion of the Court
The defendants, as commissioners of the sinking fund of the city of Hew York, have offered for sale to the highest
Upon the facts presented, I am unable, upon due reflection, to arrive at the conclusion that the proposed sale is illegal. It is conceded that the defendants have lawful authority to sell the franchises; but the plaintiff contends they are required to sell to the highest bidder, at the highest market price, and that the proposed sale is illegal because, unless the railway companies named are deprived of their alleged advantage over other possible competitors,, the highest market price is impossible of attainment. Any advantage, however, which the railway companies have, arises from the fact that they have control of railways whose termini are contiguous to the ferries, and is therefore wholly adventitious,—as-much so as if among the possible competitors there are some who, because of their control of cheaper motors or means of propulsion,, are enabled to operate the ferries at less cost to themselves than others can operate them. Over such extrinsic advantages it seems-impracticable for the defendants to exercise control without unjust discrimination against the possessors of them, and without want of proper consideration in other respects. The terms of the proposed sale and leases apply to all persons alike, and the defendants-cannot reasonably be expected to anticipate every extrinsic advantage of some possible competitors over others, and to discriminate against the former. If, because of the contiguity of the termini of the railways to the ferries, the railway companies are enabled to operate the ferries as adjuncts to their means of further-transit, so there may be among the possible competitors for the ferry franchises some who desire to operate the ferries in connection with other enterprises or means of transit. Hence, the apprehension of a possible loss to the municipality from a prorating of the fares, and the advantage of such a procedure to the ferry operators, is not to be confined to the railway companies named, as lessees of the franchises. Whether or not the possibility of loss to the municipality can be avoided by the adoption of a minimum rate of ferriage, as suggested by the plaintiff, seems to be a question solvable only by experience, and to be better addressed to the particular man of affairs than to the lawyer or judge, as such, respectively. On this motion we-are concerned only with the good faith of the defendants. To charge the defendants, successfully, with attempted waste of or injury to the property of the municipality, it is not enough that there is an honest difference of opinion respecting the manner in which the interests of the municipality may be best subserved. The bad faith of the defendants must appear. In the absence of bad faith, their acts, if within their lawful authority, must be deemed to be within the exercise of the discretion given them as administrative officers. The defendants, lawfully designated as sinking fund commissioners, are to administer
That the defendants, in fixing the terms of the proposed sale and leases of the ferry franchises, have acted in bad faith, is an unwarranted inference from the facts which appear on this motion. If the railway companies named have an advantage over other possible . competitors, it seems wholly accidental. It is conjectural only, therefore, to urge that the defendants have manifested favoritism for the railway companies, and thus been derelict in the proper performance of their duties. It is, of course, neither impossible nor improbable that the defendants have erred respecting the best interests of the municipality, in fixing the terms of the proposed sale; but, if so, the error appears to be one committed in the proper exercise of their administrative discretion, and is characterized by their utmost good faith. The maintenance of the ferry franchises as valuable ones is a proper factor for consideration in disposing of them. It is not improbable that this may only be accomplished if the ferries are successfully operated, and it is fitting, therefore, that some discretion should be left to those who undertake to operate them; particularly so, if the public are to be attracted to the use of the ferries, with regard to the ferriage to be exacted. A fixed rate of ferriage may prove disastrous to success, though success could be insured by a lesser rate, and the operators may find it ■compatible with their interests to extend it. Besides, is it not plausible to apprehend that a fixed rate of ferriage would be more advantageous to the railway companies named than to others who may desire to acquire the use of the ferry franchises, because the former could, by means of their railways, offer greater inducements to the public? Next, the exaction of excessive or rigid terms may operate prohibitively upon the railway companies, the termini of whose railways are contiguous to the ferries; and it is as much for the interests of the municipality that they should compete for the franchises as it is that others do so. Is it to be questioned that the ferries have, in connection with the railways, enhanced in value, and now yield to the municipality a much larger return than they otherwise would, because by means of the railways the ferry passengers are afforded the facilities of access to the remoter parts of Staten Island and Long Island? It is as reasonable, therefore, to apprehend a loss to the municipality from the railway companies’ refusal to operate the ferries as from any system of prorating the fares which they may adopt in connection with the railways. Lastly, even the means which the plaintiff suggests as a cure for the apprehended evil can only be effective to a degree, for, if a minimum
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.