DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

In the chapter 11 case of reorganized Debtor Motors Liquidation Company, (formerly known as General Motors Corp.) (“Old GM”) and its affiliates (collectively, the “Debtors”), John Morgenstein, Michael Jacob and Alante Carpenter (the “Morgenstein Plaintiffs”), on their own behalf and on behalf of a class they would like to represent, seek — after the deadline for filing claims in Old GM’s chapter 11 case and after Old GM’s reorganization plan became effective — to file and recover on a class proof of claim, whose assertion now would now be barred under the Debt- or’s reorganization plan (the “Plan”)1 and *497confirmation order (“Confirmation Order”). The class proof of claim would be in the estimated amount of approximately $180 million, for the estimated costs of a fix on 400,000 class members’ 2007 and 2008 Chevrolet Impalas, which the Mor-genstein Plaintiffs allege had a design defect in the spindle rods that linked to the Impalas’ rear wheels.2

In this adversary proceeding,3 brought under the umbrella of the reorganized Debtors’ chapter 11 case, the Morgenstein Plaintiffs “seek a limited revocation of the confirmation order,”4 under section 1144 of the Bankruptcy Code, allegedly for fraud on this Court in procuring the Confirmation Order.5 As stated in paragraph 1 of their Complaint:

The Plaintiffs bring this action for limited, carefully crafted plan revocation based upon the Debtors’ fraud in the chapter 11 Schedules and in the procurement of a bankruptcy confirmation order.6

Similarly, as stated in paragraph 53 of their Complaint:

Based on the facts laid out above, the Plaintiffs request that the Court revoke the Debtor’s confirmation order on the grounds that it was procured by fraud provided, however, that the revocation shall go only to the denial of discharge as to Known Creditors’ class claim, i.e., leaving any and all events, transfers and transactions wholly unaffected by the Order of Revocation of Discharge as to the Claims of Consumer Impala Owners.

Old GM and the Motors Liquidation Company GUC Trust (the “GUC Trust,”7 which is the successor to most of Old GM’s *498remaining assets under the Plan) move, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and 9, to dismiss the Complaint. They contend, among other things, that there’s no such thing as a partial revocation of a confirmation order; there’s been a failure to satisfactorily allege a fraud on the Court, much less with the particularity that Fed.R.Civ.P. 9 requires; and that even if the Complaint otherwise had merit, it would be barred by the doctrine of equitable mootness.

The Court now agrees with the first two of those contentions (concluding that the third would better be addressed on summary judgment), and especially the first— upon which the Complaint fails as a threshold matter. The Complaint will be dismissed.

Facts

Under familiar principles, the Court takes the well-pleaded8 facts from the Complaint (and its single exhibit), and from prior proceedings in Old GM’s chapter 11 case of which the Court can take judicial notice.

The Morgenstein Plaintiffs9 are three individuals who own Chevrolet Impalas from model years 2007 and 2008. They allege that due to “excessive and premature wear and tear, caused by Defendant’s conduct,” 10 the rear-wheel tires on their Impalas had to be replaced.11

Defendant Old GM filed for chapter 11 protection on June 1, 2009.12 On July 5, 2009, the Court granted Old GM’s motion, under section 363 of the Code, for an order authorizing the sale of most of Old GM’s assets to a newly formed corporation (“New GM”), financed by the United States Treasury.13 Through an order entered on September 16, 2009, the Court set a bar date — the last date by which to file a claim against Old GM — as November 30, 2009.14 By decision dated March 7, 2011,15 *499the Court overruled the handful of objections to confirmation of the Debtor’s Plan, and an order confirming the Debtor’s reorganization plan was entered on March 29, 2011.16

The Morgenstein Plaintiffs allege that 2007 and 2008 Impalas have defective rear wheel spindle rods that cause “excessive, abnormal, and premature”17 wear to the vehicles’ rear tires. Additionally, they allege that Old GM “knew of the defective rear wheel spindle rods in the Impalas generally,”18 but took steps to remedy the defect only in Impalas equipped with a police package (the “Police Package Impalas”). The Morgenstein Plaintiffs further allege that “[t]here are no material differences between the rear wheel spindle rods installed and equipped in Police Package Impalas and the rear wheel spindle rods installed and equipped in Impalas without a police package.”19

The Morgenstein Plaintiffs allege that Old GM issued two notices in 2008 relating to the defect in the Police Package Impalas. First, they allege, Old GM issued “Technical Service Bulletin 09082, National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (‘NHTSA’) Item Numbers 10026504 and 10026484,”20 which noted that “conditions on Impalas equipped with a ‘police package’ result in lower tread depth on the inboard side of the rear tires or uneven rear tire wear.”21 Second, they allege, “in or about June and July 2008, [Old GM] issued a bulletin [the ‘Program Bulletin,’ attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint] as part of its customer satisfaction program directing GM dealers to replace the rear wheel spindle rods, align the rear wheels, and replace rear tires if they had insufficient tread depth on the inboard side”22 for Police Package Impalas only.

The Program Bulletin referenced by the Morgenstein Plaintiffs is dated July 2008. The Program Bulletin first describes the “Condition”:

On certain 2007-2008 model year Chevrolet Impala vehicles equipped with a police package (RPO 9C1/9C3), the rear wheel spindle rods may cause rear wheel misalignment, resulting in lower tread depth on the inboard side of the rear tire.23

The Program Bulletin then outlines the steps dealers should take to remedy the defect and the payment procedures for the program. Under a section labeled “Customer Notification — For U.S. and Canada,” 24 the Bulletin states that “General Motors will notify customers of this program on their vehicle,”25 and refers dealers to an attached customer letter, which is dated June 2008. The letter states that the condition may cause “rear wheel misalignment, resulting in lower tread depth on the inboard side of the rear tires.”26 Other than the two notices described, the Morgenstein Plaintiffs do not allege any actions by Old GM with respect to the Impalas (with or without Police Packages) between 2008 and the time Old GM filed for bankruptcy in 2009.

The Morgenstein Plaintiffs allege that once Old GM entered bankruptcy, they *500were “not listed by Debtors as creditors of the estate,” despite Old GM’s earlier treatment of allegedly “identically-situated Impala Owners.”27 The Morgenstein Plaintiffs further allege that Old GM “had a duty to list Plaintiffs as scheduled creditors,” and “had a duty to disclose all material information, including the defective nature of Consumer Impalas.”28 As a result of these failures to disclose, the Morgen-stein Plaintiffs allege, the “Debtor caused the Plan to be confirmed upon materially false information.29 Finally, the Mor-genstein Plaintiffs assert that both the disclosure statement and the schedules were “executed by attorneys” representing Old GM.30

The Complaint seeks revocation of the Confirmation Order to the extent that it “precludes Plaintiffs ... from filing their claims, pursuing their rights, and otherwise taking appropriate action before this Court....”31

Discussion

While the GUC Trust makes what in substance are five points in its papers, two address issues that can and should be heard at a later time, if they still matter then.32 Only three need to be addressed now. In at least two of those respects, the Complaint is deficient, for reasons addressed below.

(1) Partial Revocation of a Confirmation Order

The GUC Trust’s first, and most fundamental, point is that a bankruptcy court has the power only to fully — and not partially — revoke a confirmation order entered under section 1144. The Court agrees.

As usual,33 the Court starts with textual analysis. Section 1144 of the Code, upon which the Morgenstein Plaintiffs rely, provides, in full:

On request of a party in interest at any time before 180 days after the date of the entry of the order of confirmation, and after notice and a hearing, the court may revoke such order if and only if such order was procured by fraud. An

*501order under this section revoking an order of confirmation shall—

(1) contain such provisions as are necessary to protect any entity acquiring rights in good faith reliance on the order of confirmation; and

(2) revoke the discharge of the debtor.

Textual analysis strongly favors the GUC Trust. Section 1144 authorizes the Court to “revoke such order,” but it does not also say, in words or substance, that the revocation may be “in part.” The word “revoke,” by its nature, is total, and absolute, a construction that is borne out by its definition, as derived from both legal 34 and lay35 authorities. Anything less would not be a revocation, but would instead be a modification, for which the Code has no provisions with respect to a confirmation order, but has separate provisions with respect to a plan, which could not be satisfied here.36 Nor does section 1144 say, in words or substance, that an order may be revoked with respect to any identified creditor, claim, or class of claims — one or more of which is what the Morgenstein Plaintiffs seek here.

Rather, section 1144 speaks to the order itself, which is understandable, since it would be the order as a whole that would be “procured by fraud.”37 Section 1144 simply does not say, as the Morgen-stein Plaintiffs would need it to say, that the Court can cherry pick, or otherwise choose, the components of the confirmation order that the Court desires to revoke.

Nor is there anything ambiguous, in this Court’s view (or, so far as the Court can tell in the view of any other court considering the matter), in section 1144’s text or effect in this regard. As Judge Shannon observed in one of the very few cases wherein it was even argued that a partial revocation of a confirmation order was permissible:38

The plain language of section 1144, however, only provides for revocation of an entire confirmation order.39

*502In argument going to textual analysis, or at least akin to it, the Morgenstein Plaintiffs argue, however, that section 1144(1), and the language leading into it, support their contention. The Court cannot agree. In fact, in the Court’s view, that language cuts the other way.

The language upon which the Morgen-stein Plaintiffs rely, which begins with a second sentence in section 1144, and then continues, provides:

An order under this section revoking an order of confirmation shall—

(1) contain such provisions as are necessary to protect any entity acquiring rights in good faith reliance on the order of confirmation.

Without a doubt, the quoted language evidences recognition by Congress of the very major consequences of the revocation of a confirmation order on anyone who might have acquired rights in good faith reliance upon it, and directs bankruptcy courts to take measures to address such concerns. But the quoted language neither authorizes, mentions, or even contemplates partial revocation of a confirmation order.40 Indeed, by making reference to the order as a whole (in contrast to the portion of the order being revoked), the quoted language once again underscores that it is the continuing existence (vel non) of the order as a whole, rather than the order as modified, that necessitates the protective provisions mentioned there.

Moving beyond textual analysis, the caselaw, to the extent it exists, once more supports the GUC Trust’s view. As the GUC Trust observes, “only a handful of courts have considered the issue.”41 But those courts’ conclusions have been consistent. What caselaw there is points in only one direction.

The clearest rejection of the notion that a confirmation order may be revoked in part appears in In re East Shoshone Hospital District,42 There, in a chapter 9 case,43 Chief Judge Myers rejected a contention that he could “partially” revoke confirmation in order to strike provisions of a plan. He stated, in that connection:

§ 901 incorporates by reference § 1144 which provides for revocation of an order of confirmation. The Debtor argues that it should be allowed to “partially” revoke confirmation in order to strike the plan provisions dealing with the Trust.

There is nothing in the statute, nor has there been authority provided by the Debtor, which recognizes or validates a theory of selective or partial revocation of a chapter 9 plan. Either an order of confirmation is revoked or it is not.44

The Morgenstein Plaintiffs, while acknowledging what East Shoshone Hospital *503District says, argue that the quoted remarks were dictum. It is not clear to this Court that they are. They were the first observations articulated by Chief Judge Myers in his analysis of the topic, before he then went on to say that “[additionally,” section 1144 would limit revocation of a confirmation order to the 180 day period provided under that section (and thus the motion before him was untimely), and, in a footnote, that section 1144 would authorize revocation only on a showing of fraud, which there had not been made.45 But even if his comments were dictum, they nevertheless are instructive, addressing the exact issue presented here.

Similarly, the Morgenstein Plaintiffs call into issue the GUC Trust’s reliance on Judge Shannon’s analysis of the topic in Northfield Labs, discussed above. The Morgenstein Plaintiffs are right in their point that the GUC Trust did not quote the entirety of Judge Shannon’s observations, and that on full reading, it should be determined that he did not definitively decide the issue presented here. But that is as far as the distinction takes them.

The entirety of Judge Shannon’s observations on the subject was:

Plaintiffs appear to request partial revocation of the Plan limited to “such portion of the Plan to reflect such subordination.” (Compl. 65). The plain language of section 1144, however, only provides for revocation of an entire confirmation order. It is unclear whether partial revocation is permissible pursuant to section 1144 and Plaintiffs have cited no case law in this regard. Most importantly, however, Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts showing that the Confirmation Order was procured by fraud.46

When that language is read in its totality and in context, it is best read, in this Court’s view, to say that Judge Shannon thought it was doubtful that partial revocation was permissible, but that he didn’t need to decide the issue. Nevertheless, the Court finds his thinking helpful and instructive, as tending to reinforce (or at the very least not contradict) the conclusions that would flow from textual analysis and East Shoshone Hospital District.47

Against all of this, the Morgenstein Plaintiffs offer up no case that has ever held that a bankruptcy court can partially revoke an order of confirmation. The relevant authority, even if dictum, tips dramatically to the contrary.

The Morgenstein Plaintiffs further respond to the foregoing by saying that none of the cases discussed above are binding on this Court, even if not dictum. That of *504course is true. But this Court nevertheless cares very much about the views of its bankruptcy judge colleagues, in whatever district they sit, especially since they so well understand the way provisions of the Code fit together, and the context in which they issue their decisions.48

The Morgenstein Plaintiffs further contend, or at least imply, that they are not seeking “partial revocation,” but instead are seeking “limited revocation,” or “carefully crafted” revocation.49 That is simply a play on words. Aside from the lack of distinction in any of the alternative euphemisms that the Morgenstein Plaintiffs choose to describe the relief they seek, the underlying goal, and problem, remains the same. The Morgenstein Plaintiffs (understandably) do not seek to revoke the Confirmation Order in its entirety, and the lesser relief they seek — even with the “carefully crafted” safeguards they say the Court should impose- — cannot seriously be argued to be anything other than partial revocation.

Finally, the Morgenstein Plaintiffs have offered no persuasive reason to reject the views of the Court’s colleagues in other districts, or to depart from the Court’s inclination after textual analysis. “A confirmed plan takes on the attributes of a contract.”50 Though under the Code, unanimity of acceptance of a reorganization plan is not required, requisite levels of acceptance by affected classes (in both number and amount) must be obtained51— after disclosure, in detail, as to how affected parties will be treated, and what they should know. Though a contract (like an order confirming a reorganization plan) may be rescinded in its entirety because it was induced by fraud, modification of a contract only in part, without revoking it in whole, raises grave risks of upsetting the expectations of those who provided the necessary assents. Similar considerations apply to selective revocation of a confirmation order, as plans and confirmation orders typically work hand-in-hand in defining the stakeholders’ rights.

*505The Complaint must be dismissed on the GUC Trust’s first ground alone. A bankruptcy court cannot partially revoke a plan.

(2) Fraud Upon the Court

Then, noting that fraud (which must be on the Court)52 is the only basis upon which the Confirmation Order may be revoked, the GUC Trust further contends that here fraud has not been satisfactorily alleged with the particularity Civil Rule 9(b) requires — thus requiring dismissal of the Complaint for this additional reason as well. The Court agrees.

Rule 9(b) provides:

In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.

Here the substance of the claim of fraud is that Old GM knew that the design defect was in all of Old GM’s 2007 and 2008 Impalas (and not just those that had the Police Package), and that Old GM intended to defraud the Court by failing to disclose that deficiency and make allowance for the resulting liability when Old GM confirmed a plan of liquidation. A variant is that Old GM had a duty to list the Morgenstein Plaintiffs as scheduled creditors. But the allegations underlying these claims fail to meet the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, much less the more stringent requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b).53

To secure relief under section 1144 of the Code,' a movant must point to specific acts of the debtor evidencing actual fraudulent intent.54 Here sufficient allegations of that character are lacking.

Initially, the Court must observe that the allegations that Old GM knew of the design defect with respect to 2007 and 2008 Impalas generally are conclusory statements, supported by no evidentiary facts. Of course, the Morgenstein Plaintiffs ask the Court to draw an inference that Old GM knew, because of an alleged lack of material difference in the design of Impalas’ rear wheel spindle rods between those with the Police Package and those without, but without more this is in substance a claim that Old GM should have knoum that the alleged design defect was *506more widespread. That might support allegations of negligent misrepresentation (assuming a misrepresentation or duty to speak), but without more it does not support allegations of fraud, especially a fraud upon the Court. No facts are set forth establishing that Old GM actually knew the defect was more widespread. Nor are facts alleged evidencing a decision by the Debtors to deny notice to any of the named plaintiffs, or, for that matter, the 400,000 or so owners of 2007 and 2008 Impalas.55 Inference, without more, is insufficient.56

Though under Rule 9(b), intent may be alleged generally, it still is necessary “to allege facts that give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent.”57 Since Rule 9(b) is intended “to provide a defendant with fair notice of a plaintiffs claim, to safeguard a defendant’s reputation from improvident charges of wrongdoing, and to protect a defendant against the institution of a strike suit,”58 the relaxation of Rule 9(b)’s specificity requirement for scienter “ ‘must not be mistaken for license to base claims of fraud on speculation and conclusory allegations.’ ”59 To serve the purposes of Rule 9(b), the Second Circuit thus requires plaintiffs to allege facts that give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent.60

The requisite “strong inference” of fraud may be established either (a) by alleging facts to show that defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or (b) by alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness.61 Here the Court finds neither.

With respect to the first alternative basis, Old GM’s “motive and opportunity,” the Court does not need to decide whether a company continuing in business would be defrauding its consumers if it knew of, but failed to address, the alleged design defect. Here, where a company was liquidating and the necessary fraud must be shown to have been upon the Court, motive and opportunity (and especially the former) were lacking. We here had a plan of liquidation; Old GM would not survive. It would simply be taking whatever assets it had and distributing them, pari passu, to its creditors. If Old GM had known of, and disclosed, the design defect that is alleged, it would have (or at least could have) put up for confirmation the exact same liquidation plan, and the plan would have been just as feasible. If a class claim had been disclosed and ultimately allowed (or reserved for), individual creditors’ pari passu shares of the available pot would *507have been less, of course (and that no doubt would have been of concern to them), but neither the Plan, nor any judicial action by this Court, would be any different. The Court can find no motive.62

Though technically speaking, any plan proponent putting forward a plan for confirmation has an “opportunity” to defraud the Court, in this context “opportunity” must mean something more. It should mean a juncture in the case where the plan proponent reaches the decision point (or “opportunity”) to present a plan that would not defraud the Court, and elects not to do it. Here that too is lacking.

With respect to the second alternative basis, “strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness,” the necessary allegations likewise are lacking. There are no facts alleged that give rise to the inference that Old GM had an intent to keep facts from the Court of which Old GM was aware.63 Allegations of this character, as previously noted, are essential, because, as previously noted,64 the fraud must be on the Court, and not directed at anyone else or floating in the air.

There are no facts alleged suggesting that Old GM creditors, who overwhelmingly voted to support the Plan,65 would have voted differently in the absence of the alleged fraud — a consideration that Judge Hardin of this Court found significant in addressing a similar request for section 1144 relief to advance a private agenda.66 *508Likewise, there are no facts alleged supporting a conclusion that Old GM made a decision not to give notice to Morgenstein, Jacob or Carpenter (or other 2007 and 2008 Chevy Impala owners), or not to list them as creditors of the Old GM estate, or even that Old GM regarded them as creditors of the Old GM estate, to whom it would not give notice.

Thus this case has marked similarity to Spiegel>67 where Judge Lifland dismissed a complaint premised on conclusory statements that the complainants were known creditors of the chapter 11 debtor.68

Thus the Complaint must also be dismissed for its deficiencies in pleading a fraud upon the Court.

(S) Equitable Mootness

The GUC Trust also moves to dismiss on a third ground, equitable mootness, in light of the Debtors’ earlier distribution, under the confirmed Plan (which went effective in March 2011, many months ago),69 of millions of publicly traded shares and warrants of New GM, and the continuous trading of those securities since that time.

The equitable mootness prong of the GUC Trust’s dismissal motion is not the slam dunk it once was70 — by reason of the Morgenstein Plaintiffs’ statement to this Court at oral argument, after the GUC Trust filed its motion, that they would not seek to make the holders of those seeuri*509ties give them back.71 But apart from the fairness concerns that would result even from the Morgenstein Plaintiffs’ modified requested relief, mootness concerns may very well still exist, because (the Court suspects but is not in a position yet to find that) hundreds of thousands (or more) of shares and warrants, with a value of many millions (or more) of dollars, traded since the Plan became effective, having been bought and sold based on estimates of Plan recoveries premised on the claims mix at the time the Plan was confirmed.

It is very possible that — even if those who already received stock and warrants under the Plan weren’t required to give back what they already received — all of the trading that took place after entry of the Confirmation Order (in what probably was in reliance on the Plan and Confirmation Order as then entered, and the related Disclosure Statement as then approved) by itself would support a finding of equitable mootness. But the evidence of the nature and extent of the trading after the Plan’s Effective Date, the understandings on which it took place, and remaining resources to satisfy late filed claims if allowed is thin on this motion, and goes beyond what courts normally consider on motions under 12(b)(6).72 Under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(d), that evidence is more appropriately considered on a motion under Rule 56. Thus dismissal under this prong of the GUC Trust’s motion is denied without prejudice, in the event that it ever matters in light of the Court’s dismissal of the Morgenstein Plaintiffs’ Complaint under the first two bases upon which the GUC Trust moved.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted.73 Concurrently with the issuance of this Decision and Order, the Court is issuing a separate stand-alone judgment, pursuant to Fed.R.Bankr.P. *5107058 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 58, denying the relief sought in the Complaint.74

SO ORDERED.