MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING LANDLORD’S MOTION PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 9024

The matter before the Court is the motion [ECF Doc. No. 671; AP ECF Doc. No. 662] (the “Motion”)3 of 1032-1034 Lex. Ave. Ltd. (the “Landlord”), the former landlord of PBS Foods, LLC d/b/a Payard Patisserie & Bistro (the “Debtor”) under Rule 9024 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Bankruptcy Rules”) for relief from an order of this Court, dated November 5, 2014 [ECF Doc. No. 57] (the “Rule 9019 Order”), approving a settlement and compromise of all claims asserted in this adversary proceeding (the “Settlement Offer”) by and Yann Geron (the “Trustee”), as plaintiff and chapter 7 trustee of the Debtor’s estate, against Holding Capital Group, Inc. (“HCG”), and FP Holdings, LLC (“Holdings”, and collectively with HCG, the “Defendants”).

The Landlord contends that it is in possession of “newly discovered evidence” *590(defined infra p. 595 as the “New Documents”) which should have been produced by the Trustee in response to the Landlord’s discovery requests relating to the Trustee’s motion under Bankruptcy Rule 9019 for approval of the Settlement Offer [ECF Doc. No. 45] (the “Rule 9019 Motion”) and which, if considered by the Court, would have altered the Court’s decision to approve that motion. The Landlord also contends that a review of the contents of the New Documents proves that during the Renewed Rule 9019 Hearing (defined infra p. 593) the Trustee mispresented facts to the Court. The Landlord asserts that in the face of that conduct, and pursuant to Rules 60(b)(2), (3), and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made applicable herein by Bankruptcy Rule 9024, this Court should vacate the Rule 9019 Order. The Trustee and the Defendants oppose the Motion.4

The Rule 9019 Order is the subject of a pending appeal, and, accordingly, the Court has no jurisdiction to grant the Motion. Nonetheless, under Bankruptcy Rule 8008(a), the Court is authorized to (i) defer considering the Motion, (ii) deny the Motion, or (iii) issue an indicative ruling by stating that the Motion raises a substantial issue or that the Court would grant the Motion if the District Court remands the matter for that purpose. Based upon the record of this matter, and as explained below, the Court finds that the Landlord has not established a right to relief from the Rule 9019 Order. Accordingly, the Motion is DENIED.

Jurisdiction

This Memorandum.Decision constitutes our findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 52(a), as made applicable herein by Bankruptcy Rules 7052 and 9014(c). The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(a) and the Amended Standing Order of Referral of Cases to Bankruptcy Judges of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, dated January 31, 2012 (Pres-ka, C.J'.) This is a “core proceeding.” See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (B).

Background5

On September 17, 2009 (the “Petition Date”), the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 7 of Title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) in this court. After the Petition Date, the Trustee qualified and is currently serving as chapter 7 trustee of the Debtor’s estate. Prior to the Petition Date, the Debtor operated as a restaurant in New York City in premises leased to it by the Landlord. The bankruptcy filing was precipitated, in part, by a dispute between the Debtor and the Landlord arising out of Debtor’s alleged breach of its lease. The Landlord may be the Debtor’s largest creditor, having filed an unsecured *591claim in the sum of $1,282,577.70 based, in part, on a prepetition judgment against the Debtor.

On or about September 16, 2011, the Trustee commenced this adversary proceeding to avoid and recover certain transfers of funds by the Debtor to the Defendants, and for related relief. The underlying complaint [AP ECF Doc. No. 1] (the “Complaint”) pled eight causes of action. Only Count Eight is relevant to the Motion.6 In support of that count, the Trustee alleged that on May 31, 2006, the Debtor, for no consideration, entered into a six year Trademark'License Agreement (“Licensé Agreement”) with Payard Management LLC (“Management”) to license all the trademarks, images and other items to which the Debtor had á right, title and interest (collectively, the “Marks”) including^ without limitation, the personal image and logo of the Debtor’s principal, Francois Payard (“Mr. Pa-yard”). See Compl. ¶¶ 72-74. The Trustee contended that after executing the License Agreement, Management entered into sublicenses with entities worldwide, and, since May 31, 2006, Management had been profiting from the use of the Marks under the License Agreement, including the receipt of $20,000/month under various sublicensp agreements. Id. at ¶¶77, 78. Mr. Payard was the Debtor’s sole equity holder and operating manager. Id. at ¶75. Holdings and Mr. Payard jointly owned Management. Id. at ¶76. The Trustee alleged that Holdings, as a 50% member of Management, “has ■ profited fi’om the [License] Agreement and the exploitation of the Marks without having compensated the Debtor” (•id. at ¶ 79) and “has been unjustly enriched in the form of revenue it has received under the [License] Agreement and as a member of Management.” Id. at ¶80. Thus, the Trustee contended that “he is entitled to recover from ... Holdings the value of all income ... Holdings has received under the [License] Agreement from May 31, 2Ó06 to the present time.” Id. at ¶ 81. Defendants did not file an answer or otherwise move with respect to the Complaint.

Simultaneously with the commencement of this proceeding, the Trustee filed complaints against Management,7 Mr. Payard,8 and FR Ventures LLC (“Ventures”)9 seeking, among other things, to avoid and recover payments made to them by the Debtor aggregating approximately $550,000 as alleged preferences and fraudulent conveyances under §§ 547, 548 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. In the Pa-yard Complaint, the Trustee also asserted damage claims based on the License Agreement. Payard Compl. ¶¶ 43-55. He alleged that Mr. Payard “breached his. fi*592duciary duty to the Debtor by diverting the business opportunity of exploiting the Marks through the [License] Agreement with Management, for which the Debtor received no consideration.” Id. at ¶ 51. Accordingly, the Trustee sought “to recover from [Mr. Payard] the value of all income [Mr. Payard] has received under the [License] Agreement from May 31, 2006 to the present time.” Id. at ¶ 52. Alternatively, he contended that, like Holdings, Mr. Payard had been “unjustly enriched in the form of revenue he has received under the [License] Agreement and as a member of Management.” Id. at ¶ 54. The three actions were resolved by a single settlement agreement, dated June 7, 2012 [11— 02716 AP ECF Doc. No. 13-1] (the “Pa-yard Settlement”),10 which was approved by this Court, over the Landlord’s objection, by order dated September 13, 2012.11 The Landlord did not appeal or otherwise challenge that order.

In January 2014, the Trustee filed the Rule 9019 Motion for authorization to settle this adversary proceeding. The Settlement Offer called for (i) Defendants to make a one-time payment of $105,000 to the Trustee; (ii) Holdings to waive its $726,131 claim against the estate; and (iii) Defendants to each waive their claims against the estate under § 502(h) of the Code, all in full satisfaction of any and all estate claims against the Defendants. See Rule 9019 Motion ¶¶ 2, 10. A héaring on the Rule 9019 Motion was originally scheduled for January 29, 2014, but was adjourned on consent at the request of the Landlord to March 11, 2014 (the “First 9019 Hearing”).12 Notwithstanding the Landlord’s prior activity in this case, and, *593in particular, its opposition to the Payard Settlement, the Landlord did not initially file any written response to the Rule 9019 Motion. Its counsel did appear at the First 9019 Hearing to request that the hearing be adjourned and that the Landlord be given additional time in which to file an objection to the Settlement Offer. Mar. 11, 2014 Tr. at 6:9-10. The Court (Grossman, J.)13 denied that request and, at the conclusion of that hearing, granted the Rule 9019 Motion and directed the Trustee to submit a proposed order. Id. at 2:22-23; 6:9-12; 7:13-14; 8:13-14. The Trustee did not do so. Rather, he treated the motion as having been adjourned sine die and initiated discussions with the Landlord in an effort to resolve the Landlord’s objection. Those discussions grew out of the Court’s suggestion during the First 9019 Hearing that the Landlord consider purchasing the estate’s claims against the Defendants and prosecuting them for its own benefit. Mar. 11, 2014 Tr. 5:18-19. The Court explained that since the Landlord believed the estate’s claims were worth substantially more than the Defendants were offering in the Settlement Offer, the Landlord might be prepared to “sweeten” the offer on the table, and pay the estate more than the Defendants were offering. Id. at 7:14-16; 8:5-6. That way the estate would enhance its recovery on account of those claims, and the Landlord would preserve for itself the upside it believed it could realize by prosecuting the claims. The parties were not able to reach an agreement, as the Trustee rejected the Landlord’s offer to purchase the claims (the “Amended Revised Offer”). The Trustee set the matter for further hearing. On October 28, 2014, the Landlord filed formal written opposition to the Rule 9019 Motion [AP ECF Doc. No 30] (the “Landlord’s Settlement Objection”). After a renewed hearing on November 4, 2014 (the “Renewed Rule 9019 Hearing”),14 the Court granted the Rule 9019 Motion on the record, and on November 5,2014 entered the Rule 9019 Order (i) overruling the Landlord’s Settlement Objection, (ii) granting the Rule 9019 Motion, and (iii) approving the Settlement Offer.

The Landlord timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Rule 9019 Order [AP ECF Doc. No. 38] (the “Rule 9023 Motion”). Among other things, in support of that motion, the Landlord submitted the New Documents. Both the Trustee and the Defendants opposed the motion. On May 21, 2015, this Court held a hearing on the Rule 9023 Motion, and on May 29, 2015, denied that motion. See In re PBS LLC I, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 249, 187 L.Ed.2d 184 (2013). On June 12, 2015, the Landlord filed a Notice of Appeal in the Bankruptcy Court and identified the Rule 9023 decision and the Rule 9019 Order as the “subjects of appeal.” [AP ECF Doc. No. 61] (the “Appeal”).

The Landlord filed the Motion on October 15, 2015. By order dated November 12, 2015 [ECF S.D.N.Y. No. 12], the District Court (Kaplan, J.), on consent of the parties, stayed the Appeal pending this Court’s determination of the Motion. On *594November 24, 2015, the Court conducted a hearing on the Motion (the “Rule 9024 Hearing”).15

The Buie 9024 Motion

On three occasions, the Landlord has sought discovery from the Trustee regarding the payment of license fees to Management, Holdings and Mr. Payard. In 2012, in connection with the Payard Settlement, the Landlord and Trustee engaged in informal discovery pursuant to which the Landlord requested documents and information regarding license fees paid under the License Agreement to Mr. Payard and any related entities during the period 2006-2012, and specifically with respect to license fees paid by Brazilian licensees. See Graubard Certif. Ex. B.16 In January 2014 and December 2014, the Landlord sought discovery from the Trustee in connection with the Rule 9019 Motion and Rule 9023 Motion, respectively. Both times, the Landlord requested documents and information relating to the payment of license fees to Management and/or Holdings. 17

As part of his response to the Landlord’s discovery requests for the Rule 9023 Motion, the Trustee produced the following documents that he had failed to produce in response to the two earlier requests:

(a) A letter dated August 10, 2011 from Francois Payard to the Trustee concerning a license agreement and payment of license fees in the sum of $150,000 in 2007 ( the “August 2011 Payard Letter”);

*595(b) A license agreement dated January 5, 2007 between Payard Management LLC and Westin Chosen Seoul (“Wes-tin”) (the “2007 License Agreement”); and

(c) Pages from the Debtor’s general ledger with handwritten notations concerning license fee payments (the “General Ledger Pages”, and collectively with the August 2011 Payard Letter and the 2007 License Agreement, the “New Documents”).

Graubard Cértif. ¶27^)-(0), Exs. N, O, and P. Comradery

The Landlord argues that the Trustee’s failure to produce the New Documents in response to Rule 9019 discovery requests, coupled with his failure to acknowledge Management’s receipt of license fees in response to questions posed by the Court during the Renewed Rule 9019 Hearing, provide grounds under Rules 60(b)(2), (3) and (6) to vacate the Rule 9019 Order.18

The Trustee and Defendants oppose the Motion. They contend that it is time barred by Bankruptcy Rule 8002(b)(1)(D) because it was not filed within 14 days of the entry of the 9019 Order. They also argue that the Motion is meritless because the New Documents are not relevant to the license-related issues underlying Count Eight, and because the Trustee did not engage in any fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct in connection with the Rule 9019 Motion. The Court considers those matters below.

Discussion

Determining whether to grant a motion for relief from an order or judgment under Rule 60(b) is within the discretion the court. Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986). “Properly applied Rule 60(b) strikes a balance between serving the ends of justice and preserving the finality of judgments.” Id. The standard for granting Rule 60(b) motions is “strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Schlafman v. State Univ. of New York, Farmingdale, 541 Fed.Appx. 91, 92 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order) (quoting Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995)). Because such relief “is circumscribed by public policy favoring finality of judgments and termination of litigation ... the party seeking relief under Rule 60(b) bears the burden of establishing the grounds for such relief by clear and convincing evidence.” Info-Hold, Inc. v. Sound Merck, Inc., 538 F.3d 448, 454 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). “Motions for relief under Rule 60(b) are disfavored, and are reserved for exceptional cases.” Canale v. Manco Power Sports, LLC, No. 06 Civ. 6131, 2010 WL 2771871, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2010); see also Hoffenberg v. United States, No. 00 Civ. 1686, 2010 WL 1685558, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2010) (“Relief under Rule 60(b) is only warranted if the [party] presents ‘highly convincing’ evidence that demonstrates ‘extraordinary circumstances’ justifying relief.”) (citation omitted). Pursuant to Rule 60(c)(1), “[a] motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time — and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c).

*596The Motion does not run afoul of the one year limitation, as the Court entered the Rule 9019 Order on November 5, 2014, and the Landlord filed the Motion on October 14, 2015. In any event, the Trustee and Defendants do not contend that the Motion is time-barred under Rule 60(c).19

The Court first addresses application of Bankruptcy Rule 8002 to the Motion. Rule 8002(a)(1) states the general rule that “a notice of appeal must be filed with the bankruptcy clerk within 14 days after entry of the judgment, order, or decree being appealed. ” Fed. R. Banks. P. 8002(a)(1). Am exception to that rule applies to prospective appellants who, prior to filing an appeal of a judgment, seek relief from the judgment by motion under Bankruptcy Rule 9024. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(b)(1)(D). If that party files such a motion “within 14 days after the judgment is entered,” its time to appeal the judgment is extended and runs from the date of the order disposing of that motion. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(b)(1).

“As a general matter, ‘[t]he filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance — it confers jurisdiction on the [appellate court] and divests the [trial] court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” United States v. Rodgers, 101 F.3d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58, 103 S.Ct. 400, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982)). “This divestiture rule' is founded on ‘concerns for efficiency5 ... and the desire to protect ‘the integrity of the appellate pro-eess.5 ” Cibro Petroleum Products, Inc. v. City of Albany (In re Winimo Realty Corp.), 270 B.R. 99, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citations omitted). It applies to appeals filed in bankruptcy cases. Id. See also In re Millennium Global Emerging Credit Master Fund Ltd., 471 B.R. 342, 348 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[t]he filing of an appeal divests a bankruptcy court of jurisdiction over all aspects of the case that are the subject of the appeal.”) Thus, “a lower court may take no action which interferes with the appeal process or with the jurisdiction of the appellate court.” Dicola v. American Steamship Owners Mut. Prot. and Indem. Assoc., Inc. (In re Prudential Lines, Inc.), 170 B.R. 222, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citations omitted).

The Trustee and Defendants misplace their reliance on Bankruptcy Rule 8002 because it does not address the consequences of the filing of an appeal when, as here, the Motion was filed more than 14 days after the appeal was taken.20 Instead, Bankruptcy Rule 8008 is applicable. That rule “conforms bankruptcy practice to that of [Rule 62.1 of] the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and [Rule 12.1 of] the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure....” 10 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 8008.01, p. 8008-2 (16th ed. 2014) (hereinafter Collier). As relevant, the rule states:

If a party files a timely motion in the bankruptcy court for relief that the court lacks authority to grant because of an appeal that has been docketed and is pending, the bankruptcy court may:

*597(1) defer considering the motion;

(2) deny the motion; or

(3) state that the court would grant the motion if the court where the appeal is pending remands for that purpose, or state that the motion raises a substantial issue.

Fed. R. Bankr. P.8008(a).21 The rule “provides a procedure for the issuance of an indicative ruling when a bankruptcy court determines that, because of a pending appeal, the court lacks jurisdiction to grant a request for relief that the court concludes is meritorious or raises a substantial issue.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8008 Advisory Committee Note to 2014 Amendment. It applies “when a post judgment motion— such as a motion for relief from judgment under Civil Rule 60(b) made more than 14 day after entry of the judgment which does not suspend the time for filing a notice of appeal is made in the bankruptcy court at a time when a pending appeal has deprived the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction to decide the motion.” Collier, ¶ 8008.01, p. 8008-2.

Rule 8008, as amended, became effective December 1, 2014. See U.S. Supreme Court Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Apr. 25, 2014).22 It applies to cases pending as of the effective date, like this one, “insofar as just and equitable.” Id, The Court finds that it is just and equitable to apply the rule in this case.23 In doing so, the Court will not defer from considering the Motion. As explained below, the Landlord has not demonstrated a right to relief under Rule 60(b)(2), (3) or (6). Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 8008(a)(2), the Court will deny the Motion. The Court now reviews application of Rules 60(b)(2), (3) and (6) in this case.

Rule 60(b)(2)

Rule 60(b)(2) provides for relief from a final order based upon “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b).” Fed, R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2). A party seeking such relief must demonstrate that:

(1) the newly discovered evidence is of facts existing at the time of decision;

(2) the moving party is excusably ignorant of the facts despite using due diligence to learn about them;

*598(3) the newly discovered evidence is admissible and so important as to probably effect change in the result of the former ruling; and

(4) the newly discovered evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching of evidence already offered.

See United States v. Int'l. Bhd. of Teamsters, 247 F.3d 370, 392 (2d Cir. 2001); Mancuso v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 905 F.Supp. 1251, 1264 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

The Trustee and the Defendants do not dispute that the New Documents existed at the time of the Renewed Rule 9019 Hearing, or that the Landlord was excusably ignorant of their existence.24 Furthermore, they do not contend that those documents are inadmissible or merely cumulative of evidence already offered in connection with the Rule 9019 Motion. However, they deny that the Landlord is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(2). They contend that the documents are not relevant to the matters at issue in Count Eight,' and, as such, the Landlord’s use of those documents at the Renewed Rule 9019 Hearing would not have altered the Court’s disposition of the Rule 9019 Motion. Trustee Obj. ¶ 34. See also Defendants’ Obj. ¶ 15. The Landlord disputes that assertion, contending that the New Documents prove that Westin was paying $150,000/year in license fees to Management and that, as such, Count Eight had greater value to the estate than the Trustee represented at the Rule 9019 Hearing. See Graubard Certif. ¶¶ 38-39; see also Landlord Certif. ¶ 8 (The New Documents show “the License fees, monies coming in, and monies going out.”) The Landlord maintains that had the Court been aware of that value, it would not have approved the settlement. Motion. ¶ 55.

To establish a right to relief under Count Eight, the Trustee must prove either that Holdings was paid license fees by Management and/or the sub licensees, or that he could pierce Management’s corporate veil and recover from Holdings, as a 50% owner of Management, license fee payments paid to Management. The New Documents do not substantiate, let alone support, the allegations underlying Count Eight because they do not reflect the payment of license fees from any source to Holdings and provide no support for the Trustee’s veil piercing claims. Rather, those documents only show that: (i) Management was party to a license agreement with Westin (see 2007 License Agreement); (ii) in January 2007, Westin made a $150,000 payment to the Debtor (see August 2011 Payard Letter); (iii) the payment represented a fee owed by Westin to Management under the 2007 License Agreement (id.); and (iv) in December 2007, the Debtor transferred $150,000 to Management (see General Ledger). Nonetheless, at argument the Landlord contended that if those facts had been called to Judge Grossman’s attention, the Court would have taken them into account in determining whether the $105,000 cash payment called for under the settlement was adequate (Nov. 24 Tr. 43:15-19) and since they show that $150,000 was paid to Management under the 2007 License Agreement, the Court would have questioned the adequacy of the cash payment. *599(Id: at 39:3-6; 46:20-23). The Landlord also argued that had it been aware of the New Documents prior to the Renewed Rule 9019 Hearing, it could have conducted discovery by subpoenaing the law firm that prepared the 2007 License Agreement (id at 64:2-7).

Neither assertion provides grounds for granting the Motion. The Landlord has taken no discovery of HCG or Holdings on matters relating to the Rule 9019 Settlement, or otherwise. The Court finds no merit to the Landlord’s suggestion that until it had evidence of a single $150,000 license fee payment by Westin in 2007, it could not have formulated a reason to seek discovery from Holdings regarding Holdings’ receipt of license fee payments from Management. The Landlord was put on notice of the Trustee’s allegations against Holdings in Count Eight in September 2011, when the Trustee sued Holdings. Moreover, the Landlord admits that it was provided information in September 2012 from Management’s counsel concerning license fee payments totaling approximately $59,000 received by Management from licenses for Japan and Korea in 2008 and 2009. Graubard Certif. ¶¶ 8, 22, 33(d) and Ex. E. With the Complaint in this proceéd-ing pending at that time, the Landlord had the opportunity to seek discovery from Holdings on those allegations in connection with the Settlement Offer but did not do so and limited discovery, requests solely to the Trustee. Rule 9024 is not a vehicle for the Landlord to obtain discovery that it could have obtained years ago. Moreover, there is no reason to think that discovery would have revealed that Holdings received license fee payments from Management or otherwise. In a letter dated April 15, 2015, Debtor’s counsel advised the Landlord that the “$150,000 that was paid to [Debtor by Westin] in or about January 2007 was paid to [Debtor] by mistake, [Debtor] remitted same to [Management], which was the sub-licensor of Westin Cho-sun. The $150,000 was never distributed to [Holdings] and was used as working capital.” See Trustee Obj., Ex. 2 [AP ECF Doc. No. 69-2], Moreover, pursuant to the Payard Settlement,' the Court authorized the Trustee to transfer the Marks to Mr. Payard. See supra note 10.

Based upon our review of the record of the Renewed Rule 9019 Hearing, we do not believe that Judge Grossman would have found the New Documents probative of matters relevant to that hearing. First, as previously noted, those documents do not demonstrate either that Holdings was paid any license fee fees or that there is a basis for piercing Management’s corporate veil to make Holdings accountable for license fees paid to Management. The documents show that Management was paid $150,000 under the License Agreement, but the Trustee settled the estate’s claims against Management in the Payard Settlement. The New Documents do not contain information that is directly relevant to this action; it is unlikely that Judge Gross-man would have attached - much, if any, significance to them had the Landlord offered them in opposition to the Rule 9019 Motion. Moreover, although, in its objection, the Landlord claimed that the Settlement Offer did not adequately account for “the license fees that were generated and never paid to the Debtor that have been alleged in the complaint as the eighth cause of action,” (Landlord’s Settlement Obj. ¶'19), and that “it verily believe[d] that the license fees received over the years should be in the several hundred thousands of dollars,” id. the Landlord offered no evidence in support of that contention either in its objection or at the *600Renewed Rule 9019 Hearing.25 Rather, the crux of the Landlord’s objection to the Settlement Offer was that the Trustee erred in rejecting Landlord’s Revised Amended Offer in favor of that offer, not that the Trustee had not properly evaluated the strength of the estate’s claims against Holdings. Id. at ¶ 16 (After recounting events leading up to Landlord’s submitting its Amended Revised Offer (id. at ¶¶ 5-15), Landlord asserted that it was “left with no alternative but to present the Amended Revised Offer directly to the Court for its consideration as a higher and better offer than the Settlement Offer.”); Id. at ¶ 18 (“The Landlord objects to the Settlement Offer because in comparison to the Amended Revised Offer, there is less money ($25,000) going to creditors.”). The New Documents have no bearing on the adequacy of the Revised Amended Offer. For these additional reasons, the Court rejects the Landlord’s contention that access to the New Documents could have altered the outcome of the Rule 9019 Motion. Accordingly, the Landlord has not established a basis relief under Rule 60(b)(2). See, e.g., Atkinson v. Prudential Property Co., Inc., 43 F.3d 367, 371-72 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rule 60(b)(2) motion and holding that it was unlikely that newly discovered letter would change lower court’s determination that no written agreement existed between parties meeting statutory requirements for broker agreements because such letter also did not meet such statutory requirements); British Caledonian Airways Ltd. v. First State Bank of Bedford, Texas, 819 F.2d 593, 601-02 (5th Cir. 1987) (affirming district court denial of Rule 60(b) motion on ground that allegedly newly discovered evidence of collection letter did not justify granting motion because at most it showed negligence on defendant’s part, not the actual knowledge that the plaintiff needed to prove its case, and movant delayed in seeking discovery), reh’g denied; Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Edelson (In re Wildman), 859 F.2d 553, 558 (7th Cir. 1988) (denying Rule 60(b)(2) on basis that allegedly “newly discovered evidence” of partnership bankruptcy petition and references in a trustee fee petition may have established existence of partnership but not whether partnership owned interests in land trust where ownership was primary dispute).26

*601 Rule 60(b)(3)

Rule 60(b)(3) provides that a court may grant a party relief from a final order on the basis of “fraud ... misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). A Rule 60(b)(3) motion is not a vehicle for relitigating the merits of the challenged motion. Fleming v. New York Univ., 865 F.2d 478, 484 (2d Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). During the Rule 9019 Hearing, the Court and the Trustee engaged in the following colloquy with regard to Count Eight:

THE COURT: Hold it. Why do you think the eighth cause of action as he uses does not have the value he ascribes to it?

MR. CERON: My information is that those payments were not made. I can confirm it with counsel as well. Those payments were not made. And I want to just remind the parties that Mr. Graubard has not presented any evidence, has not investigated any evidence. The only allegations he’s making are allegations that I provided to him, information that I provided to his counsel, to him in connection with trying to understand what the claims were.

Nov. 4, 2014 Tr. 14:13-24. The Landlord contends that “[t]he specific statement by the Trustee on the record that he knows that no license fees were paid was clearly a material misrepresentation with regard to the payment of license fees.” Graubard Certif. ¶41. According to the Landlord, the New Documents establish that the statement was misleading. The Landlord further contends that the “Trustee’s words were not ambiguous and could not have been more succinct than the language actually used, i.e., he affirmatively represented that no license payments had been made in connection with the Debtor. The Court relied on the Trustee’s statement on the record.” Graubard Certif, ¶ 41(a) (emphasis omitted).

The Landlord asserts that the statement that there were no payments made under the License Agreement actually: (i) refers “to those license fee payments made from *602those entities in Las Vegas, Korea, Japan and Brazil that Payard acknowledged were in existence in his letter dated August 10, 2011 addressed to the Trustee (‘August 10th Letter’) and in the First Amended Employment Agreement between the Debtor and Payard ... in which Payard acknowledged the existence of ‘Brazilian licensee Payard Mercosul Ltda.”; (ii) confirms that “the payment of $150,000 that went to the Debtor and was then transferred to Management was a fortuitous error by the licensee therein Westin Cho-sun Seoul ... which highlighted the very existence of those license fees which underlie the unjust enrichment causes of action alleged as Count Eight”; (iii) establishes that “even if Westin had sent $150,000 directly to Management, that is exactly the type of license fee covered by the Count Eight, and which the Trustee claims was not made”; (iv) meant that “[I]t is the very payment of all license fees by the licensees there under to Management pursuant to the License Agreement for which the debtor received no compensation, that is the basis for [Count Eight]” and (v) “is a representation that no payments were ever made by any licensee to Management under the License Agreement [which ...] is incredible.” Graubard Reply Certif. ¶¶ 5-7. It further contends that the Trustee’s alleged misstatement is especially significant because (x) the Rule 9019 Motion did not address Count Eight and is completely silent with regard to the payment of license fees; (y) the Defendants never answered the complaint; and (z) the Trustee conducted no formal discovery of the Defendants. Graubard Cer-tif. ¶¶ 30-31. Finally it contends that the Trustee’s failure to produce the New Documents in connection with the Rule 9019 Motion coupled with the alleged misstatement constitutes both “misconduct” and “fraud” that is actionable under Rule 60(b)(3). Id. at 11 35, 42, 45.

The Trustee disputes the Landlord’s contentions and maintains that his statements on the record were accurate then and are still accurate today. Trustee Obj. ¶¶ 39, 43. He maintains that the $150,000 payment reflected in the New Documents “has no relation whatsoever to Defendants ____” and “was never distributed to ,.. Holdings.... ” Id. at ¶ 34. Further, he contends that “[t]he Landlord’s claim that the Trustee made a material misrepresentation to this Court clearly lacks merit and is nothing more than an attempt to misconstrue the Trustee’s statements on the record.” Id. at ¶ 39. “The Trustee’s comments were clearly referring to Defendants, as they were made at the hearing on the [Rule] 9019 Motion. The Landlord’s efforts to muddy the record fall far short of the ‘clear and convincing’ evidence necessary to show that the Trustee misrepresented any matters to this Court.” Id. at ¶40. Directly responding to the fraud allegation, the Trustee emphasizes that the “Trustee’s statements at the 9019 hearing regarding the fact that no license fees had béen paid were accurate and referring to Defendants in the instant adversary proceedings. The mere fact that the Landlord failed to understand the Trustee’s statement does not constitute fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the Trustee.” Id. at ¶ 43. The Court finds no merit to the Landlord’s contentions.27

*603To establish a right to relief under Rule 60(b)(3), the Landlord “must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the [Trustee] engaged in fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct” and establish that the “misconduct prevented [it] from fully and fairly presenting [its] case.” Catskill Dev., L.L.C. v. Park Place Entm’t Corp., 286 F.Supp.2d 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). ■ In asserting that the Trustee mispresented facts to the Court, the Landlord is not being faithful to what was actually stated at the hearing. The Court posed the question at issue in response to Landlord’s counsel’s assertion that the “eighth cause of action has a very, very large potential recovery and it was not even addressed in the underlying papers to this Court. They only addressed it for seven causes of action.” Nov. 4, 2014 Tr. 14:8-11. Thus, in responding to the Court’s question, the Trustee was not speaking to whether any license fee payments were made to the Debtor, he was speaking to whether any. license fees had been paid to Holdings, the defendant in Count Eight. Moreover, contrary to the Landlord’s assertion and as previously noted, the New Documents do not substantiate, or even support, the contention that Holdings received license fee payments from Management or otherwise. Nothing in- the New Documents supports a finding that Holdings received any license fee payments. The fact that the Debtor received one payment from a sub-licensee almost seven years prior to the Renewed Rule 9019 Hearing and thereafter transferred it to. Management would not have impacted the Court’s assessment of the merits of that, settlement. The Landlord has simply not brought forward any clear and convincing evidence, let. alone any evidence, that the Trustee misstated facts regarding the license fees to the Court.28

As used in Rule 60(b)(3), the term “fraud” means a [‘knowing misrepresentation of a material fact, or concealment of the same when there is a duty to disclose, done to induce another to act to his or her detriment.” Info-Hold, Inc. v. Sound Merch. Inc., 538 F.3d at 456 (citations omitted). Such fraud may include “deliberate omissions when a response is required by law or when the non-moving party has volunteered information that would be misleading without the omitted material.” Id. (citations omitted). As the Court has found that (i) the Trustee did not misrepresent facts .to the Court, and (ii) Geron did not deliberately withhold the *604New Documents from the Landlord, the Landlord cannot establish “fraud” for purposes of Rule 60(b)(3).

Nor does the Court find merit to the Landlord’s assertion that the Trustee’s failure to produce the New Documents in response to Landlord’s discovery requests is grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(3) based on “misconduct”. Graubard Certif. ¶¶ 42-44. Although the Court is satisfied that the Trustee did not intentionally fail to produce the New Documents in response to those requests — and notes that he produced them in connection with the Rule 9023 Hearing — it is settled that “even ah accidental failure to disclose or produce materials requested in discovery can constitute ‘misconduct’ within the purview of Rule 60(b)(3).” Catskill Development, 286 F.Supp.2d at 314 (collecting cases). See also Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 923 (1st Cir. 1988) (“ ‘Misconduct’ does not demand proof of nefarious intent or purpose as a prerequisite to redress — [Depending upon the circumstances, relief on the ground of misconduct may be justified ‘whether there was evil, innocent or careless, purpose.’ ”). See, e.g., Schultz v. Butcher, 24 F.3d 626, 630-31 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating that “although [plaintiff] claims the report was not withheld intentionally, the document was in her attorney’s possession at the time of the request, and the failure to produce such an important report which contained information helpful to an adversary’s position is not easily excused”, and finding misconduct under the purview of Rule 60(b)(3) where plaintiff inadvertently failed to produce documents in discovery); Catskill Development, 286 F.Supp.2d at 315 (concluding that defendant’s failure to produce tapes was “product of mistake [on defendant’s counsel’s] part”, that nonetheless “constituted ‘other misconduct’ pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3).”) (footnote omitted).

Assuming, arguendo, that the Trustee’s failure to produce the New Documents in response to the Landlord’s discovery requests in connection with the Rule 9019 Motion constitutes “misconduct” under Rule 60(b)(3), to obtain relief the Landlord must also show that the “misconduct substantially interfered with [its] ability to prepare [its opposition to the Rule 9019 Motion] and defend against the motion fully and fairly.” Monaghan v. SZS 33 Assoc., L.P., No. 89 Civ. 4900, 1992 WL 135821, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1992). The Landlord has failed to make that showing since, as discussed above, the Trustee’s inadvertent failure to produce the New Documents did not undermine, in any way, the Landlord’s ability to prepare for and oppose the Rule 9019 Motion. As such, the Landlord has not established grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(3). See Greiner v. City of Champlin, 152 F.3d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that opposing party’s withholding of psychological report did not constitute such fraud as to justify relief from the judgment, since withheld report was not admissible under Fed R. Evid. 404, not relevant, was cumulative, and would not have helped moving party if it had been available at the time of trial); Mauldlin v. Edwards (In re M/V Peacock), 809 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir. 1987) (determining that shipowners’ failure to disclose that their ship was not registered in accordance with particular federal statute did not support relief because moving party had incentive to investigate the issue and means to do so that were not affected by the opponent’s failure to make voluntary discovery because information was not exclusively within the control of opponent.).29

*606 Rule 60(b)(6)

Rule 60(b)(6) permits a court to grant a party relief from a final order for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). While the rule “allows courts to vacate judgments whenever necessary to accomplish justice,” relief under that rule “should be granted only in extraordinary circumstances.” Aczel v. Labonia, 584 F.3d 52, 61 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988)). See also DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266, 1272 (2d Cir. 1994) (confirming that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is appropriate where “the judgment [at issue] may work an extreme and undue hardship.”) “Rule 60(b)(6) is a broadly drafted ‘umbrella provision,’ which must be read in conjunction with the other sections of that Rule, and is applicable only where the more specific provisions do not apply.” PRC Harris, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 700 F.2d 894, 898 (2d Cir. 1983). Thus, relief under Rule 60(b)(6) cannot be predicated “on- one of the grounds for relief enumerated in clauses (b)(1) through (b)(5).” Williams v. 563-569 Cauldwell Assoc. LLC, No. 10 Civ. 09, 2013 WL 1344672 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013) (quoting Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 863, 108 S.Ct. 2194). Such motions must be denied. Id. Put another way, “if the reasons offered for rehef from judgment can be considered in one of the more specific clauses of Rule 60(b), such reasons will not justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6).” United States v. Int’l. Bhd. of Teamsters, 247 F.3d 370, 391-92 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

The Landlord contends that “rectifying a misrepresentation by [the] Trustee to the Court would qualify under subsection (6) based on the desire of the Court to maintain the integrity of the bankruptcy process on a fair and equitable basis to the Trustee, to the bankrupt estate, the creators and to the Bankruptcy Court itself.” Graubard Certif. ¶ 47. However, in doing so, it is merely restating the Landlord’s alleged grounds for relief under Rules 60(b)(2) and (3). That does not provide grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See, e.g., Teamsters, 247 F.3d at 391-92. The Landlord has not stated a right to relief under Rule 60(b)(6).30

*607 Conclusion

For all the foregoing reasons, the Landlord’s motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.