In re Grinnell
In re Grinnell
Opinion of the Court
This is a case of voluntary bankruptcy, the petition in which was filed on the 15th of October, 1873. The formal adjudication was made on the next day. On the 9th of September, 1873, the firm of Blake Brothers & Co. loaned to the firm of George Bird Grinnell & Co., a firm composed of the bankrupts as general partners, and of a special partner, the sum of $100,000, payable on demand, with simple interest, on a pledge and hypothecation of certain collateral securities deposited with the former firm by the latter firm, to secure the loan, the securities consisting of certain bonds and shares of stock. On the 18th of September, 1873, more shares of stock were added. Some- of the' shares of stock have been sold, and their proceeds applied towards the payment of the loan, and there is now due thereon $7(5.393.17, with interest from September 30th, 1873. On the 15th of September, 1873, a further loan was made of $25,000, payable on demand, with simple interest, on the pledge and hypothecation, as collateral security, of certain other shares of stock. No part of that loan has been repaid. On the 17th of September, 1873, a further loan was made of $150,000, payable on demand, with simple interest, on a pledge and hypothecation, as collateral security, of certain other shares of stock and certain other bonds. On the 18th of September, 1S73, more shares of stock were added. Some of the shares of stock have been sold, and the interest on some of the bonds has been collected, and the proceeds applied towards the payment of the last-named loan, and there is now due thereon $108,781.84, with interest from October 4th, 1873. On the 17th of September, 1873, a further loan Was made of $75,000, payable on demand, with .simple interest, on a pledge and hypothecation, as collateral security, of certain other shares of stock. On the 18th of September, 1873, more shares of stock were added. Some of the shares of stock have been sold, and the proceeds applied towards the payment of the last-named loan, and there is now due thereon $49,528, with interest from September 30th, 1873. All the said securities, except the shares of stock so deposited on the 18th of September, 1873, were deposited simultaneously with the making of the loans. To further secure said loans, and to cover any deficiency there might be on either of them, after applying thereto the specific securities on which it was made, and specially relating to it, the borrowers, on or about the ISth of September, 1873, deposited with, and pledged and hypothecated to. the lenders, certain other shares of stock and certain other bonds, and, on the 19th of September, 1873, made a further pledge and hypothecation to, and deposit with, the lenders, of certain other bonds. The securities not so sold are still held by the lenders. Each of the loans was made payable on demand, and under an understanding and agreement between the lenders and the borrowers, that, in case of any default in paying the same on demand, the lenders might immediately reimburse themselves for the amount due to them thereon, by a sale of the collaterals given to secure it. On the 20th of September, 1873, the lenders demanded from the borrowers the payment of the amounts due on all of the loans, but none of them were paid.
A petition is now presented to this court, by Blake Brothers & Co., setting forth the above facts, and further stating that they did not. at the time of the taking place of any of the foregoing transactions, know, or sus
This is an application to the court to direct a sale of the property, so as to ascertain its value, as between the pledgees of it and the estate of the bankrupts, in order to arrive at a basis for determining whether the pledgees will remain creditors of the estate, after deducting such value from their debt, or whether such value will pay the debt and leave a surplus for the estate. The application is supposed by the petitioners to be such an one as is provided for by the 20th section of the act, which contains this language: “When a creditor has a mortgage or pledge of real or personal property of the bankrupt, or a lien thereon, for securing the payment of a debt owing to him from the bankrupt, he shall be admitted as a creditor only for tile balance of the debt, after deducting the value of such property, to be ascertained by agreement between him and the assignee, or by7 a sale thereof, to be made in such manner as the court shall direct; or the creditor may release or convey his claim to the assignee upon such property, and be admitted to prove his whole debt. If the value of the property exceeds the sum for which it is so held as security, the assignee may release to the creditor the bankrupt’s right of redemption therein, on receiving such excess; or he may sell the property, subject to the claim of the creditor thereon; and, in either case, the as-signee and creditor, respectively, shall execute all deeds and writings necessary or proper to consummate the transaction. If the property is not so sold, or released and delivered up, the creditors shall not be allowed to prove any part of his debt.”
It is well settled, that a creditor holding security for a debt does not in any manner prejudice his claim to the security he holds by proving his debt, as a debt with security, and setting out in the proof the particulars of the security, and its estimated value. Such a form for a proof of debt is one of the forms prescribed by the supreme court. He does not, by such a form of proof, release his security, and prove his debt as an unsecured debt. On the contrary, such a form of proof insists on and maintains the security. Moreover, proving a debt, by such a form of proof, is a necessary prerequisite, if a secured creditor desires to maintain his security, and, at the same time, invoke the mode of procedure provided for by the 20th section. This is apparent, from a consideration of various provisions of the act, and the same provisions also show that the 20th section can have no operation until an assignee has been appointed or elected. The 14th section provides, that, when an assignee is appointed and qualified, and an assignment is made to him of all the estate, real and personal, of the bankrupt, such assignment shall relate back to the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy (which commencement is the filing of the petition, if followed by an adjudication), and that thereupon, by operation of law, the title to all such property and estate, both real and personal, shall vest in such assignee. The 14th section also provides, that all property conveyed by the bankrupt in fraud of his creditors, and all his rights of action for property or estate, real or personal, and for any cause of action which the bankrupt had against any person, arising from contract, and all his rights of redeeming such property or estate, shall, in virtue of the adjudication of bankruptcy, and the appointment of the assignee, be ht once vested in the assignee. The 14th section also-provides, that “the assignee shall have authority, under the order and direction of the court, to redeem or discharge any mortgage or conditional contract, or pledge, or deposit, or lien upon any property, real or personal, whenever payable, and to tender due per-, formanee of the condition thereof, or to sell the same, subject to such mortgage, lien, or other encumbrances.” The 17th of the general orders in bankruptcy, prescribid by the-
In view of all these provisions; it is impossible, to say that the sale contemplated by the 20th section can take place before an- as-signee is appointed. The assignee is the only person who can represent the creditors other than the particular secured creditor. Whether such other creditors are wholly unsecured ■or insufficiently secured, they have an interest in seeing that the debt of the particular secured creditor is duly proved, and is not fraudulent or illegal, and that the securities held for it are applied on it at their proper value, whether such value is ascertained by agreement between such particular secured creditor and the assignee, or by a sale. Before such application of the securities is made, the assignee has a right, on .behalf of such other creditors, to elect whether he will redeem the pledged property, by paying the debt and taking the property, or whether he will ask to have it sold subject to the lien, or whether he will give it up to the secured creditor on receiving an agreed sum as its excess of value over the debt. Nothing of all this can be done until there is an assignee.
But the distinct principle of these provisions is, that all valid liens which exist on the property of a bankrupt when the proceedings in bankruptcy are commenced are preserved, and will be respected by the bankruptcy court, and enforced, and allowed to be paid out of the proceeds of the property on which they are liens. It is, however, confided to the bankruptcy court to determine whether the debt is valid, and whether the lien is valid, and to regulate the disposition of the property on which the lien is claimed. For this purpose, in involuntary cases, power is given to the court, by the 40th section, to restrain the debtor and any other person from making any transfer or disposition of any part of the debtor’s property not excepted by the act from the operation thereof, and from any interference therewith. This power is to be exercised when the order to show cause is issued, and is intended to restrain the disposition of the debt- or’s property until there can be an adjudication of bankruptcy, and proper proceedings thereafter. The same effect results from the filing of a voluntary petition, for the debtor, in filing it, brings all his property under the protection and within the control of the court. It by no means follows, however, that the court will allow the assignee, or any of its officers, to take from the possession of pledgees occupying the position of bona tides and solvency which appears to be that of the present petitioners, property of the character of that pledged to them in the present case, unless such disturbance of their possession shall be adjudged in the course of, or as the result of. a suit to be brought by the assignee against them, to set aside the pledge as fraudulent or void, for some cause for which the .assignee has the right conferred on him, by the act. to set it aside in such a suit. Nor does it follow that, the debt and the lien not being disputed by the assignee, the court, while regulating the time and manner of selling such pledged property, will take it from the possession of such pledgees before, or for the purposes of, the sale, or take from their possession so much of its proceeds as may be necessary to discharge the debt due to them. It, nevertheless, remains true, that the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, whether voluntary or involuntary (if followed by an adjudication and the appointment of an assignee), operates, from the time of such filing, as a practical restraint on a pledgee of the property of the bankrupt, who is notified of such filing, from disposing of it otherwise than at his own risk, until the bankruptcy court can act in the premises. For it was held by Judge
[On the same point, see Case No.. 5,829.]
Reference
- Full Case Name
- In re GRINNELL
- Status
- Published