Johnson v. Califano
Johnson v. Califano
Opinion of the Court
Plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to section 205(g) of the Social Security Act
Plaintiff, a forty-six year old truck driver, claims an inability to work from October 15,1975 to June 8,1978 due to a back injury sustained when he fell in March 1975. He was treated at the Veterans Administration Hospital in the Bronx beginning in June 1975 and a diagnosis of slipped disc was then entered. After a follow-up visit in July 1975, the examining physician reported: “Much better; ready to return to work.” The outpatient records of the Hospital, covering the period from July 1975 through April 1977, note that plaintiff had a twenty-year history of chronic low back pain, but also state: “appears very well”; “no known trauma”; “no muscles spasm”; “no sensory deficit”; “no sciatica”; “full range of motion in lumbo-sacral spine.” He was also treated for high blood pressure of recent onset and advised to lose weight.
From September 1976 through June 1977, plaintiff was examined by five doctors, three of whom noted extensive Schmorl node formation in the lumbar spine. While this finding provided objective support for plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pam, specifically that his back is “basically unstable to excessive physical activities” such as prolonged lifting, stooping or bending, the doctors concluded that he was “capable of returning to sedentary work such as chauffeuring as long as he does not lift anything' heavy.”
Plaintiff testified at the hearing that his back condition had been exacerbated by the fall in March 1975; that his condition returns to normal for months at a time and then becomes painful for similar time periods; that he renewed his license after the injury occurred because he did not consider his condition a hazard to driving; that his leg and arm movements would not be affected by the pain while driving but that it was difficult to get into a sitting position and once seated it was hard to get up. He further testified that his activities since the injury included doing a little housework, shopping, walking, going to movies, sitting in the park and visiting with friends and relatives. Further, in August 1977 plaintiff actually drove a tractor-trailer and helped to load it apparently without difficulty.
William Mooney, a vocational expert specializing in rehabilitation of the disabled, testified at the hearing that plaintiff’s prior work as a tractor-trailer driver, which did not entail loading or unloading, is “medium” work; that assuming the restrictions and limitations plaintiff testified to, he would be able to perform such work on days when he was free of pain; that plaintiff’s skills as a truck driver were readily transferable to jobs in the “light and sedentary” category. He enumerated specific occupations that plaintiff with his back limitations would be capable of performing and that existed in significant numbers in the region where plaintiff lives.
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, supported by objective medical facts, indicate that he is afflicted with a back ailment. The inquiry does not end there,
For twenty years, while afflicted with a back ailment, plaintiff has driven tractor-trailers. Assuming his fall in March 1975 worsened his condition so that he could not resume his prior employment, a determination which the Secretary did not explicitly make,
The Secretary concluded that the plaintiff did not suffer functional limitations which would have precluded him from engaging in all types of substantial gainful activity during the period in issue. This
The motion of the Secretary for judgment on the pleadings rejecting plaintiffs claim is granted.
. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
. Id §§ 416(i), 423.
. Id. § 423(d)(1), (2)(A). See id. § 416(i)(l)(A).
. Id. § 405(g). See Cutler v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1282, 1285 (2d Cir. 1975); Gold v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 463 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1972); Kaminski v. Califano, 465 F.Supp. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
. Gold v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 463 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1972).
. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). See Bastien v. Califano, 572 F.2d 908, 912 (2d Cir. 1978); Deyo v. Weinberger, 406 F.Supp. 968, 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
. Bastien v. Califano, 572 F.2d 908, 912 (2d Cir. 1978). See Gold v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 463 F.2d 38, 41n. 2 (2d Cir. 1972).
. Pucci v. Richardson, 369 F.Supp. 1344, 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See Reyes Robles v. Finch, 409 F.2d 84, 87 (1st Cir. 1969); Kaminski v. Califano, 465 F.Supp. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Mejias v. Social Security Administration, 445 F.Supp. 741, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
. Id. § 423(d)(1). See id. § 416(i)(l)(A).
. On a finding that plaintiff is not able to return to his earlier employment, the burden shifts to the Secretary to demonstrate that he has the residual capacity to perform a specific job that exists in the national economy. Small v. Califano, 565 F.2d 797, 800 (1st Cir. 1977); McLamore v. Weinberger, 538 F.2d 572, 574 (4th Cir. 1976); Kenny v. Weinberger, 417 F.Supp. 393, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Gettys JOHNSON v. Joseph A. CALIFANO, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
- Status
- Published