Liu v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp.
Liu v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp.
Opinion of the Court
SECOND AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs, a group of investors, allege that Defendants, comprising a number of companies and the investment bank Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. (“CSFBC”), engaged in a concerted scheme to defraud the market by publishing artificially deflated revenue projections for the companies in which Plaintiffs invested. This scheme allegedly created a market environment in which investors expected each company to exceed its revenue forecasts.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Amy Liu filed her original complaint (the “Initial Complaint”) in the Southern District of Florida on February
III. THE PROPOSED SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
The following facts are alleged in the SAC, and are deemed true for the purposes of this motion.
A. The Parties
Plaintiffs allege that the following named plaintiffs purchased securities of various issuers in the open market during each relevant Subclass Period: Amy Liu purchased an undisclosed number of Commerce One securities; Antoine Kasprzak purchased 1,000 shares of Airspan securities; Robert Tenney purchased over 20,-000 shares of Commerce One securities; Robert Tate purchased 10,000 shares of Bsquare Corp. (“Bsquare”) securities; Mary Gorton purchased 5,350 shares of CacheFlow, Inc. (“CacheFlow”) securities; Carla Kelly purchased 3,500 shares of Efficient Networks, Inc. (“Efficient Networks”) securities; Henry Ciesielski purchased 200 shares of eMachines, Inc. (“eMachines”) securities and 45 shares of McData Corp. (“McData”) securities; Ed Grier purchased 7,900 shares of E.piphany, Inc. (“E.piphany”) securities; Frank Turk purchased 200 shares of Handspring, Inc. (“Handspring”) securities; Jennie Papuzza purchased 200 shares of InterNAP Network Services Corp. (“InterNAP”) securities; Stanley Warren, as trustee for the Warren Family Trust, purchased 1,000 shares of Lightspan Partnership, Inc. (“Lightspan”) securities; Ellen Dulberger purchased 1,000 shares of SupportSoft, Inc., formerly Support.com, Inc. (“Sup-portSoft”) securities; Craig Mason purchased 500 shares of Tanning Technology Corp. (“Tanning”) securities; Sharon Brewer purchased over 4,000 shares of Tumbleweed Communications Corp. (“Tumbleweed”) securities; and Lloyd Hinn purchased 1,000 shares of Tumbleweed securities.
Defendant CSFBC is a Massachusetts corporation doing business as an investment bank, and was at all relevant times a registered broker-dealer and member of the National Association of Securities
Plaintiffs name as defendants five of the sixteen Issuers (the “Issuer Defendants”), to wit: Efficient Networks, eMachines, Lightspan, Tanning, and Tumbleweed. Plaintiffs do not name as Issuer Defendants the other eleven Issuers managed by the- CSFBC Defendants, specifically Airspan, Commerce One, Bsquare, Cache-Flow, McData, E.piphany, Handspring, In-terNAP, Lante, New Focus, and Support-Soft.
B. The Conspiracy
Plaintiffs allege that various individuals affiliated with the Issuer Defendants who signed the registration statements associated with each company’s IPO (the “Issuer Individuals”)
C. Notice of Fraud
Plaintiffs allege that they were not put on notice of the alleged wrongdoing until counsel, while investigating the Initial Complaint, uncovered the scheme in February 2003.
D. The Class
Plaintiffs bring this suit on behalf of themselves and the members of a putative class (the “Class”) comprising all “persons and entities who purchased common stock of each Issuer” during the Class Period.
E. The Alleged Fraud
Plaintiffs allege that, while marketing its services to prospective Issuers, the Technology Group introduced a scheme called “Pop and Performance,” which is referenced by name on a number of marketing slides used by the Technology Group.
1. The CSFB Defendants
Plaintiffs allege that CSFBC had both the opportunity and motive to commit fraud.
Plaintiffs allege that CSFBC, Quattrone and the members of the Technology Group each had direct incentives to maximize the number of offerings they administered and ensure that each issuer’s stock price rose after its initial offering.
CSFBC, Quattrone and the Technology Group also benefitted by the increased demand both for the stocks they successfully promoted and' for their investment services.
Plaintiffs further allege that CSFBC had actual knowledge of its wrongdoing.
In July of 1998, CS agreed to establish a venture capital fund (the “Venture Fund”) managed by Quattrone, Boutros and Brady, contributing 99% of the fund’s equity through Merchant Capital, a CS subsidiary, and claiming 80% of the profits of the fund.
2. The Issuer Defendants
Despite the initial underpricing of their IPOs, the Issuer Defendants profited from the success of Defendants’ scheme.
Plaintiffs allege that each Issuer Defendant had actual knowledge of its fraudulently understated prices because it had engaged in detailed discussions with the Technology Group regarding IPO pricing, including the advantages of pricing an IPO artificially low.
3. The Sales Memo
Plaintiffs allege that the Technology Group’s standard practice was to communicate the actual value of an issue and the discounted proposed offering price to CSFBC’s sales staff using two documents, an internal “Equity Sales Book” and a “Sales Points Broadcast” (collectively referred to as the “Sales Memo”).
4. The Issuers’ Prospectuses
Plaintiffs allege that each Issuer’s prospectus, prepared for the Issuer’s IPO, contained numerous false statements regarding principal factors considered in determining the offering price.
5. CSFBC’s Research Reports
“CSFBC published research reports for each Issuer that contained statements discussing the revenues of each Issuer, including a projected income statement for each Issuer.”
6.Fraudulent Scheme and Deceitful Course of Business
Plaintiffs allege that CSFBC engaged in the conduct described above as part of its standard business conduct, and that its scheme was so successful and pervasive that it saturated the market with unreasonably high expectations for securities offerings managed by CSFBC and the Technology Group.
7. Reliance and Transaction Causation
Plaintiffs relied on the integrity of statements made in the Sales Memo and the research analysts’ reports, issued in the aftermarket for each Issuer’s stock, in addition to each Issuer’s prospectus in deciding to purchase shares of the Issuers’ securities.
8. Loss Causation
Plaintiffs allege that they were damaged because they paid artificially inflated prices for the Issuers’ securities that then fell when Defendants’ fraudulent scheme was disclosed.
The scheme of setting revenue forecasts so that they would be exceeded by actual revenues did not continue indefinitely; the fraud effectively ended when one of three events occurred: (1) the Issuer reported quarterly revenues that failed to exceed projected revenues; (2) the company announced prior to a full quarterly report
9. CS and CSG
Plaintiffs allege that CS and CSG participated in CSFBC’s fraud.
the following acts: (1) CS established and continued to operate the initial venture funds before alternative structures were proposed, (2) CS continued to establish and operate new venture funds utilizing the alternative structures, (3) CS appointed ... Frank Quattrone [ ] to the Board of its same subsidiary (Merchant Capital) which it used to provide capital to these venture funds, (4) CS directed its subsidiary (Merchant Capital) to continue and expand its venture fund activities with [Quattrone, Boutros and Brady] and the Technology Group, including the formation of new employee venture funds, and (5) CS created special sub-committees in its subsidiary (Merchant Capital) for the purposes of managing newly formed venture funds with the Technology Group and QBB.109
Plaintiffs allege that CSG also participated in the fraudulent activities of the Technology Group by authorizing Merchant Capital to undertake its alleged improper activities.
10. Insider Trading
The CSFB Defendants sold the stock of each Issuer in the aftermarket through the hedge funds established by Quattrone and through the venture funds created by QBB Management and Merchant Capital.
11. Destruction of Evidence
Plaintiffs allege' that members of the Technology Group, in anticipation of litigation, attempted to eliminate evidence of their wrongdoing at the direction of senior management, purposefully destroying records, files and other evidence relating to violations of securities law.
F. Claims for Relief
Plaintiffs assert the following claims on behalf of themselves and the Class:
I. 10b-5 Claims
Plaintiffs assert two causes of action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (the “Exchange Act”) and Rule 10b-5, 17
First, that the CSFB Defendants violated Rule 10b-5 by engaging in a scheme pursuant to which they issued false and misleading statements to the investing public in violation of their duty to disseminate accurate and truthful information, knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that such statements would affect the price and marketability of each Issuer’s common stock, and thus caused Plaintiffs to purchase stock at artificially inflated levels which thereafter fell, damaging Plaintiffs.
Second, that the Issuer Defendants violated Rule 10b-5 by engaging in a scheme pursuant to which they issued false and misleading statements to the investing public in violation of their duty to disseminate accurate and truthful information, knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that such statements would affect the price and marketability of each Issuer’s common stock, and thus caused Plaintiffs to purchase stock at artificially inflated levels which thereafter fell, damaging Plaintiffs.
a. Misrepresentations Alleged in Plaintiffs’ 10b-5 Claims
In support of these claims, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “issued, caused to be issued, and participated in the issuance of false and misleading statements to the investing public ... and failed to disclose material facts to the public,” thereby hu-plementing their scheme.
The CSFB Defendants, through the Technology Group’s analysts, and with the knowledge of the Issuer Defendants, issued research reports containing understated quarterly and annual revenue forecasts and projected income statements for each Issuer.
CSFB’s sales force disclosed information from the Sales Memos to certain members of the investing public, predicting revenue growth.
The Issuers’ prospectuses described the means by which the offering price was determined, but failed to state that the actual offering price was substantially discounted from the calculated appropriate price to ensure initial high performance.
b. Fraudulent Scheme Alleged in Plaintiffs’ 10b-5 Claims
Plaintiffs further allege that all Defendants shared the common purpose of “creating the illusion of ever rising stock prices so that [ ] Defendants could profit from the sale of resulting over-priced securities owned by them and induce Plaintiffs and the members of the Class to purchase common stock at artificially inflated prices.”
Plaintiffs allege that CSFBC’s repetition of material misstatements for each Issuer it managed constituted a deceitful course of business.
2. Plaintiffs’ 20(a) Claims
Plaintiffs assert four additional claims under section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t.
First, that CSFBC violated section 20(a) through its control of the Technology Group and power to direct the operations of the Technology Group, and through its failure to fulfill its duty to the public as an underwriter and broker with respect to the actions of the Technology Group.
Second, that CS violated section 20(a) through its control and ownership of the Technology Group and power to direct the operations of the Technology Group and its failure to fulfill its duty to the public as an investment advisor, broker or dealer, with respect to the actions of the Technology Group.
Third, that CSG violated section 20(a) through its control and ownership of the Technology Group and CSFBC, its power to direct the operations of the Technology Group and CSFBC and its failure to fulfill its duty to the public as an investment advisor, broker or dealer, with respect to the actions of the Technology Group and CSFBC.
Fourth, that each Issuer Defendant violated section 20(a) through its employment and control of the Issuer Individuals during the perpetration of the Issuer Individuals’ alleged fraud, and through the Issuer Defendants’ power to control or influence the specific corporate policy that governed its business operations.
A. Leave To Amend
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may amend its pleading “only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave should be freely given when justice so requires.”
Leave should only be denied for reasons such as undue delay on the part of the moving party, bad faith, repeated failure to cure deficiencies in pleading, undue prejudice or futility of the amendment.
B. Standing
Only an actual purchaser or seller of a security has standing to sue under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.
C. Statute of Limitations
1. Period
Under section 9(e) of the Exchange Act, “No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section, unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation.”
On July 30, 2002, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the “Act”), which provides, in pertinent part, that:
[A] private right of action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws, as defined in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(47)), may be brought not later than the earlier of—
(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation; or
(2) 5 years after such violation.149
The Act goes on to state that “Nothing in this section shall create a new, private right of action.”
2. Notice
A plaintiff in a federal securities case will be deemed to have discovered fraud for purposes of triggering the statute of limitations when a reasonable investor of ordinary intelligence would have discovered the existence of the fraud.... Moreover, when the circumstances would suggest to an investor of ordinary intelligence the probability that she has been defrauded, a duty of inquiry arises, and knowledge will be imputed to the investor who does not make such an inquiry.151
Facts triggering a duty to inquire are frequently termed “storm warnings.”
Available information must establish “a probability, not a possibility” of fraud to trigger inquiry notice.
Once sufficient storm warnings appear, “plaintiffs must exhibit ‘reasonable diligence’ in investigating the possibility that they have been defrauded. If they fail to meet this obligation, plaintiffs will be held to have had ‘constructive knowledge’ of the fraud against them.”
y. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment would be futile, for a number of reasons, and that leave to amend should accordingly be denied.
A. Lante and New Focus
Plaintiffs identify sixteen companies whose securities were tainted by the fraudulent scheme alleged.
Plaintiffs’ response to this challenge is twofold. First, “[w]hile the Plaintiffs understand that actual purchasers or sellers are needed of stocks ... in this instance with the similar if not identical claims, having such a high percentage of the stocks satisfies the standing issue.”
Defendants further argue that any future requests for leave to amend with respect to Lante and New Focus should be denied.
B. Inquiry Notice
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ 10b-5 claims are time-barred.
Defendants contend, with the help of an attractively rendered full-color chart, that,
even if the longer, “two years from discovery” rule enacted as part of the Sar-banes-Oxley Act [ ] were to apply ..., and even if the proposed new claims were held to relate back to the filing of the original complaint ..., and even if the filing of the original class action complaint were deemed to toll the statute of limitations for the new plaintiffs ..., the new claims are time-barred and leave to amend should be denied.176
Defendants’ contention regarding the expiration of the statute of limitations is compelling only if one or more of the events they describe actually sufficed to place Plaintiffs on inquiry notice more than one (or two) years before they filed the SAC. Plaintiffs contend that they did not have access to sufficient facts to trigger inquiry notice “until the original Plaintiff, Amy Liu, retained counsel who uncovered the fraudulent scheme in February 2003.”
1. The Press Accounts
Defendants point to a number of articles in readily accessible publications prior to January 2001 that refer to the same circumstances as Plaintiffs’ description of the “Pop” — the immediate rise in post-IPO stock price — that was part of Defendants’ scheme to defraud.
However, these articles, while clearly triggering inquiry notice for plaintiffs claiming damages deriving from fraudulently manipulated IPOs, say nothing about the actual scheme alleged to have damaged Plaintiffs in the instant case. It is true that many of Plaintiffs’ allegations assert IPO underpricing,
If substantially all of the factual allegations in the SAC reflected information available in January 2001, then Plaintiffs’ claims would necessarily be barred. Similarly, if Plaintiffs had knowledge of sufficient facts by that time to “be capable of perceiving the general fraudulent scheme” alleged, they would have been placed on inquiry notice at that point and, again, Plaintiffs’ claims would be barred.
Chuck Hill, research director at First Call, a firm that collates analysts’ estimates, condemns another increasingly common and deceptive practice of deliberately understating a company’s expected earnings.
He says: “Nowadays it is imperative not to miss your estimates (because the market will punish the stock). More and more firms are giving (confidential) low-ball guidance figures to analysts, knowing they can beat them. It is naive and it is going to end badly.”188
This passage certainly suggests that, by early 2000, some firms were fraudulently discounting their revenue estimates in an effort to manipulate investor sentiment. However, although the article does specifically refer to high-technology “bubble” stocks, it makes no mention of any of the Issuers by name, and does not suggest that CSFBC or any of the other Defendants were engaging in the practice of deliberately underestimating a company’s expected earnings. Moreover, the article does not claim that the low-ball figures were disseminated to the public. In fact, the dearth of publicity regarding the practice of discounting revenue estimates lends credence to Plaintiffs’ assertion that they did not become aware of Defendants’ practices until Plaintiffs’ counsel discovered them in February 2003. Moreover, the bulk of the articles produced by Defendants center on IPO underpricing and market manipulation designed to hype stock prices through tie-in agreements and analyst collusion (the subject of the consolidated Initial Public Offering securities litigation), further supporting Plaintiffs’ contention that the precise alleged fraud was not apparent before February 2003.
2. The Related Filings
Defendants similarly point to the filings in the In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation proceedings (No. 21 MC 92) as events that should have established inquiry notice. The filing of related lawsuits can suffice to put plaintiffs on inquiry notice, where the alleged fraud is similar.
3. The “Disclosing Events”
Finally, Defendants turn to the Disclosing Events themselves as sources of notice of potential fraud. A Disclosing Event — either a failure of a company to meet revenue forecasts, an announcement that the company would not meet fore
4. Reasonable Diligence
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs failed to discharge their duty of reasonable diligence in the face of purported “storm warnings,” and therefore should be charged with constructive notice of Defendants’ alleged fraud from the time when those storm warnings occurred.
Defendants point out that the SAC mentions only that counsel’s pre-filing investigation was performed “shortly before the filing of the original complaint in February of 2003,” and claim that such late discovery of the facts underlying the present action demonstrates a failure to diligently investigate the alleged fraud.
C. Claims of Proposed New Plaintiffs
Defendants assert that the amendment of the Complaint to include a new set of plaintiffs should be denied as time-barred on the following grounds: (1) that the proposed SAC should not relate back to the date of the Initial Complaint (February 28, 2003) because Plaintiffs have not satisfied the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(3), and (2) that tolling of the statute of limitations is unavailable because none of the named plaintiffs had standing at the time of the original complaint.
Both of these arguments rest on Defendants’ correct observation that, because “none of the plaintiffs who filed this action in February 2003 or joined it through the
VI. APPOINTMENT OF ROBERT TENNEY AS LEAD PLAINTIFF
Plaintiffs seek the appointment of Robert W. Tenney as lead plaintiff pursuant to the requirements of the PSLRA.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend their complaint is granted with respect to all claims except those arising from transactions in Lante and New Focus stock. Plaintiffs’ motion to add Robert W. Tenney as lead plaintiff is granted. Plaintiffs are directed to submit a revised proposed SAC, consistent with this Opinion, by June 4, 2004. The Clerk is directed to close these motions.
SO ORDERED.
. See generally Plaintiffs' Proposed Second Amended Complaint (''SAC”).
. See Issuer Defendants' Opposition to Motion to Amend Complaint ("Issuer Opp.”), at 2.
. See id.
. See id., at 3.
. See id.
. Id.
.See SAC ¶¶ 8-23.
. See id. ¶ 24.
. See id.; Ex. A to SAC.
. See id. ¶¶ 25-26.
. See id. ¶ 27.
. See id.
. See id. ¶ 28.
. Id.
. The Issuer Individuals are Mark A. Floyd, Efficient Network's CEO, President and Chairman; Jill S. Manning, Efficient Network's Vice President and CFO; John T. Ker-nan, eMachines' CEO and Chairman; Steven H. Miller, eMachines' CFO, Secretary, and Vice President; John T. Kernan, Lightspan's CEO and Chairman; Kathleen R. Mcelwee, Lightspan's Vice President and CFO; Larry G. Tanning, Tanning’s CEO, President and Chairman; Henry F. Skelsey, Tanning's Vice President, CFO and member of the Board of Directors; Jeffrey C. Smith, Tumbleweed's CEO, President and Chairman; and Joseph C. Consul, Tumbleweed’s Vice President and CFO.
. See id. ¶ 39.
. See id. ¶¶ 252-53.
. Id. ¶ 41.
. Id. ¶ 42.
. Id. ¶ 43.
. Id. ¶ 44.
. Id. ¶ 45.
.See id. ¶ 46.
. Id. ¶¶ 46-47.
. Id. ¶ 49.
. See id. ¶ 50.
. Id. ¶ 52.
. See id. ¶ 53.
. Id. The Subclass dates for claims arising from Plaintiffs’ purchase of each Issuer's securities follow: Airspan, 7/20/00 to 1/31/01; Bsquare, 12/7/00 to 7/6/01; CacheFlow, 12/7/00 to 2/1/01; Commerce One, 12/7/00 to 3/2/01; eMachines, 3/24/00 to 6/19/00; Efficient Networks, 7/15/99 to/VOl; E.piphany, 12/7/00 to 3/2/01; Handspring, 12/7/00 to 3/27/01; InterNAP, 12/7/00 to 3/6/01; Lante, 2/11/00 to 10/3/00; Lightspan, 2/10/00 to 8/16/00; McData, 8/9/00 to 4/19/01; New Focus, 12/7/00 to 3/5/01; Support.com (Support-Soft), 7/19/00 to 4/18/01; Tanning, 7/23/99 to 7/5/00; and Tumbleweed, 8/6/99 to 10/18/00.
. See id. ¶¶ 54-55.
. See id. ¶¶ 56-58.
. See id. ¶ 61.
. See id.
. See id.
. See id. ¶ 62.
. See generally id. ¶¶ 63-99.
. Id. ¶¶64, 66.
. See id. ¶¶ 67-69.
. See id. ¶¶ 66-67, 70-71.
. Id. ¶ 72.
. See id. ¶¶ 74-76.
. See id. ¶ 77.
. See id. % 78.
. See id. ¶¶ 79-80.
. Id.
. See id. ¶ 81.
. See id. ¶¶ 82-85.
. See id. lilf 86-87.
. See id. ¶¶ 88-90.
. Id.n 91-92.
. See id. ¶¶ 93-95.
. See id. ¶¶ 96-97.
. See generally id. ¶¶ 100-28.
. See id. ¶ 100.
. See id. ¶¶ 101-03.
. Id. ¶¶ 107-12, 119-20.
. See id. HV 113-18, 121-22.
. See id. ¶¶ 126-27.
. See id. ¶ 128.
. See id. ¶¶ 129-41.
. See id. ¶ 141.
. See id. ¶ 145.
. See id. ¶¶ 146-47.
. See id. ¶¶ 151-56.
. See id. ¶¶ 157-61.
. See id. ¶¶ 157-58.
. See id. ¶ 159.
. See id. ¶ 160.
. See id. ¶ 161.
. See id. ¶¶ 162-64.
. See id. ¶¶ 113-4, 165-67.
. Id. ¶ 168.
. See id. K1J116, 169-70.
. Id. ¶ 102.
. Id. ¶¶ 175-76.
. See id. ¶¶ 177-80.
. See id. ¶¶ 178-83; Ex. E to SAC.
. See id. ¶¶ 183-84, 186.
. See id. ¶ 187; Ex. C to SAC.
. See id. ¶¶ 188-89.
. Id. ¶ 190-91.
. See id. ¶¶ 192-93, 195.
.Id. ¶ 196; see also Ex. D to SAC.
. See id. ¶ 197.
. See id. ¶ 198.
. See id. ¶ 199.
. See id. ¶¶ 200-01, 203-04.
. See id. ¶¶ 205-07.
. See id. ¶ 208.
. See id. ¶ 209.
. See id. ¶ 210.
. See id. ¶ 211.
. See id. ¶ 212.
. See id. ¶¶ 213-15.
. See id.
. See id. ¶¶ 217-18.
. See id. ¶ 219.
. See id. ¶¶ 220-22.
. Id. ¶ 220.
. Id.
. Id. ¶ 223.
. See id. ¶¶ 224-25.
. See id. ¶¶ 53, 225.
. See id. ¶¶ 226-27.
. See id. ¶¶ 228-40.
. See id. ¶¶ 229-32.
. See id. ¶¶ 233, 235-36.
. See id. ¶ 235.
. Id. ¶ 237.
. See id. ¶ 238.
. See id. ¶ 239.
.See id. ¶ 241.
. Id.n 242-43.
. Id A 244-45.
. See id. ¶¶ 246-48.
. See id. ¶ 249.
. See id. ¶ 250. The circulation of this memo was central to Quattrone’s May 3, 2004 conviction for obstructing a grand jury, obstructing federal regulators and witness tampering. See Randall Smith, Quattrone Found Guilty On 3 Counts in Big U.S. Win, Wall St. J., May 4, 2004, atAl.
.Id. ¶ 251 (emphasis added).
. Plaintiffs bring no claims under the Securities Act of 1933.
. See id. ¶¶ 254-64.
. See id. ¶¶ 265-75.
. Id. ¶ 257.
. See id. ¶¶70, 74, 114, 122-24, 128, 196.
. Id. ¶ 199.
. See id. ¶¶ 197-98.
. See id. ¶¶ 102-03, 126-27. Statements made in the Sales Memo for each Issuer are described with particularity in Ex. E to SAC.
. Id. ¶ 176.
. See Id. ¶ 179.
. Id. ¶ 104. See also id. ¶¶ 181-82.
. See id. ¶1¶ 187-189, Ex. C to SAC.
. Id. ¶¶ 256, 267.
. Id. ¶ 256.
. Id.n 205-06.
. Id. ¶ 212.
. See id. ¶¶ 276-80.
. See id. ¶¶ 281-85.
. See id. ¶¶ 286-90.
.See id. ¶¶ 291-94.
. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); Nerney v. Valente & Sons Repair Shop, 66 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 1995); In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 214 F.R.D. 117, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182, 83 S.Ct. 227; Rush v. Artuz, No. 00 Civ. 3436(LMMDF), 2001 WL 1313465, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.26, 2001). Defendants oppose Plaintiffs' motion to amend on the grounds that amendment would be futile because the proposed SAC would be dismissed. Accordingly, the Court must take all of the SAC’s allegations as true and draw all inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002).
. In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F.Supp.2d at 397.
. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182, 83 S.Ct. 227; Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc. v. Lau, 825 F.2d 647, 653 n. 6 (2d Cir. 1987).
. In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F.Supp.2d 281, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Dooner v. Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 572 (JGK), 2003 WL 135706, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.17, 2003) (“this is the plaintiff’s third complaint ... [tjhree bites at the apple is enough”); In re Am. Express Co. Shareholder Litig., 39 F.3d 395 (2d Cir. 1994); Fisher v. Offerman & Co., Inc., No. 95 Civ. 2566 (JGK), 1996 WL 563141, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.2, 1996); In re Hyperion Sec. Litig., No. 93 Civ. 7179 (MBM), 1995 WL 422480, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1995), aff'd sub nom., Olkey v. Hyperion 1999 Term Trust, Inc., 98 F.3d 2 (2d Cir. 1996)).
. See Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1995); Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Hayes, 141 F.Supp.2d 344, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 723, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975); see also Grace v. Rosenstock, 228 F.3d 40, 46 (2d Cir. 2000) ("Early in the development of such actions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, which addresses fraud "in connection with” the purchase or sale of a security, this Court ruled that no private action under those provisions is available to persons who were neither buyers nor sellers of the relevant securities.”).
. In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 214 F.R.D. at 122-23 (emphasis in original) (permitting substitution of lead plaintiffs) (quoting Goldberger v. Bear, Stearns & Co., No. 98 Civ. 8677 (JSM), 2000 WL 1886605, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.28, 2000)) (emphasis added). See also Ramos v. Patrician Equities Corp., 765 F.Supp. 1196, 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("A plaintiff, including one who is seeking to act as class representative, must have individual standing to assert the claims in the complaint against each defendant being sued by him.”).
. Akerman v. Oryx Communications, Inc., 609 F.Supp. 363, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 734 (3rd Cir. 1970)).
. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e). This limitations period applies to claims under section 10(b). See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 359-60, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991).
. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-204, § 804(b), 116 Stat. 745, 801; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1658.
. Id. at § 804(c).
. Dodds v. Cigna Sec., Inc., 12 F.3d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
. Id.
. Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1993)).
. Salinger v. Projectavision, Inc., 972 F.Supp. 222, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. '21' Intern. Holdings, Inc., 821 F.Supp. 212, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
. Newman v. Warnaco Group, Inc., 335 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Dodds, 12 F.3d at 351-52).
. Id., at 194.
. Nivram Corp. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 840 F.Supp. 243, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
. Addeo v. Braver, 956 F.Supp. 443, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (quoting Dodds, 12 F.3d at 350) (citations omitted).
. See generally CSFBC’s Opposition to Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint ("CSFBC Opp.”); Issuer Opp.
. See SAC, at 2.
. See id. ¶ 39.
. The eleven Issuers not named as Defendants are Airspan, Commerce One, Bsquare, CacheFlow, McData, E.piphany, Handspring, InterNAP, Lante, New Focus, and Support-Soft.
. See SAC ¶¶ 8-23.
. See Plaintiffs' Response In Opposition to Defendants' Motions Opposing Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint ("Reply”), at 26.
. See id.
. See Primavera Familienstiftung v. Askin, No. 95 Civ. 8905 (RWS), 1996 WL 494904, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.30, 1996). In Primavera, the plaintiff sued three hedge funds, although the plaintiff had only directly invested in one of the three funds. However, the plaintiff had, through that investment, purchased securities issued by each of the three funds. See id., at *2. Moreover, the same individual was alleged to have administered all three funds. Id. As a result, the court deferred the standing issue to the certification stage, because "the issues of standing [we]re sufficiently bound up with those of class certification, and their resolution b[ore] sufficiently little weight on the disposition of the remainder of these motions or on the discovery process” to require their earlier resolution. Id., at *8. But see Ramos, 765 F.Supp. at 1199 ("Numerous cases hold that the question of standing must be considered independently from the issue of whether there is a proper class action under Rule 23”); In re Bank of Boston Corporation Sec. Litig., 762 F.Supp. 1525, 1531 (D.Mass. 1991) (in a securities fraud action, "[a] federal district court may not permit a plaintiff to circumvent the standing requirement simply because the plaintiff files his suit as a class action ... [t]hus, when the issue of standing is raised by a party, the Court must resolve this issue before considering the class certification requirement of Rule 23.”).
. At trial, Plaintiffs may show that the CSFB Defendants engaged in the alleged wrongful conduct with respect to many issuers, whether or not they are identified in the Complaint.
. See CSFBC Opp. at 2.
. See 9/17/03 Letter from Defendants to Court. Plaintiffs' failure to identify named plaintiffs for each Issuer Defendant was discussed at the September 22, 2003 status conference before this Court.
. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182, 83 S.Ct. 227.
. See In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation, 241 F.Supp.2d at 398 (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims without leave to amend where ''Plaintiffs [] had numerous opportunities to amend their pleadings” and had been repeatedly advised of their deficiencies).
. See Issuer Opp. at 5-6.
. See generally id. at 6-13.
. See id. A two year delay would bar Plaintiffs’ claims under either section 9(e) or Sar-banes-Oxley. Because Defendants have not met their burden of establishing inquiry notice as a matter of law, the Court does not reach the issue of which statute applies.
. Id. at 2 (emphasis in original); see also Issuer Defendants' chart entitled "Expiration of Discovery Periods,” Appendix A to Issuer Opp.
. SAC ¶ 46.
. Nivram, 840 F.Supp. at 249.
. See Issuer Opp. at 6-10; see also Exs. AG to 11/6/03 Declaration of John Boyle, counsel for Issuer Defendants ("First Boyle Decl.”).
. Issuer Opp. at 6.
. See Westinghouse, 821 F.Supp. at 222.
. See SAC ¶¶ 1, 61, 100-28, 165-84, 208-10.
. See id. ¶¶ 187-93, Ex. C.
. See id. ¶¶ 65-79, 162-64.
. See SAC ¶¶ 187-193. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that the prospectuses included materially misleading statements about the methods Defendants used to calculate offering prices, omitting to disclose that the ultimate IPO price was discounted below what would have been an appropriate price. Whether or not such misstatements may have been actionable under the 1933 Act is an academic question. As noted earlier, Plaintiffs bring no claim under the 1933 Act. Plaintiffs make these allegations to provide support for their claim that Defendants engaged in an ongoing, consistent scheme of depressing revenue predictions to achieve quick and sustained growth in share prices.
.Salinger, 972 F.Supp. at 229.
. See Exs. A-G to First Boyle Decl.
. See Ex. B to First Boyle Decl.
. See Exs. A-B, D-G to Issuer Opp.; Exs. A-E to 12/9/03 Declaration of John Boyle ("Second Boyle Decl.”).
. See Menowitz, 991 F.2d at 42; Ezra Charitable Trust v. Frontier Ins. Group, Inc., No 00-5361, 2002 WL 87723 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.23, 2002), aff'd, LC Capital Partners v. Frontier Ins. Group. Inc., 318 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that filing of litigation against the same defendant "put a plaintiff on inquiry notice of the probability of fraud with another transaction involving the defendant” where "the complaints in both lawsuits involve[d] similar allegations that [defendant] failed to disclose its inadequate loss reserves and did not sufficiently monitor its operations.”).
.See Ex. H to First Boyle Decl.
. See Issuer Opp. at 13.
. Id., at 13; SAC ¶ 48.
. Defendants rely on Weiss v. Ganz, 26 F.Supp.2d 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) in support of their contention. In Weiss, however, the complaint was dismissed because it alleged neither a date of discovery nor diligent investigation of claims, and in fact provided evidence that the facts constituting the basis for the claim had come to light eighteen months before filing. See id. at 658. Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs allege (albeit imprecisely) a date of discovery and a pattern of behavior that obscured the nature of the wrongdoing until that date. See SAC ¶¶ 48-51.
.See Issuer Opp. at 9-24.
.If Plaintiffs first discovered the alleged scheme no earlier than February 28, 2003, then the claims brought by the new proposed Plaintiffs would not have expired by October 2, 2003 under the one-year statute of limitations in section 9(e). Obviously, such claims would also be timely under the two-year statute of limitations prescribed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. There is accordingly no need to address the issue of which term of limitations applies.
. See 5/5/03 Motion of Robert W. Tenney; Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of the Re-filed Motion of Robert W. Tenney to be Appointed Lead Plaintiff.
. CSFB’s Submission Regarding Motion for Appointment of Lead Plaintiff, at 1 (acknowledging lack of standing to object to appointment of lead plaintiff but reserving rights to raise these issues at a later date).
Reference
- Full Case Name
- In re: INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING SECURITIES LITIGATION This document relates to: Amy Liu, Robert Tenney, Robert Tate, Mary Gorton, Carla Kelly, Henry Ciesielski, Ed Grier, Frank Turk, Jennie Papuzza, Stanley Warren, Ellen Dulberger, Craig Mason, Sharon Brewer and Lloyd Hinn v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., Credit Suisse First Boston, Credit Suisse Group, Efficient Networks, Inc., eMachines, Inc., Lightspan Partnership, Inc., Tanning Technology Corp., and Tumbleweed Communications Corp.
- Cited By
- 2 cases
- Status
- Published