Belair v. MGA Entertainment, Inc.
Belair v. MGA Entertainment, Inc.
Opinion of the Court
OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
The Brooklyn photographer Bernard Belair brings this action against the California corporation MGA Entertainment, Inc., alleging that MGA’s Bratz line of dolls unlawfully infringes on a copyrighted image that he created for a Steve Madden shoe advertisement. MGA has moved for summary judgment. Because no reasonable trier of fact could find that any of the Bratz dolls are substantially similar to the figures depicted in Belair’s copyrighted image, MGA’s motion is granted.
II. BACKGROUND
In the late 1990s, Belair created a series of images to be used in advertisements for Steve Madden shoes.
Sometime around August, 1998 Carter Bryant, who was working for the toy maker Mattel at the time, conceived of the Bratz dolls. He envisioned a group of four young friends who are very cool and popular, wear trendy clothing, and have a “we can do anything, we’ve got a lot of power, we believe in ourselves” attitude.
The first line of Bratz dolls — named Cloe, Sasha, Yasmin, and Jade — arrived in toy stores in 2001,
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
“The moving party bears the burden of establishing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.”
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must “construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant.”
B. Copyright Infringement
To prove infringement under the
1. Actual Copying
The first element — actual copying — may be established by direct or indirect evidence.
2. Substantial Similarity to Protectible Elements
“[C]opyright protection may extend only to those components of a work that are original to the author.”
A photograph may be original in the rendition of a subject. Rendition concerns not “what is depicted, but rather how it is depicted.”
A photograph may also be original in the creation of its subject, when a
“ ‘The standard test for substantial similarity between two items is whether an ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard the aesthetic appeal as the same.’ ”
“[W]hen faced with works ‘that have both protectible and unprotectible elements,’ ” the usual “ordinary observer” test becomes “more discerning,”
3. Statute of Limitations
Copyright infringement claims must be “commenced within three years after the claim accrued.”
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Similarity
Because MGA has acknowledged that it copied Belair’s Angel/Devil image when making the original sculpt for the Bratz dolls, the normal two-pronged inquiry is reduced to one: could a reasonable juror find a substantial similarity between the Bratz dolls and the protectible elements of the image?
As a threshold matter, I consider which elements of the image are not protectible — namely, the common theme of a young, attractive, fashionable woman and the elements that “flow naturally and necessarily from the choice”
Of course, there is a limited range of proportions available to a photographer or doll maker seeking to depict a stereotypically attractive young woman. “Similarity of expression ... which necessarily results from the fact that the common idea is only capable of expression in more or less stereotyped form will preclude a finding of actionable similarity.”
becomes freakish, not idealized. The expression of an attractive young, female fashion doll with exaggerated proportions is thus highly constrained.”
A discerning eye notes numerous differences between the physique of the Bratz sculpt and that of Angel and Devil.
Devil is also different from the sculpt. She has narrow eyes in deep sockets protected by a prominent brow; the sculpt’s brow is almost non-existent. Devil has
Despite these differences, the similarities between the sculpt and the Devil/Angel image are significant. If MGA were selling the sculpt as a final product, there might well be a triable issue of fact regarding copyright infringement. But Be-lair’s complaint alleges that it is the Bratz line of “dolls, toys, games, and videos” that infringes on his copyrighted image.
The fact that the Bratz sculpt is similar to the Belair image is not dispositive because the physical differences between Be-lair’s women and the model sculpt pale in comparison to the differences between Be-lair’s women and the painted, clothed, and made-up Bratz dolls that are packaged and sold as finished products. No reasonable juror could find that those final products are substantially similar to Belair’s image.
Belair’s Angel is wearing a tiny pink tank-top that exposes her midriff, tight blue jeans that are folded up to her calf, and white, open-toed high-heeled shoes. His Devil is wearing a black leather jacket, a black mini skirt, black calf-high leather platform boots, and a black choke collar. Angel’s dark hair is held back and curls down to the sides of her head. Devil’s dark hair shoots up in an elaborate wave.
None of the Bratz dolls are dressed in substantially similar fashion. Cloe, one of the original four Bratz dolls, is wearing glittery denim bell bottoms that cover her feet, a turquoise tank top with the word “Angel” and a small halo printed on it, a large turquoise belt, turquoise closed-toed platform shoes, and a turquoise patterned headband. Her straight platinum blond hair reaches below her buttocks. Unlike Angel and Devil, who both have very dark eyes, Cloe’s are blue. Whereas Angel and Devil appropriately sport accessories including a halo and wings, and horns and a tail, respectively, Cloe has only a white spotted backpack dispositive because the physical differences between Belair’s women and the model sculpt pale in comparison to the differences between Belair’s women and the painted, clothed, and made-up Bratz dolls that are packaged and sold as finished products. No reasonable juror could find that those final products are substantially similar to Belair’s image.
Belair’s Angel is wearing a tiny pink tank-top that exposes her midriff, tight blue jeans that are folded up to her calf, and white, open-toed high-heeled shoes. His Devil is wearing a black leather jacket, a black mini skirt, black calf-high leather platform boots, and a black choke collar. Angel’s dark hair is held back and curls down to the sides of her head. Devil’s dark hair shoots up in an elaborate wave.
None of the Bratz dolls are dressed in substantially similar fashion. Cloe, one of the original four Bratz dolls, is wearing glittery denim bell bottoms that cover her feet, a turquoise tank top with the word “Angel” and a small halo printed on it, a large turquoise belt, turquoise closed-toed platform shoes, and a turquoise patterned headband. Her straight platinum blond hair reaches below her buttocks. Unlike Angel and Devil, who both have very dark eyes, Cloe’s are blue. Whereas Angel and Devil appropriately sport accessories including a halo and wings, and horns and a tail, respectively, Cloe has only a white spotted backpack and a turquoise hair band.
Given the similarity in head, limb, and torso proportions between the dolls and Angel, do these extensive dissimilarities matter? Professor Nimmer asserts that it “is entirely immaterial that, in many respects, plaintiffs and defendant’s works are dissimilar, if in other respects, similarity as to a substantial element of plaintiffs work can be shown.”
But, of course, in the absence of partial literal similarity, enough dissimilarities may eventually eliminate the claim of substantial similarity. This is particularly so, as Judge Newman of the Second Circuit has explained, in the context of graphical and three-dimensional works, which are perceived in their entirety (unlike literary works, which can perhaps more naturally be perceived piece by piece, in linear fashion, and where additional dissimilarities may not detract from previous similarities).
[I]f the points of dissimilarity not only exceed the points of similarity, but indicate that the remaining points of similarity are (within the context of plaintiffs work) of minimal importance either quantitatively or qualitatively, then no infringement results.60
In the context of toys, and particularly toys that replicate human or quasi-human forms, differences in physical features, clothing, and accoutrements matter. Thus, one small, plastic, baby doll with a big head, broad face, and wide eyes that is dressed only in a diaper and crawls along the ground after being wound up will not infringe on another doll that shares all of those attributes if the two have different colored hair and diapers, slightly different facial features, and other small differences.
That logic applies here as well. The Bratz dolls and the figures in Angel/Devil Girl do share similarly large heads, long
It is undisputed that MGA was aware of the Steve Madden look and sought to capitalize on it. But that is not enough to justify a finding of infringement.
B. Statute of Limitations and Laches
Belair brought this suit on October 20, 2009
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, MGA’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this motion [Docket No. 65] and this case.
SO ORDERED.
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. Defendant’s Separate Statement Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 ("MGA 56.1”) ¶ 3; Plaintiff Bernard Belair’s Response to Defendant MGA Entertainment, Inc.'s Statement Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 ("Belair 56.1”) ¶ 3.
. MGA 56. ¶¶ 4-5; Belair 56.1 ¶¶ 4-5.
. See Angel/Devil Girl, Ex. 1 to Declaration of Gerard A. Haddad, plaintiff's counsel, in support of Plaintiff Belair's Opposition to MGA’s Motion for Summary Judgment ("Haddad Decl.”).
. Belair 56.1 ¶282; Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendant MGA Entertainment, Inc.'s Statement of Material Facts ("MGA 56.1 Reply”) ¶ 282; Deposition of Bernard Belair, Ex. 12 to Haddad Decl., at 145:19.
. Reporter's Transcript of Jury Trial Proceedings ("Trial Tr.”), Mattel Inc. v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 9049 (CD. Cal. June 17, 2008), Ex. H to Declaration of Kenneth A. Plevan, defendant’s counsel, in support of MGA Entertainment Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plevan Decl.”), at 2810-2811.
. The details of Carter's move from Mattel to MGA have been the subject of extensive litigation. See Mattel Inc. v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., 616 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2010); Mattel Inc. v. MGA Entertainment Inc., 782 F.Supp.2d 911 (C.D.Cal. 2011).
. See Trial Tr. at 4144-46.
. See id.; Belair 56.1 ¶ 266; MGA 56.1 Reply ¶ 266.
. Annexed to this opinion as Exhibits A through F are the Angel/Devil image, photographs of the four original Bratz dolls, and a photograph of the final sculpt that the four dolls all share.
. MGA 56.1 ¶¶ 13-14; Belair 56.1 ¶¶ 13-14.
. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
. Fincher v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712, 720 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2008)).
. Zalaski v. City of Bridgeport Police Dep’t, 613 F.3d 336, 340 (2d Cir. 2010).
. Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 204 (2d Cir. 2009).
. Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).
. Id. (quoting Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 607 F.3d 288, 292 (2d Cir. 2010)).
. Brod v. Omya, Inc., 653 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation omitted).
. Kaytor v. Electric Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 545 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)) (emphasis removed).
. Brod, 653 F.3d at 164 (quoting Wilson v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 625 F.3d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 2010)).
. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
. Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F.Supp.2d 444, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (emphasis in original) (quoting Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995)). Accord Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991); Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records, 351 F.3d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 2003).
. See Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 267 (2d Cir. 2001).
. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant MGA Entertainment, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment at 11.
. Feist, 499 U.S. at 348, 111 S.Ct. 1282.
. Id. at 345, 111 S.Ct. 1282.
. See Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 67 (2d Cir. 2010) ("This principle, known as the 'idea/expression dichotomy,’ 'assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.’ ” (quoting Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50, 111 S.Ct. 1282)).
. Bill Diodato Photography, LLC v. Kate Spade, LLC, 388 F.Supp.2d 382, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that two photographs shot through the opening below a bathroom stall door of a woman's feet astride a toilet, showcasing her stylish shoes, did not share protectible original elements: all of the elements for which plaintiff sought protection — "the legs and handbags ... framed by the floor and bathroom walls,” "shoot[ing] a photograph of the bottom part of a woman's legs in a bathroom or on a toilet," etc. — stemmed from the choice of the idea, namely "the depiction of a woman’s feet as she sits on the toilet, used as a striking device to highlight fashion accessories,” and were therefore unprotectible). Accord Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 587-88 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[s]cenes a faire are unprotectible elements that follow naturally from a work’s theme rather than from an author’s creativity”).
. Mannion, 377 F.Supp.2d at 452.
. See, e.g., Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 116 (2d Cir. 1998); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992).
. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 4 S.Ct. 279, 28 L.Ed. 349 (1884) (originality of Oscar Wilde portrait founded upon overall composition, including pose, wardrobe, and background, "suggesting and evoking the desired expression”); Rogers, 960 F.2d at 304 (holding that plaintiff's copyright in photograph, which depicted an arranged scene of a man and woman on a park bench with eight puppies on their laps, protected against the defendant’s attempt to replicate the subject matter of the photograph in a three-dimensional sculpture; emphasizing the detailed selection of "the location, the bench on which the [subjects] are seated and the arrangement of the small dogs”).
. Mannion, 377 F.Supp.2d at 450.
. Gaito, 602 F.3d at 66 (quoting Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 111 (2d Cir. 2001)).
. Id. (quoting Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1002).
. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 308 (emphasis in original).
. Gaito, 602 F.3d at 66 (quoting Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp., 25 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1994)).
. Id. (quotation omitted).
. Id. (quotation omitted).
. Id. (citing Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 133 (2d Cir. 2003)).
. Canal + Image UK Ltd. v. Lutvak, 773 F.Supp.2d 419, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Tufenkian, 338 F.3d at 134).
. LaChapelle v. Fenty, 812 F.Supp.2d 434, 442, No. 11 Civ. 945, 2011 WL 2947007, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2011). See, e.g., Rogers, 960 F.2d 301 (finding substantial similarity
. Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods. Div. of General Mills Fun Group, 443 F.Supp. 291, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b).
. See Kwan v. Schlein, 634 F.3d 224, 228 (2d Cir. 2011).
. Harris v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 646 F.Supp.2d 622, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing to Auscape Int’l v. National Geographic Soc., 409 F.Supp.2d 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
. Diodato, 388 F.Supp.2d at 392.
. Mattel, 616 F.3d at 915.
. See, e.g., photographs of advertisements, Ex. K to Plevan Decl. at 4, 6, 7, 8, 14, (showing exaggerated and idealized female physiques in advertisements from the August, 1998 issue of Seventeen magazine), photographs of advertisements, Ex. L to Plevan Decl. at 5, 8, 12, 13, (same, from the August, 1999 and March, 2000 issues of Seventeen).
. See Declaration of Paula Garcia, vice president of product design and development at MGA, in Support of Defendant MGA Entertainment, Inc’s Motion for Summary Judgment ("Garcia Decl.") ¶ 5. Photographs of the dolls and the sculpt were filed as Exhibits 1 through 5 to the Garcia declaration. Tangible versions of the dolls and sculpt were provided to the Court.
. See Sculpt, Ex. 5 to Garcia Decl.
. See id.; Angel/Devil Girl, Ex. 1 to Haddad Decl.
. Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 916 (2d Cir. 1980).
. In the Ninth Circuit, the limited range of available expression for depicting an idealized human body means that in this situation, Belair would need to show that the dolls’ physique is "nearly identical" to that of his images. See Mattel, 616 F.3d at 914. The Second Circuit does not use this test. Instead, the "ordinary observer” test simply becomes “more discerning.” Gaito, 602 F.3d at 66.
. "Similarity as to standard doll features is not as indicative of copying as would be similarity of features that render the protected toy distinctive.” Durham Indus., 630 F.2d at 916.
. See Sculpt, Ex. 5 to Garcia Decl.; Angel/Devil Girl, Ex. 1 to Haddad Decl.
. See Angel/Devil Girl, Ex. 1 to Haddad Decl.; Cloe, Ex. 1 to Garcia Decl.; Jade, Ex. 2 to Garcia Decl.; Sasha, Ex. 3 to Garcia Decl.; Yasmin, Ex. 4 to Garcia Decl.; Sculpt, Ex. 5 to Garcia Decl.
. Second Amended Complaint ¶ 49.
. Nimmer § 13.03[B][1][a], at 13-62.
. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936).
. See Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Significant dissimilarities between two works of this sort inevitably lessen the similarity that would otherwise exist ...."). Accord. Durham Indus., 630 F.2d at 913.
. Nimmer § 13.03[B][1][a], at 13-63.
. See Durham Indus., 630 F.2d at 915.
. Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498, 501 (2d Cir. 1982) (Lumbard, J„ dissenting) (characterizing the majority opinion).
. See Ideal Toy Corp., 443 F.Supp. at 304 (holding that there is no right "to a monopoly in the theme of a black-robed, helmeted, evil figure in outer-space conflict with a humanoid and a smaller non-humanoid robot” and refusing to find probable success on the merits even though the challenged toys, packaged and sold as the "Star Team” only months after the release of the hugely popular "Star Wars” movie, included two robots and Knight of Darkness highly reminiscent of the famous characters R2-D2, C-3PO, and Darth Vader.)
. Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983).
. MGA 56.1 ¶ 17; Belair 56.1 ¶ 17.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Bernard BELAIR v. MGA ENTERTAINMENT, INC.
- Cited By
- 7 cases
- Status
- Published