U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission v. Sharef
U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission v. Sharef
Opinion of the Court
OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) commenced this action against Uriel Sharef, Ulrich Bock, Carlos Sergi, Stephan Signer, Herbert Steffen, Andres Truppel, and Bernd Regendantz (“defendants”), former senior executives at Siemens Aktiengesellschaft (“Siemens”), a multinational engineering and electronics conglomerate headquartered in Germany. The SEC alleges four causes of action: (1) violations of Section 30A of the Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”); (2) violations of Section 13(b)(5) of the Exchange Act; (3) aiding and abetting violations of Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act; and (4) aiding and abetting violations of Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act.
Herbert Steffen now moves to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2)
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Siemens, a German corporation headquartered in Munich, Germany
A. Overview of the Alleged Bribery Scheme
The Complaint alleges that between 1996 and 2007 the defendants orchestrated a bribery scheme which paid millions of dollars in bribes to top government officials in Argentina.
In 1998, Siemens and its Argentine affiliate were awarded the contract for a one billion dollar project to create national identity cards.
Between 2002 and 2006, defendant Bernd Regendantz, Chief Financial Officer of SBS, signed quarterly and annual certifications under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in which he represented that SBS’s financial statements were not false or misleading.
B. Steffen’s Alleged Role in the Bribery Scheme
The Complaint alleges that Sharef recruited Steffen “to facilitate the payment of bribes” to officials in Argentina because of his longstanding connections in Argentina, which he acquired during his tenure at Siemens Argentina.
In order to facilitate payment of bribes to the Argentine officials, Steffen met several times with Regendantz, who became the Chief Financial Officer of SBS in February 2002, and “pressured” Regendantz to authorize bribes from SBS to Argentine officials.
Once Regendantz authorized the bribes, the allegations against Steffen are limited to participation in a phone call initiated by Sharef from the United States in connec
C. SBS’s Payment of the Bribes and Cover Ups
Regendantz ultimately authorized a ten million dollar bribe, but only after seeking additional guidance from “superiors” including Siemens’ Head of Compliance, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Executive Officer, and two members of the Managing Board, including Sharef, whose responses he “understood ... to be instructions that he authorize the bribe payments.”
The bribe was paid in two installments: $5.2 million was routed through an intermediate in Uruguay.
The second payment of the $10 million advance, in the amount of $4.7 million was not made until February 2004.
In connection with these payments, between 2002 and 2006, Regendantz signed quarterly and annual certifications pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act falsely representing the financial statements of SBS.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
On a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction the “plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant.”
IY. APPLICABLE LAW
Section 27 of the Exchange Act, specifically 15 U.S.C. Section 78aa, governs the exercise of personal jurisdiction in securities cases.
A. Minimum Contacts
A nonresident defendant sued under the Exchange Act need not have minimum contacts with the state seeking to exercise personal jurisdiction; rather the only contacts required are with the United States as a whole, as Section 78 provides for nationwide service of process.
It is well-established that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant who causes an effect in the forum by an act committed elsewhere.
If the defendant’s contacts with the forum state rise to this minimum level, the defendant may defeat jurisdiction only by presenting “a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.”
Y. This Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over Steffen
Steffen argues that he lacks minimum contacts with the United States, and that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him would be unreasonable.
A. Plaintiffs Have Not Established Minimum Contacts
The SEC’s allegations are premised on Steffen’s role in encouraging Regendantz to authorize bribes to Argentine officials that ultimately resulted in falsified SEC filings. While Steffen’s actions may have been a proximate cause of the false filings — and even that is a matter of some doubt — Steffen’s actions are far too attenuated from the resulting harm to establish minimum contacts. Steffen was brought into the alleged scheme based solely on his connections with Argentine officials. In furtherance of his negotiations with those officials, Steffen “urged” and “pressured” Regendantz to make certain bribes. However, Regendantz did not agree to make the bribes until he communicated with several “higher ups” whose responses he perceived to be instructions to make the bribes.
To be sure, there is ample (and growing) support in case law for the exercise of jurisdiction over individuals who played a role in falsifying or manipulating financial statements relied upon by U.S. investors in order to cover up illegal actions directed entirely at a foreign jurisdiction.
As the SEC points out, the lynchpin of these decisions is that jurisdiction exists where “ ‘an executive of a foreign securities issuer, wherever located, participates in a fraud directed to deceiving United States shareholders.’ ”
B. Exercise of Jurisdiction Over Steffen Is Not Reasonable
The decision not to exercise jurisdiction in this case is bolstered by my conclusion that requiring Steffen to defend this case in the United States would be unreasonable. If minimum contacts are present the defendant may defeat jurisdiction only by presenting, “a compelling ease that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.”
Steffen’s lack of geographic ties to the United States, his age, his poor proficiency in English, and the forum’s diminished interest in adjudicating the matter, all weigh against personal jurisdiction. Geographic ties alone do not dictate the extent of the reasonableness inquiry.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Steffen’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is granted. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this motion [Docket No. 23].
SO ORDERED.
. See Complaint ("CompL”) ¶¶ 69, 73, 76, 79.
. Because I find that personal jurisdiction is lacking, I do not reach the argument that the Complaint was untimely filed.
. See Compl. ¶ 16.
. See id.
. See id. ¶ 20.
. See id. ¶ 12.
. See id.
. See id. ¶ 1.
. See id.
. See id. ¶ 59.
. See id. ¶ 25.
. See id.
. See id. ¶ 26.
. See id. ¶¶ 27-28.
. See id. ¶ 28.
. See id. ¶¶ 29-30.
. See id. ¶ 30.
. See id. ¶ 33.
. See id. ¶ 35.
. See id. ¶ 37.
. See id.
. See id. ¶ 60.
. See id. ¶¶ 37, 60.
. See id. ¶ 59.
. See id.
. See id. ¶ 12. At all times relevant to this case, Steffen was Group President of Siemens Transportation Systems until he retired in 2003. See id.
. See id. ¶¶ 27-28. Meanwhile, other Siemens managers, including defendant Bock, met with payment intermediaries who had been involved in the earlier payment of bribes on Siemens’ behalf, including former Siemens official and defendant Sergi. These payment intermediaries informed the Siemens managers that they would have to pay the remaining unpaid but promised bribes as well as new bribes.
. See id. ¶¶ 39-40.
. Id.
. Id. ¶¶ 12, 51. These meetings ultimately led to the payment of an additional $11.79 million payment, but it is not alleged that Steffen directed or did anything more than urge Sharef to make additional payments. See id. ¶¶ 51-54.
. Id. ¶ 41. A portion of the bribes were paid to bank accounts in New York and Miami. See id. ¶ 42.
. See id. ¶ 44.
. See id. ¶¶ 44-47.
. See id. ¶¶ 49-50.
. See id. ¶¶ 48, 55.
. See ¶¶ 55-58. Sergi, on instructions from Sharef, submitted eight fictitious invoices totaling $4.7 million to the then Siemens Argentina CEO, who then forwarded them to Regendantz. Defendant Signer instructed an SBS subordinate to sign the backdated, fictitious invoices supporting the $4.7 million payment. Two of the payments made in 2004 were to bank accounts in Miami. See id.
. See id. ¶ 59.
. See id.
. In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig., 334 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2003).
. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 751 F.2d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 1984). Accord Tamam v. Fransabank Sal, 677 F.Supp.2d 720, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("As no
. See In re Stillwater Capital Partners Inc. Litig., 851 F.Supp.2d 556, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 567 (2d Cir. 1996)
. A.I. Trade Fin., Inc. v. Petra Bank, 989 F.2d 76, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1993). Accord Whitaker v. American Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196, 208 (2d Cir. 2001).
. Recurrent Capital Bridge I, LLC v. ISR Sys. & Sensors Corp., 875 F.Supp.2d 297, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Schenker v. Assicurazioni Genereali S.p.A., Consol., No. 98 Civ. 9186, 2002 WL 1560788, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2002)).
. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(b)(2) (2010). The section provides in relevant part: “The district courts of the United States ... shall have jurisdiction of an action ... alleging a violation of the antifraud provisions of this chapter involving-(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.” (emphasis added)
. SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1339 (2d Cir. 1972) abrogated on other grounds by Morrison v. National Austl. Bank, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010)).
. 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
. See King County, Wash. v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 712 F.Supp.2d 104, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
. See In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig., 334 F.3d at 207 (discussing the Clayton Act's analogous service of process provision) (citing Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974)).
. Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 305 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
. See Opp. Mem. at 10-11. The other type of personal jurisdiction a court may exercise — general jurisdiction- — -exists if the defendant’s contacts with the forum have been continuous and systematic. See In re Astrazeneca Sec. Litig., 559 F.Supp.2d 453, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
. In re Astrazeneca, 559 F.Supp.2d at 466-67. Jurisdiction over "the representative of a corporation may not be predicated on jurisdiction over the corporation itself, and jurisdiction over the individual officers and directors must be based on their individual contacts with the forum state.” In re Alstom SA, 406 F.Supp.2d 346, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Charas v. Sand Tech. Sys. Int’l, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 5638, 1992 WL 296406, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1992)).
. See Eskofot A/S v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 872 F.Supp. 81, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d at 1033).
. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1341.
. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).
. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2780, 2789, 180 L.Ed.2d 765 (2011).
. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1341. Accord id. at 1341 & n. 11 (activity in interstate commerce must be “sufficiently extensive and regular to make [the] possibility [of litigation in the United States] a foreseeable risk of the business”). Notably, the Second Circuit applied an even more stringent test in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, holding that "plaintiffs have the burden of showing that [defendants] engaged in 'intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions ... expressly aimed’ at residents of the United States.” 538 F.3d 71, 95 (2d Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 130 S.Ct. 2278, 176 L.Ed.2d 1047 (2010) (quoting Calder, 465 U.S. at 789, 104 S.Ct. 1482). However, while "express aim” is certainly sufficient to confer jurisdiction, it has not generally been found to be a requirement, particularly in the securities context. See, e.g., SEC v. Straub, No. 11 Civ. 9645, 921 F.Supp.2d 244, 254 n. 7, 2013 WL 466600, at *6 n. 7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2013) ("[T]he Supreme Court has never suggested — whether in Calder or otherwise — that [express aim is] necessary for a Court to exercise jurisdiction.”) (citing In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F.Supp.2d 449, 455 n. 34 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)). Because I conclude that jurisdiction is lacking even under the less stringent test for jurisdiction, I need not determine whether the Second Circuit raised the bar in In re Terrorist Attacks.
. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985).
. Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102, 113-14, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987) (quoting World-Wide Vollcswagen, 444 U.S. at 292, 100 S.Ct. 559).
. See Def. Mem. at 3-4, 6-7.
. See Opp. Mem. at 12, 14.
. Thus, it is not even clear that Steffen’s actions were a proximate cause of the bribes being made, given Regendantz’s perceived need for approval from "higher ups.”
. See Compl. ¶¶ 47, 59 (noting that Regendantz instructed a subordinate to handle the paperwork related to the bribe payments and that Regendantz signed false quarterly and annual certifications, not Steffen). Neither Sharef’s call to Steffen from the United States nor the fact that a portion of the bribery payments were deposited in a New York bank provide sufficient evidence of conduct directed towards the United States to establish minimum contacts. First, Steffen did not place the calls to Sharef. Further, Steffen did not direct that the funds be routed through a New York bank. See id. ¶ 44 (explaining the payment of the bribes was orchestrated by defendants Truppel, Signer, and Bock along with subordinates, but not by Steffen). His conduct was focused solely on ensuring the continuation of the Siemens contract in Argentina.
. See, e.g., SEC v. Stanard, No. 06 Civ. 7736 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2007) (unpublished transcript of ruling, Opp. Ex. 1, Tr. 3: 15-18) (upholding jurisdiction over an executive of a foreign securities issuer who manipulated the reported earnings of a public company by engaging in sham reinsurance transactions and finding that he “specifically intended that his work would result in false statements by [his company]”); In re Parmalat, 376 F.Supp.2d at 455 (holding that "if, as plaintiffs claim, [defendant] knowingly participated in the issuance of false financials and reports, she knew or had good reason to know that her actions would have effects here” based on intimate familiarity with the statutory filings of the company); In re CINAR Corp. Securities Litigation, 186 F.Supp.2d 279, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (upholding jurisdiction over a Canadian general counsel, who had signed a fraudulent registration statement, holding that the act of signing the statement was a clear example of purposeful availment of the privilege of doing business within the United States).
. See Straub, 921 F.Supp.2d at 244-51, 258, 2013 WL 466600, at *1-3, *10. The court stated, "even if Defendants' alleged primary intent was not to cause a tangible injury in the United States, it was nonetheless their intent, which is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.” Id. at 256, at *7.
. See SEC’s Reply in Support of Its Notice of Supplemental Authority at 2 (quoting Straub, 921 F.Supp.2d at 256-57, 2013 WL 466600, at *8 (quoting Stanard, No. 06 Civ. 7736)) (emphasis added).
. By distinguishing these cases from the facts here, I do not intend to suggest that signing or directly manipulating financial statements is necessary. It is not necessary to draw that line because the allegations against Steffen are far more attenuated.
. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292, 100 S.Ct. 559; Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1341 (holding that "attaining the rather low floor of foreseeability necessary to support a find
. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd., 131 S.Ct. at 2789. See also Charas, 1992 WL 296406, at *5 (finding jurisdiction lacking where defendant "neither entered the United States nor transacted any business in the United Statesf,] did not sign the registration statements at issue ... [and] any fraudulent activities that Defendants may have committed in relation to [plaintiffs’] public offerings cannot reasonably be deemed the 'direct and foreseeable result’ of the alleged failure of an outside director residing in Japan to monitor the Canadian corporation's affairs”). Although Charas involved an alleged failure to monitor, the contacts are similarly attenuated here where Steffen neither authorized the bribes, nor directed the cover ups, including but not limited to, manipulating financial statements.
. See, e.g., Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1341 n. 11 (activity in interstate commerce must be "sufficiently extensive and regular to make [the] possibility [of litigation in the United States] a foreseeable risk of the business”); In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d at 95 (defendants must have "engaged in ‘intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions ... expressly aimed’ at residents of the United States”).
. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477, 105 S.Ct. 2174.
. SEC v. Softpoint, Inc., No. 95 C. 2951, 2001 WL 43611 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2001) (noting that the defendant presented no evidence that litigating in New York would significantly burden him); but cf. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P. v. Gotham Partners, L.P., 104 F.Supp.2d 279, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that doubtless there will be defendants subject to national process who can show sufficient hardship to overcome even a strong federal interest).
. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115, 107 S.Ct. 1026 (quoting United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404, 85 S.Ct. 528, 13 L.Ed.2d 365 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
. See In re LDK Solar Sec. Litig., No. 07-CIV-5182, 2008 WL 4369987, at *7 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 24, 2008) ("If the reasonableness inquiry were dictated by the extent of defendants’ geographic ties to the forum alone, the purposeful availment and purposeful direction inquiries would be meaningless.”).
. See Comply ¶ 19.
. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Herbert Steffen’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Failure to File Within the Statute of Limitations at 15.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. Uriel SHAREF, Ulrich Bock, Carlos Sergi, Stephan Singer, Herbert Steffen, Andres Truppel, and Bernd Regendantz
- Cited By
- 13 cases
- Status
- Published