M.G. v. New York City Department of Education
M.G. v. New York City Department of Education
Opinion of the Court
OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
The parents of Y.T. — a child with autism in the New York City school system — filed this action against the New York City Department of Education (“DOE”) and other defendants, and are seeking a preliminary injunction to maintain Y.T.’s current 1:1 applied behavioral analysis (“ABA”) home services and also to add several new services to his educational placement. Because plaintiffs have not yet exhausted administrative review on their claims, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to consider their request for new services. However, because I find that the 1:1 ABA services are part of Y.T.’s current educational placement, and therefore must be maintained during the pendency of the state administrative review, plaintiffs need not exhaust administrative remedies to seek continuation of these services. Further, they are entitled to an injunction enjoining defendants from defunding the 1:1 ABA home services until a final, nonappealable order or an uncontested individualized education program (“IEP”) removes those services from Y.T.’s educational placement.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Y.T.’s Background
Y.T. is an eleven year old child who has been classified as a student with autism.
B. The 2008-2012 School Years
While born in Egypt, Y.T. moved with his parents to New York in 2008, where he was enrolled in the New York City public school system.
In November 2008, defendants conducted the first IEP meeting for Y.T.
Plaintiffs allege that this program failed to produce any progress for Y.T. during the 2008-2012 academic years, but defendants still did not change the IEP recommendations or add additional services.
C. The State Administrative Complaint
In February 2012, plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking modification to the 2011-2012 IEP and “compensatory education for the previous three years.”
During the pendency of this matter before the IHO, Y.T. entered the 2012-2018 school year, still placed in the 6:1:1 class
On February 11, 2013, the IHO issued a final Findings of Fact and Decision (“IHO Decision”).
However, the IHO found that the services provided for the 2011-2012 school year were insufficient:
By that date the student had been in the 6:1:1 class at PS 255 for three full years and had ... the assistance of a 1:1 paraprofessional for two years. The DOE had access to multiple progress reports and other evaluative material ... to indicate the student’s slow rate of progress and the repeated instances of unmet goals from one IEP to the next.... Thus I find that the [DOE] was now on notice that additional home-based service were appropriate.... Based upon ... credible testimony ... I do not find that the recommended 6:1:1 class, using a mixed modality of instructional methods, was inappropriate for 2011-2012 — -just insufficient without additional 1:1 instruction outside the school day....
____ I now find it appropriate, so long as the student is not receiving full-time ABA instruction in school to increase the home services to 20 hours per week with at least 16 hours to be direct services to the student.26
The remainder of plaintiffs’ requested relief was denied.
On March 25, 2013, plaintiffs appealed the IHO’s decision to the State Review Officer (“SRO”) at the New York State Department of Education.
D. The Instant Action
At the end of the 2012-2013 school year, plaintiffs were informed that the DOE intended to discontinue the 1:1 ABA home services as of June 30, 2013.
“ ‘A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.’ ”
IY. APPLICABLE LAW
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”)
IDEA also requires states to establish procedural safeguards for children with disabilities and their parents to ensure that they can exercise their rights under the Act.
Once a party exhausts these administrative remedies, it may seek review of the final decision in either a state or federal district court.
IDEA also contains a “stay-put” or “pendency” provision, which states that during any of these hearings or appeals, “the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of the child.”
A party seeking a judicial remedy for a violation of the stay-put provision need not exhaust its administrative remedies.
V. DISCUSSION
A. The 1:1 ABA Services Should Be Maintained Through Pendency
Plaintiffs seek an injunction to maintain the 1:1 ABA home services that Y.T. is now receiving throughout the pendency of their state proceedings and possible court review.
Though not found in the 2011-2012 or 2012-2013 IEPs, the 1:1 ABA services became a part of Y.T.’s “current educational placement” once the DOE began providing them. Ordinarily, the current placement for pendency purposes is “the last agreed upon placement at the moment when the due process proceeding is commenced.”
Defendants also argue that the 1:1 ABA services are compensatory in nature and thus not part of Y.T.’s current educational placement.
Contrary to defendants’ argument,
This Court recognizes the potentially perverse incentives caused by ordering the ABA services under the stay-put provision. By complying with the IHO’s interim orders and providing Y.T. with the 1:1 ABA services, the DOE opened itself to being forced to maintain the provision of these services throughout the pendency of plaintiffs’ administrative complaint and appeals.
B. Plaintiffs’ Request for Mandatory Injunctive Relief Is Denied
In addition to the maintenance of the currently-received 1:1 ABA home services under IDEA’S pendency provision, plaintiffs also request an order directing defendants to provide additional services, evaluations, and observations.
As their first ground for exemption from the exhaustion requirement, plaintiffs claim that the administrative system is unduly delayed.
Plaintiffs also argue that their Complaint raises “systemic-policy and practice claims” which the administrative process has “ ‘no power to correct.’ ”
Even if this Court had subject matter jurisdiction to grant plaintiffs’ requested mandatory relief, their claims do not meet the standard for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs are requesting additional services that are not currently being provided to Y.T. They have failed to show irrepara
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants are enjoined from terminating funding for the services provided to Y.T. under his current educational placement, including the current level of 1:1 ABA home services, until a final, non-appealable order or an uncontested IEP removes those services from Y.T.’s educational placement. A conference is scheduled for August 12, 2013 at 5:00 p.m.
SO ORDERED.
. See Complaint ("Compl.”) ¶ 1; Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Application for a Preliminary Injunction ("Opp. Mem.”) at 1.
. Compl. ¶ 40.
. Id. ¶ 41.
. See id. ¶¶ 42-43, 45-46.
. See id. ¶¶ 3, 38, 51; Plaintiffs’Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction ("PL Mem.”) at 6; Opp. Mem. at 1.
. See Compl. ¶¶ 51-52.
. See id. ¶¶ 4, 65.
. See id. ¶¶ 63, 65-67, 69, 74, 84, 93, 102, 114, 119.
. See id. ¶ 68.
. Id. ¶ 69.
. See id. ¶¶ 86, 90, 104, 116. Plaintiffs allege that DOE "place[s] a majority of children who are classified as autistic in their 6:1:1 programs.” PL Mem. at 6.
. See Compl. ¶¶ 79, 96-97, 106-107, 116.
. See id. ¶¶ 92, 103.
. See id. ¶¶ 62, 87, 113.
. Id. ¶ 117. Plaintiffs refer to this complaint as a "due process complaint” or "DPC,” presumably in reference to the "impartial due process hearing” afforded under federal law. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2006).
. See Compl. ¶ 129; 4/20/12 Interim Order, Ex. L to 7/3/13 Declaration of Elisa Hyman, Attorney for Plaintiffs ("Hyman Decl.”), at 3-4.
. See Compl. ¶ 131; 6/25/12 Second Interim Order ("Second Interim Order”), Ex. M to Hyman Decl.
. Second Interim Order at 3.
. See id.; Compl. ¶ 131.
. See Compl. ¶ 132. The DOE did not appeal this or any of the other interim orders issued by the IHO. See id. ¶ 141.
. See id. ¶¶ 132, 134, 137.
. See id. ¶ 138; 10/26/13 Third Interim Order, Ex. N to Hyman Dec!., at 4.
. See Compl. ¶ 139.
. See Ex. O to Hyman Deck; PI. Mem. at 13.
. Id. at 15.
. Id. at 16-17.
. See id. at 18.
. See PI. Mem. at 13; Opp. Mem. at 4.
. See PI. Mem. at 13; Opp. Mem. at 5.
. See PI. Mem. at 14; Opp. Mem. at 5. Plaintiffs only learned of this fact after contacting the DOE through counsel. See Ph Mem. at 14.
.See Compl. at 40-43.
. See 7/5/13 Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause for Preliminary Injunction.
. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 660 F.3d 643, 648 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008)).
. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 365 (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 171 L.Ed.2d 1 (2008); Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982)). See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a) (preliminary injunctions).
. Red Earth LLC v. United States, 657 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Metropolitan Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 615 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2010)). Accord Pamlab, L.L.C v. Macoven Pharm., L.L.C, 881 F.Supp.2d 470, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (recognizing that the Supreme Court in Winter "cast some doubt on the continuing viability” of the Second Circuit's "serious questions” prong, but noting that "the Second Circuit has since held that ‘our venerable standard for assessing a movant’s probability of success on the merits remains valid' ” (quoting Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 2010))).
. Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F.3d 227, 233 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 473-74 (2d Cir. 1996)). The Second Circuit has recognized that "[t]he distinction between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions is not without ambiguities or critics, and that in a close case an injunction can be framed in mandatory or prohibitory terms.” Jolly, 76 F.3d at 474 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
. 20U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
. Id. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
. Id. § 1412(a)(1)(A).
. See id. § 1412(a)(4). See also id. § 1414(d) (outlining minimum requirements for an IEP and how it is developed).
. M.H. v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 224 (2d Cir. 2012) (alterations in original) (quoting T.P. ex rel. S.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 254 (2d Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
. Id. (first ellipses in original) (quoting Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 2003)).
. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a).
. See id. § 1415(b)(6), (f).
. Id. § 1415(g)(1); N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404.
. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 326-27, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988). Accord Cave v. East Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 514 F.3d 240, 249 (2d Cir. 2008).
. Levine v. Greece Cent. Sch. Dist., 353 Fed. Appx. 461, 464-65 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 158 (2d Cir. 1992)).
. See Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 2002). While plaintiffs also assert claims under Section 794 of Title 29 of the United States Code (Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act), these claims are also subject to IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. IDEA requires that “before the filing of a civil action under [other federal laws] seeking relief that is also available under [IDEA], the [administrative] procedures under [IDEA] shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under [IDEA itself].” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(0-
. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). Accord 34 C.F.R. § 300.518(a) (2013).
. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).
. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. L.P., 421 F.Supp.2d 692, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Zvi
. Id.
. Id. (citing Honig, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592).
. Murphy, 297 F.3d at 199.
. Id. at 199 (quoting Miss America Org. v. Mattel, Inc., 945 F.2d 536, 545 (2d Cir. 1991)).
. Arlington, 421 F.Supp.2d at 696 (citing Zvi D., 694 F.2d 904).
. See Compl. at 40.
. Arlington, 421 F.Supp.2d at 696 (citing Zvi D„ 694 F.2d 904).
. Id. Even without Zvi D.’ s rule that a court's enforcement of IDEA’S pendency provision acts as "an automatic preliminary injunction,” 694 F.2d at 906, plaintiffs here would still be entitled to preliminary injunctive relief. There is " 'a serious question going to the merits to make them a fair ground for trial,’ ” and the “ 'balance of hardships tip[s] decidedly in the plaintiff[s’] favor.' " Red Earth, 657 F.3d at 143 (quoting Metropolitan Taxicab, 615 F.3d at 156).
. Id.
. See Compl. ¶ 132; Opp. Mem. at 15.
. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (creating an exemption to the stay-put requirement when "the State or local educational agency and the parents” agree to the change); PI. Mem. at 17; Opp. Mem. at 15.
. See Arlington, 421 F.Supp.2d at 696 (citing Honig, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592). See also Doe v. Brookline Sch. Comm., 722 F.2d 910, 917 (1st Cir. 1983) ("Congress has expressed a strong preference for the preservation of the status quo through its enactment of [the pendency provision].... ”).
. See Opp. Mem. at 14-15.
. IHO Decision at 17 (emphasis added).
. See Opp. Mem. at 14-15.
. See IHO Decision at 18.
. See id. at 25.
. See id. at 17.
. See Opp. Mem. at 15.
. Arlington, 421 F.Supp.2d at 696 (citing Honig, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592).
. See Compl. at 40-41.
. See Compl. ¶¶ 248-257; PL Mem. at 15.
. See Honig, 484 U.S. at 327, 108 S.Ct. 592.
. See Compl. ¶¶ 251, 254-255. In support of this argument, plaintiffs cite to Sabatini v. Coming-Painted. Post Area School District, 78 F.Supp.2d 138 (W.D.N.Y. 1999), where the court exempted the plaintiffs from exhaustion due to delays in the administrative process, see id. at 141; Pl. Mem. at 15 n. 5. To whatever extent the arguments made in Sabatini are persuasive to this Court, the facts of that case are distinguishable. The Sabatini court made a significant point of noting that it was defendants in that case, not plaintiffs, who had appealed the IHO decision, and that there was "no indication of the reason for the delay or the date when the appeal will be decided.” 78 F.Supp.2d at 141.
. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(b).
. See Opp. Mem. at 5.
. Levine, 353 Fed.Appx. at 464 (quoting Heldman, 962 F.2d at 158).
. Levine, 353 Fed.Appx. at 465 (quoting J.S. v. Attica Cent. Sch., 386 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2004)).
. See Compl. ¶¶ 163-18 8.
. Compare Compl. at 40-43, with 3/25/13 Petition to New York State Review Officer, Ex. E to Hyman Decl.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- M.G. and V.M., on behalf of themselves individually and their child, Y.T. v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION New York City Board of Education Dennis Walcott, in his official capacity as Chancellor of the New York City School District
- Cited By
- 11 cases
- Status
- Published