Wells Fargo Bank, National Ass'n v. Davidson Kempner Capital Management LLC
Wells Fargo Bank, National Ass'n v. Davidson Kempner Capital Management LLC
Opinion of the Court
OPINION AND ORDER
1. BACKGROUND
Wells Fargo Bank, National Association (“Wells Fargo”) instituted this interpleader action to determine the proper disposition of certain pooled securities under its trusteeship.
A. Factual Background
Bedford is currently the “Directing Se-
“If the Directing Securityholder has not provided notice to the Trustee of its exercise of the Purchase Option within 10 Business Days of its receipt of notice that a [certificate has become a defaulted security], the Purchase Option calculated pursuant to clause (i) above will be deemed to be irrevocably waived ....”
In July 2013, the Directing Security-holder previous to Bedford requested and received a Fair Value determination for certain defaulted securities.
“On August 9, 2013, Bedford notified Wells Fargo that it had become the Directing Securityholder.”
Section 7.02 of the Pooling Agreement states, “No Certifieateholder shall have any right to ... control the operation and management of the Trust Estate, or the obligations of the parties hereto....”
B. Procedural History
Wells Fargo initiated this interpleader action, contending that the Pooling Agreement is “ambiguous with respect to Bedford’s right to exercise the Purchase Option with respect to the Disputed [Securities],”
On March 25, the Court granted the DWS Parties’ motion for reconsideration in light of newly produced evidence that a Fair Value Determination was, in fact, issued to the previous Directing Security-holder. In its Second Amended Complaint, Wells Fargo has asked the Court to: (1) order the interpleader defendants to settle all claims regarding Bedford’s rights to exercise the Purchase Option in respect to the Disputed Securities; (2) restrain the interpleader defendants from claiming any interest in the Disputed Securities, or from bringing separate suit against Wells Fargo; and (3) to award Wells Fargo its costs. Bedford and the DWS Parties bring cross motions for judgment on the pleadings.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Legal Standard
At any time after the pleadings are closed, but before trial commences, a party may move for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c).
“[T]he legal standards of review for motions to dismiss and motions for judgment on the pleadings ‘are indistinguishable.’ ”
B. Applicable Law
Under New York law, “ ‘[t]he initial interpretation of a contract is a matter of law for the court to decide.’ ”
“An option contract is a promise which meets the requirements for the formation of a contract and limits the promi-sor’s power to revoke an offer.”
III. DISCUSSION
As discussed in the March 6 Opinion, and at the March 25 conference, the Purchase Option for the Disputed Assets was waived by the previous Directing Security-holder’s failure to exercise its option to purchase within ten business days of receiving a Fair Value determination. Therefore, under the terms of the Pooling Agreement, Bedford had no valid purchase option as to the Disputed Securities. The Court now considers two arguments not addressed in the March 6 Opinion:
First, Bedford argues that a binding contract exists because: (1) Bedford complied with the procedures laid out in the Pooling Agreement; and (2) Wells Fargo acknowledged receipt of Bedford’s notice of intent to exercise the purchase option at the Fair Value price. Wells Fargo disputes that a binding agreement was created when it acknowledged receipt of notice.
Bedford believes that a binding bilateral contract for purchase of the Disputed Securities exists because it adhered to all conditions precedent as outlined in the Pooling Agreement when giving notice of its intent to exercise. Cases cited by Bed-ford in support of this claim reiterate that “[a]n option is an irrevocable offer to sell which becomes a binding contract of sale on acceptance by the optionee.”
Second, Bedford argues that Section 7.02 of the Pooling Agreement bars the DWS parties from contesting the validity of the purchase option and asserting their counterclaims. The DWS Parties argue that they have not “instituted” an “action, suit, or proceeding,” or asserted rights under the Pooling Agreement to
Finally, Wells Fargo’s duties as trustee under the Pooling Agreement include the administration of purchase options. Wells Fargo created this controversy by taking steps that led Bedford to conclude that it had a valid purchase option. Wells Fargo then chose to institute this interpleader action rather than seeking to amend the Pooling Agreement to cure the perceived ambiguity.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Bedford’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED. The DWS Parties’ cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this motion (Docket No. 36) and this case.
SO ORDERED.
. See Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-RR2 Pooling Agreement ("Pooling Agreement"), Ex. 1 to 12/20/13 Declaration of Danielle C. Lesser, counsel for Bedford, in Support of Bedford's Motion to Dismiss ("Lesser Decl.”), § 2.01.
. See Second Amended Interpleader Complaint ("Compl.”) ¶¶ 5-10.
. Id. ¶ 8.
. See Pooling Agreement § 1.01 (defining "Directing Securityholder”).
. See id. § 7.13.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
. See Comply ¶ 15.
. See id.
. Id. ¶ 16.
. See id. ¶ 17.
. Id. ¶ 18.
. See id. ¶ 19.
. Id. ¶ 20.
. Although it has not submitted an amended answer, or supplemental briefing, Northwestern has previously opposed Bedford’s motion adopting the DWS Parties’ arguments. See Northwestern's Memorandum in Opposition to Bedford's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
. See Comply 21.
. Pooling Agreement § 7.02.
. Id.
. Id. ¶ 23.
. Id. ¶1.
. See Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass’n v. Davidson Kempner Capital Mgmt. LLC, No. 13 Civ. 5981, 2014 WL 896741 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2014) (the "March 6 Opinion”). Familiarity with the March 6 Opinion is presumed for purposes of this Motion.
. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
. Dargahi v. Honda Lease Trust, 370 Fed.Appx. 172, 174 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., Inc. v. International Union, 47 F.3d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam)).
. LaFaro v. New York Cardiothoracic Group, PLLC, 570 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting DeMuria v. Hawkes, 328 F.3d 704, 706 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2003)).
. Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Patel v. Contemporary Classics of Beverly Hills, 259 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2001)).
. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).
. DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
. Yakin v. Tyler Hill Corp., 566 F.3d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Parks Real Estate Purchasing Grp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 472 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 2006)).
. Consolidated Edison, Inc. v. Northeast Util., 426 F.3d 524, 527 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Abiele Contracting v. New York City Sch. Constr. Auth., 91 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 666 N.Y.S.2d 970, 689 N.E.2d 864 (1997)).
. Fundamental Portfolio Advisors, Inc. v. Tocqueville Asset Mgmt., L.P., 7 N.Y.3d 96, 104, 817 N.Y.S.2d 606, 850 N.E.2d 653 (2006) (citing Nassau Trust Co. v. Montrose Concrete Prods. Corp., 56 N.Y.2d 175, 184, 451 N.Y.S.2d 663, 436 N.E.2d 1265 (1982)).
. Globecon Group, LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 434 F.3d 165, 176 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Gilbert Frank Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 966, 525 N.Y.S.2d 793, 520 N.E.2d 512 (1988)).
. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 25 (1981).
. Kaplan v. Lippman, 75 N.Y.2d 320, 325, 552 N.Y.S.2d 903, 552 N.E.2d 151 (1990) (citing Cochran v. Taylor, 273 N.Y. 172, 183, 7 N.E.2d 89 (1937); Bullock v. Cutting, 155 A.D. 825, 140 N.Y.S. 686 (3d Dep’t 1913)).
. See 15 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 46:12 (4th ed. 1990).
. J.N.A. Realty Corp. v. Cross Bay Chelsea, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 392, 396, 397 N.Y.S.2d 958, 366 N.E.2d 1313 (1977) (citing Sy Jack Realty Co. v. Pergament Syosset Corp., 27 N.Y.2d 449, 318 N.Y.S.2d 720, 267 N.E.2d 462 (1971)).
. See Compl. ¶ 20.
. Texas Co. v. Z. & M. Indep. Oil Co., 156 F.2d 862, 865 (2d Cir. 1946).
. See Novello v. 215 Rockaway, LLC, No. 2426-07, 2008 WL 412625 (Sup.Ct. Nassau Cty. Feb. 5, 2008) ("[0]nce a tenant gives notice of intent to exercise a purchase option in accordance with the lease, 'the unilateral option agreement ripens into a fully enforceable bilateral contract.’ " (quoting Kaplan v. Lippman, 75 N.Y.2d 320, 552 N.Y.S.2d 903, 552 N.E.2d 151 (1990)) (emphasis added)). Other cases cited by Bedford are simply inap-posite. See Brainstorms Internet Mktg., Inc. v. USA Networks, Inc., 6 A.D.3d 318, 775 N.Y.S.2d 844, 844 (2004) (“[Defendant], by sending e-mail to plaintiffs setting closing date for its purchase of remaining [portion] of plaintiffs' business, did, in fact, exercise purchase option accorded it in the parties’ purchase agreement pursuant to the agreement’s terms.”).
. DWS Parties’ Supplemental Memorandum of Law ("DWS Supp. Mem.”) at 2-3.
. I need not reach the effect of section 7.02 on the DWS Parties’ first counterclaim, which is largely duplicative of its affirmative defenses. Nor need I reach the second counterclaim, which was pled in the alternative.
.See Pooling Agreement § 7.01.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as trustee, Interpleader v. DAVIDSON KEMPNER CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC, Waterfall Asset Management LLC, The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, STS Partners Fund, LP, Bedford CMBS Acquisitions LLC, Cede & Co., as holder of certain Certificates and nominee name of The Depository Trust Company, and Does 1 through 50, holders of beneficial interests in the Certificates, Interpleader
- Cited By
- 4 cases
- Status
- Published