MEMORANDUM & ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Denise Wallis brought this action under Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), against Carolyn W. Colvin, the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”), challenging the decision of the Commissioner denying Wallis’s application for disability and insurance benefits. Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 1.

A. Procedural History

Wallis filed an application for Social Security Disability and Supplemental Security Income benefits (collectively, “benefits”) on November 28, 2011, indicating that her disabling condition dated back to June 30, 2007.2 Id. ¶¶ 3-4. On March 8, 2012, Wallis was notified that her application had been denied, and she subsequently filed a request for a hearing. Id Wallis appeared before an Administrative Law Judge (the “hearing officer”3) on January 25, 2013. Id. ¶ 6. The hearing officer denied Wallis’s request for benefits. |d. Wallis appealed the hearing officer’s decision, and on February 7, 2014, the Appeals Council declined further review, rendering the hearing officer’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner.4 Id. ¶ 8.

Wallis filed her complaint in this Court on February 28, 2014, claiming the decision of the Commissioner not to award her benefits was “arbitrary, capricious, incorrect, and not supported by substantial evidence.” Id. ¶ 9; see Social Security Pl.’s Br. (“Pl.’s Mem.”), ECF No. 14. The Commissioner disagrees," arguing the hearing officer’s findings of fact “are supported by substantial evidence and are conclusive.” Def.’s Answer ¶ 9, ECF No. 9.

B. Factual Background5

Wallis was born on September 27, 1969. Admin. R. Tr. (“Admin. R”) 29, ECF No. *21110.6 She completed an eighth-grade education and is able to communicate in English. Id at 10, 29. Wallis is single and has three children. Id. at 45. She lives with her father and her eleven-year-old daughter at Wallis’s father’s residencé. Id. at 45-46. Wallis has held different jobs during her lifetime, including a line worker at a factory, a packager at a cheese shop, a temporary employee, and a waitress. Id. at 182.

Wallis suffers from a variety of physical impairments including asthma and an abdominal hernia, id. at 286, though her application for benefits is based primarily on her psychiatric impairments, id. at 39, which include depression and post-traumatic stress disorder, id. at 69.

11. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court reviews the Commissioner’s findings and .conclusions—here, those of the hearing officer, see, e.g., Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1996)—to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record, and whether the correct legal standards were applied. E.g., Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence as “more than a mere scintilla” and such evidence that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The underlying five-step disability- determination is well-known and will not be recited again -here; for a statement of this framework, see, for example, McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 2008); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v)).

III. ANALYSIS

Wallis challenges the Commissioner’s determination on three grounds. First, Wallis argues the Commissioner erred in his evaluation of the medical opinion evidence. PL’s Mem. 10-15. Second, Wallis argues the Commissioner failed properly to weigh the relevant medical evidence in determining Wallis’s residual functional capacity. Id. at 15. Third, Wallis claims the Commissioner’s assessment of her credibility is flawed. Id. at 16-22.7 The Commissioner disputes each of these arguments, and urges the Court to affirm. See Def.’s Mem. Law Pursuant General Order 18 (“Def.’s Mem.”), ECF No. 15. The Court addresses each of Wallis’s arguments in turn.

A. Weight of Treating Source Opinion

Wallis argues that the hearing officer erred in failing to assign sufficient weight to the opinion of Anandavalli Me-*212non, M.D. (“Dr. Menon”), Wallis’s psychologist. Pl.’s Mem. 10-12. Wallis argues that the hearing officer ought have given “great weight” to the opinion of Dr. Menon, as a treating source, and further that the hearing officer’s purported reasons for not doing so are unsupported by the record. See id. at 10-15. The Commissioner maintains that the hearing officer provided adequate reasoning for his decision to weigh the medical opinions in the way that he did, and that this decision is supported by substantial evidence. Def.’s Mem. 5-8.

The opinions of treating sources are “[generally” given “more weight” than those of non-treating sources. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). When a treating source’s opinion is not given “controlling weight,”8 a hearing officer must “give good reasons ... for the weight [he or she] give[s] the opinion.” Id. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). The relevant factors a hearing officer ought consider in determining the appropriate weight are the “[ljength of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination!,]” the “[n]ature and extent of the treatment relationship!,]” the “[s]upportability” of the opinion (i.e., the extent to which the medical source has explained her findings and supported them with evidence such as “medical signs and laboratory findings”), consistency with the record as a whole, whether the source specializes in the area on which she has opined, and any other factors that “tend to support or contradict the opinion.” Id. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6).

Here, Dr. Menon opined that Wallis is “unlikely able to do work,”9 Admin. R. 343, and provided a checklist evaluating Wallis’s ability to perform various tasks, see id. at 342-43. The hearing officer assigned Dr. Menon’s opinion “limited weight” on the ground that “it is internally and externally inconsistent.” Id. at 27. As for internal consistencies, the hearing officer pointed out, for example, that while “Dr. Menon noted that [Wallis] had ‘marked’ limitation in her ability to use judgment, function independently and demonstrate reliability. ... Dr. Menon also indicated, in two separate instances, that [Wallis] could manage benefits in her own best interest.” Id. at 27. In terms of external inconsistencies, the hearing officer noted that Dr, Menon’s opinion that Wallis “had ‘extreme’ limitations in ability to deal with [the] public, relate to authority figures, and maintain attention/concentration” are belied by Wallis’s “function report” as well as the opinions of Wallis’s primary care physician (who “generally noted that [Wallis] possessed intact judgment and insight”) and the consulting psychiatrist (who “noted only a mild impairment to attention and concentration”). Id. Accordingly, the hearing officer’s determination that Dr. Menon’s opinion was entitled to limited weight is adequately supported and explained. See Michels v. *213Astrue, 297 Fed.Appx. 74, 75-76 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that hearing officer properly discounted treating physician’s opinion where hearing officer pointed to conflicting medical evidence and internal inconsistencies).10

B, Residual Functional Capacity

Wallis next argues that the hearing officer’s residual functional capacity determination is flawed insofar as it reflects an improper assessment of the medical opinion evidence.11 See Pl.’s Mem. 15. In 'particular, she argues that the hearing officer’s “failure to appropriately accord weight to the opinions of treating sources” led him to arrive at a residual functional capacity that did not properly account for Wallis’s “non-exertional impairments.” Id. Because this Court has concluded that the hearing officer’s weighing of medical opinion evidence was not in error, it must reject Wallis’s argument concerning the hearing officer’s residual functional capacity determination.

C. Wallis’s Credibility

■ Wallis’s third argument is that the hearing officer erred by failing properly to assess Wallis’s credibility as to her statements about her condition. PL’s Mem. 16-22. The Commissioner refutes this claim, arguing that the hearing officer’s decision to discredit certain of Wallis’s statements about her symptoms and their limiting effects was proper in light of contrary evidence contained in Wallis’s treatment records. Def.’s Mem. 8-10.

A hearing officer “is required to take the claimant’s reports of pain and other limitations into account, but is not required to accept the claimant’s subjective complaints without question” and “may exercise discretion in weighing the credibility of the ‘ claimant’s testimony in light of other evidence in the record.” Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010). In evaluating Wallis’s credibility, the hearing officer

was required (1) to consider “all of the available evidence,” including [Wallis’s] own statements, the observations and opinions of [Wallis’s] treating physicians, and the observations and opinions of other medical professionals who examined [Wallis] or reviewed [her] records; and (2) to weigh [Wallis’s] statements against the objective evidence, including medical records.

Whipple v. Astrue, 479 Fed.Appx. 367, 370 (2d Cir . 2012) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1), (4)). Since the Commissioner is charged with the task of “re*214solving] evidentiary conflicts and ... appraising] the credibility of witnesses, including the claimant[,]” the Court will not disturb the Commissioner’s adverse credibility determination so long as that determination is supported by substantial evidence. Aponte v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. of United States, 728 F.2d 588, 591 (2d Cir. 1984).

Here, the hearing officer found that Wallis’s “medically determinable impairments reasonably could be expected to cause the alleged symptoms[,]” but that her “statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely eredible[.]” Admin R. 25.

To the extent Wallis’s argument as to the hearing officer’s credibility determination is premised on the hearing officer’s failure correctly to weigh the opinions of treating sources, see PL’s Mem. 17-18, that argument lacks merit since, as discussed above, the hearing officer properly weighed the medical opinion evidence. Furthermore, while the hearing officer could have been more precise and thorough in explaining the reasoning behind his decision to discredit certain of Wallis’s statements,12 there is, nonetheless, substantial evidence to support that decision. Specifically, Wallis’s testimony is undercut by its inconsistencies with other parts of the record. and by a general dearth of corroborating evidence for it. For example, as the hearing officer pointed out, while Wallis stated that she quit working because she was afraid of people standing behind her, Admin. R. 43, she indicated oh another occasion that it was transportation issues and childcare responsibilities that impeded her ability to work, id. at 281. The record also contains inconsistencies between her testimony and other evidence regarding Wallis’s daily activities.13 Moreover, Wallis’s statements concerning the severity of her mental and psychological impairments are belied by medical reports from sources appropriately determined to be credible.14 Given the substantial evidence on the record, the hearing officer properly evaluated the weight of Wallis’s testimony.

*215III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court enters judgment for the Defendant, dismissing Wallis’s complaint, ECF No. 1, and affirming the Commissioner’s decision.

SO ORDERED.