IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK _________________________

SONIA ELISA E.,

Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 3:19-CV-0476 (DEP) ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security,1

Defendant.

__________________________

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

FOR PLAINTIFF

LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF ELIZABETH V. KRUPER, ESQ. MID-NEW YORK 221 South Warren Street Suite 310 Syracuse, New York 13202

FOR DEFENDANT

HON. GRANT C. JAQUITH AMY BLAND, ESQ. United States Attorney Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys P.O. Box 7198 100 S. Clinton Street Syracuse, NY 13261-7198

1 Plaintiff=s complaint named Nancy A. Berryhill, in her capacity as the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, as the defendant. On June 4, 2019, Andrew M. Saul took office as Social Security Commissioner. He has therefore been substituted as the named defendant in this matter pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and no further action is required in order to effectuate this change. See 42 U.S.C. ' 405(g). DAVID E. PEEBLES U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ORDER Currently pending before the court in this action, in which plaintiff seeks judicial review of an adverse administrative determination by the Commissioner of Social Security, pursuant to

(g) and 1383(c)(3), are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings.2 Oral argument was heard in connection with those motions on July 1, 2020, during a telephone conference conducted on the record. At the close of

argument, I issued a bench decision in which, after applying the requisite deferential review standard, I found that the Commissioner=s determination resulted from the application of proper legal principles and is supported by

substantial evidence, providing further detail regarding my reasoning and addressing the specific issues raised by the plaintiff in this appeal. After due deliberation, and based upon the court=s oral bench decision, which has been transcribed, is attached to this order, and is

2 This matter, which is before me on consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636(c), has been treated in accordance with the procedures set forth in General Order No. 18. Under that General Order once issue has been joined, an action such as this is considered procedurally, as if cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings had been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. incorporated herein by reference, it is hereby ORDERED, as follows: 1) | Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED. 2) |The Commissioner’s determination that the plaintiff was not disabled at the relevant times, and thus is not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act, is AFFIRMED. 3) clerk is respectfully directed to enter judgment, based

upon this determination, DISMISSING plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. hu. Alta David E. Peebles U.S. Magistrate Judge Dated: July 8, 2020 Syracuse, NY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK --------------------------------------------x SONIA ELISA E.,

Plaintiff,

vs. 3:19-CV-476

ANDREW M. SAUL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant. --------------------------------------------x Transcript of a Decision held during a Telephone Conference on July 1, 2020, the HONORABLE DAVID E. PEEBLES, United States Magistrate Judge, Presiding. A P P E A R A N C E S (By Telephone) For Plaintiff: LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF MID-NEW YORK 221 South Warren Street Suite 310 Syracuse, New York 13202 BY: ELIZABETH V. KRUPER, ESQ.

For Defendant: SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION Office of the General Counsel JFK Federal Building, Room 625 15 New Sudbury Street Boston, Massachusetts 02203 BY: AMY BLAND, ESQ.

Jodi L. Hibbard, RPR, CSR, CRR Official United States Court Reporter 100 South Clinton Street Syracuse, New York 13261-7367 (315) 234-8547 1 (The Court and counsel present by telephone.) 2 THE COURT: Let me begin by thanking both counsel 3 for excellent written and oral presentations, I have enjoyed 4 working with both of you. 5 Plaintiff has commenced this proceeding pursuant to 6

(g) and 1383(c)(3) to 7 challenge a determination by the Commissioner of Social 8 Security denying plaintiff's application for benefits and 9 finding that she was not disabled at the relevant times. 10 The background is as follows: Plaintiff was born 11 in September of 1975 and is currently 44 years of age. She 12 was 40 years old at the time of the alleged onset of her 13 disability on March 1, 2016. Plaintiff stands 5 foot 1 inch 14 in height and weighs between 150 and 205 pounds at various 15 points in the record. She has apparently undergone bariatric 16 surgery. Plaintiff has a 12th grade education and attended 17 regular classes while in school. She is right-handed. 18 Plaintiff is separated. She has three children who are now 19 approximately 14, 21, and 23 years of age. She also has a 20 boyfriend who she met online. She has 50 percent custody of 21 her youngest son. Plaintiff resides in an apartment in 22 Norwich, New York. She has no driver's license and relies on 23 friends, Catholic Charities, or A&D Cab for transportation, 24 she does not use public transportation such as buses. 25 Plaintiff worked until November of 2015. She quit 1 her position at the time after an issue with her manager. 2 Over time, she has held various positions, including as a 3 kennel worker, a worker in her Off-Track Betting facility, a 4 cashier in various grocery and convenience store settings, 5 and an assembler in a manufacturing facility. She lost a job 6 in April of 2014 based on poor performance. Her longest 7 period of employment was between 2002 and 2004 in the 8 Polkville store. She did not work between 2005 and 2007 as a 9 result of her pregnancy and giving birth to her son. She 10 also did not work from 2010 to 2011 when she was 11 self-medicating with alcohol. 12 Plaintiff has a significant history of sexual abuse 13 and that and other stressors have caused her to suffer mental 14 impairments that have been variously diagnosed including as 15 OCD, or obsessive compulsive disorder, post-traumatic stress 16 disorder, or PTSD, major depressive disorder, MDD, 17 generalized anxiety disorder and bipolar disorder, borderline 18 personality disorder, adjustment disorder with depressed 19 mood, and alcohol abuse. She apparently has been abstinent 20 since February of 2016. 21 Plaintiff has been hospitalized on several 22 occasions including in the Bassett Medical Center emergency 23 room in November 2015, Binghamton General Hospital in 24 December 2015, again Binghamton General Hospital in 25 February 2016, Conifer Park, she underwent treatment there in 1 July of 2015, and New Horizons where she attended weekly 2 sessions between March and September of 2016. In June of 3 2016, she apparently made plans to overdose. That is 4 reflected in page 827 of the administrative transcript. 5 Plaintiff has treated with psychiatrist Dr. Nickolas -- the 6 records reflect that it might be T-o-g-l-a-s, we are going to 7 refer to Dr. Nickolas Toglas as Togias because that is the 8 way it appears in the administrative law judge's decision. 9 She has treated with Dr. Togias since June of 2016 and sees 10 him approximately every two months. She also treats with 11 LCSW Mary Ann Rason who she sees weekly. She also attends 12 weekly group sessions entitled Seeking Safety. Plaintiff 13 is -- her general physical needs are taken care of by 14 Physician's Assistant Erica Hill. She also at a time 15 underwent treatment at Chenango Behavioral Health with 16 another therapist, Kelly Hunter. 17 Plaintiff has been prescribed various medications 18 over time, including Effexor, Seroquel, Synthroid, trazodone, 19 Prozac, hydroxyzine, lithium, prazosin, Ravea, Estoril, 20 Depakote, and Latuda. 21 In terms of activities of daily living, at various 22 points in the record, including at 46 to 47 and 443, there is 23 indication that she can dress, shower, groom, cook, she shops 24 twice a week, she can do dishes, laundry, can vacuum, can 25 sweep, dust, clean, watches television, enjoys writing, can 1 go on social media and can FaceTime, visit friends. She has 2 a relationship with a boyfriend of some length. She has 3 expressed a desire to do volunteer work. She plays games 4 with her son, she plays games on her phone, and in 2017 drove 5 to and back from Florida. 6 Procedurally, plaintiff applied for Title II and 7 Title XVI benefits under the Social Security Act on 8 September 10, 2015. In that application, she alleged an 9 onset date of October 1, 2011, that was subsequently amended 10 to March 1, 2016. In support of her application, she claims 11 disability based on PTSD, major depressive disorder, and 12 generalized anxiety disorder. That appears at page 212 of 13 the administrative transcript. 14 A hearing was conducted on April 16, 2018, by 15 Administrative Law Judge, or ALJ, Mary Leary to address 16 plaintiff's application for benefits. On July 13, 2018, ALJ 17 Leary issued an unfavorable decision. That became a final 18 determination of the agency on March 18, 2019, when the 19 Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied 20 plaintiff's request for review. This action was commenced on 21 April 23, 2019, and is timely. 22 In her decision, ALJ Leary applied the familiar 23 five-step sequential test for determining disability. She 24 first found that plaintiff is insured or was insured through 25 June 30, 2018. 1 At step one of the sequential analysis, she found 2 that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 3 activity since March 1, 2016. 4 At step two, ALJ Leary concluded that plaintiff 5 does suffer from impairments that impose more than minimal 6 limitations on her ability to perform basic work functions, 7 including alcohol use, borderline personality disorder, 8 adjustment disorder with depressed mood, major depressive 9 disorder, PTSD, generalized anxiety disorder, bipolar 10 disorder, and OCD or obsessive compulsive disorder. 11 At step three, ALJ Leary concluded that plaintiff's 12 conditions do not meet or medically equal any of the listed 13 presumptively disabling conditions set forth in the 14 Commissioner's regulations, specifically considering Listings 15 12.04, 12.06, 12.08, and 12.15. She found in connection with 16 those listings that neither the B nor the C criteria are met 17 in this case. 18 After surveying the record, ALJ Leary concluded 19 that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity, or 20 RFC, to perform work at all exertional levels with additional 21 nonexertional limitations as follows: She can understand, 22 remember, and carry out simple instructions consistent with 23 routine unskilled work; she can perform simple decision 24 making related to basic work functions; she can tolerate 25 frequent minor changes within the workplace and she can 1 tolerate occasional contact with coworkers and supervisors, 2 but no contact with the general public, in an occupation 3 where the individual can complete tasks relatively 4 independently, and where social interaction is not a primary 5 job requirement. 6 Applying that RFC at step four, Administrative Law 7 Judge Leary concluded that plaintiff is incapable of 8 performing her past relevant work, which was characterized as 9 a sales clerk, a gambling cashier, and a food sales clerk, 10 all of which were with an SVP of 3 -- I'm sorry, gambling 11 cashier is an SVP of 4. Sales clerk is in the light 12 category, gambling cashier is sedentary, food sales clerk is 13 light according to the vocational expert. 14 At step five, the administrative law judge 15 concluded based on the testimony of the vocational expert 16 that plaintiff, notwithstanding her impairments, is capable 17 of performing available work in the national economy, and 18 three example positions were cited, including as a stubber, 19 as a spiral binder, and as an automotive detailer, and 20 therefore concluded that plaintiff was not disabled at the 21 relevant times. 22 As you know, my function is limited, the standard 23 that I must apply is extremely deferential. I must determine 24 whether correct legal principles were applied, and the 25 resulting determination is supported by substantial evidence. 1 Substantial evidence, of course, is defined as such relevant 2 evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 3 support a conclusion. As the Second Circuit noted in Brault 4 v. Social Security Administration,

from 2012, 5 the standard to be applied is a rigorous standard. It is far 6 more rigid than the clearly erroneous standard that we are 7 all familiar with. The Second Circuit also noted that with 8 the substantial evidence standard in place, that means once 9 an ALJ finds facts, they can be rejected only if a reasonable 10 fact finder would have to conclude otherwise. 11 In this case, plaintiff has raised essentially two 12 contentions in support of her challenge to the determination. 13 She challenges the weight of medical evidence afforded by the 14 administrative law judge to the various opinions in the 15 record centering upon the records of treating source 16 Dr. Togias, which is also cosigned by Therapist Rason. She 17 also challenges the administrative law judge's evaluation of 18 her subjective complaints of symptomology. 19 The task of the administrative law judge begins 20 with formulating the plaintiff's RFC. A claimant's RFC 21 represents a finding of the range of tasks she is capable of 22 performing notwithstanding the impairments at issue. An RFC 23 determination is informed by consideration of all relevant 24 medical and other evidence. When assessing a claimant's RFC, 25 the ALJ must analyze exertional capabilities, which includes 1 such things as the ability to sit, stand, walk, lift, carry, 2 push and pull, as well as nonexertional limitations or 3 impairments, which include of course the mental impairments 4 of the type that are now at issue. And of course the RFC 5 determination must be supported by substantial evidence in 6 order for the resulting determination to be upheld. 7 The focus of this case is of course on the medical 8 records in evidence, and there are four of those in this 9 case. The first was cosigned by Dr. Togias and Therapist 10 Rason. It was given on February 27, 2018 and appears at 11 pages 869 to 871 of the record. In that medical source 12 statement, plaintiff was found to have marked limitations in 13 carrying out detailed instructions, marked limitations in the 14 ability to make judgments on simple work-related decisions. 15 She was found to have marked limitations in the areas of 16 interacting appropriately with the public and interacting 17 appropriately with supervisors, including accepting 18 instructions and criticism from them, as well as marked 19 limitations in responding appropriately to stress, work 20 pressures in the usual work setting, and responding 21 appropriately to changes in a routine work setting. She was 22 also found to experience marked limitations in the ability to 23 perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular 24 attendance and be punctual within customary tolerances, and 25 in the ability to complete a normal workday and workweek 1 without interruptions from psychologically-based symptoms and 2 to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable 3 number and length of rest periods. That opinion was assigned 4 little weight by the administrative law judge. 5 A second was from LCSW-R Kelly Hunter given on 6 March 10, 2016 and appearing at pages 447 to 449 of the 7 administrative transcript. In that statement, Therapist 8 Hunter indicates that plaintiff is very limited in the 9 following areas: Maintain attention/concentration, interact 10 appropriately with others, maintain socially appropriate 11 behavior without exhibiting behavior extremes, maintain basic 12 standards of personal hygiene and grooming, and appears to 13 be -- appears able to function in a work setting at a 14 consistent pace. 15 The next opinion is given by Dr. Sara Long, it was 16 dated April 12, 2016. Dr. Long, a psychiatrist, examined the 17 plaintiff on that date, and her report appears at pages 441 18 to 445 of the administrative transcript. Based upon her 19 examination, Dr. Long issued the following medical source 20 statement: "No limitations were observed regarding following 21 and understanding simple directions and performing simple 22 tasks. She was able to maintain attention and concentration 23 and is able to maintain a regular schedule. Generally, she 24 is able to learn new tasks, perform complex tasks, make 25 appropriate decisions, relate adequately with others, and is 1 capable of adequate stress management. Ms. E. presents with 2 significant history of sexual abuse, experiencing guilt 3 regarding the other children involved. She states she has 4 reported those problems to therapists in the past and not -- 5 and told not to pursue it. It was today discussed with 6 Ms. E. that the concern is that this individual not be a 7 current risk to other children. She might discuss with her 8 therapist the option of making a police report and leaving it 9 to their judgment as to whether they want to confirm that 10 this person is not a current risk and reporting it to the 11 authorities would relieve her of having to carry any feelings 12 of responsibility as then it would be the judgment by the 13 third party as to whether it should be pursued." She went on 14 to state that the results of the present evaluation appear to 15 be consistent with psychiatric and history of substance abuse 16 problems which may interfere with her ability to function on 17 a regular basis. 18 The last opinion of record is from Dr. T. 19 Inman-Dundon, a state agency consultant. It appears a couple 20 places in the record as part of the Exhibit 3A and 21 Exhibit 4A. In his opinion, Dr. Inman-Dundon found that 22 plaintiff was moderately limited in some areas including as 23 follows: The ability to perform activities within a 24 schedule, maintain regular attendance and be punctual within 25 customary tolerances, the ability to complete a normal 1 workday and workweek without interruptions from 2 psychologically-based symptoms and to perform at a consistent 3 pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest 4 periods. Also found moderately limited in the ability to 5 accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticisms 6 from supervisors, and the ability to get along with coworkers 7 or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral 8 extremes. She was rated as moderately limited also in the 9 ability to respond appropriately to changes in the work 10 setting, the ability to be aware of normal hazards and take 11 appropriate precautions, and the ability to set realistic 12 goals or make plans independently of others. There were not 13 any more serious limitations discerned by Dr. Inman-Dundon. 14 In Dr. Inman-Dundon's mental RFC opinion at page 15 87, he concludes as follows: It appears that claimant 16 experienced psychiatric decompensation in the context of 17 alcohol abuse. Currently claimant is abstinent, and appears 18 to be able to sustain simple tasks. Claimant can perform the 19 basic demands of unskilled work. 20 The -- as I said earlier, Dr. Togias and Therapist 21 Rason's opinions were given little weight. Therapist 22 Hunter's opinions were given little weight. Dr. Long's 23 opinion was given significant weight, and Dr. Inman-Dundon's 24 opinion was given great weight, and that is from May of 2016. 25 The focus of plaintiff's argument concerning these 1 opinions is on those of Dr. Togias. Dr. Togias obviously 2 qualifies as a treating source. Ordinarily the opinion of a 3 treating physician regarding the nature and severity of an 4 impairment is entitled to considerable deference provided it 5 is supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory 6 diagnostic techniques and not inconsistent with other 7 substantial evidence. If controlling weight is not given to 8 a treating source's opinion, the administrative law judge 9 must apply several factors to determine what degree of weight 10 should be assigned to the opinion. By regulations, those 11 factors include the length of the treatment relationship and 12 the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the 13 treatment relationship, the evidence supporting the treating 14 provider's opinion, the degree of consistency between the 15 opinion and the record as a whole, whether the opinion is 16 given by a specialist, and other evidence that has been 17 brought to the attention of the administrative law judge. 20 18 C.F.R. Section 404.1527 and 404 -- 416.927. And of course 19 when a treating source's opinions are repudiated, the ALJ 20 must provide reasons for the rejection and those reasons must 21 be supported by substantial evidence. 22 In this case, the reasons given for not accepting 23 Dr. Togias' opinions stem from the determination by the 24 administrative law judge that they were not consistent with 25 the treatment notes from both Dr. Togias and Therapist Rason 1 as well as plaintiff's activities of daily living. It was 2 also noted -- it also is noted that being a check-the-box 3 form, sometimes those opinions of check-the-box forms are 4 given less weight, although there is some narrative in this 5 case. 6 The opinions of Dr. Togias are also inconsistent 7 with those of Dr. Inman-Dundon and Dr. Long. As I indicated 8 during the oral argument, I recognize the importance of a 9 treating source and the longitudinal knowledge and history 10 that can be provided by a treating source, particularly in a 11 mental health case. The -- in this case, when I look to 12 what's known as the Burgess factors, certain of those factors 13 have been discussed by Administrative Law Judge Leary. 14 Reference is made to Dr. Togias and his specialty as a 15 psychiatrist. Reference is made to the treatment notes. 16 There is no reference to the length of treatment and 17 frequency, but there is reference to the consistency of the 18 opinion with other medical evidence, and the amount of 19 evidence supporting the opinions. 20 The -- I have reviewed carefully the treatment 21 notes that appear in the record, including those at 22 Exhibit 10F from Physician's Assistant Erica Hall, and 11F 23 and continuing on, from Dr. Togias and Social Worker Rason, 24 and there was another social worker also in there, Karen 25 Grosso. And it -- as the administrative law judge noted, 1 those treatment records, although they do show some hot 2 spots, they do, for the most part, show a fairly benign 3 psychological and psychiatric status as the administrative 4 law judge noted at page 21. Many, many of the treatment 5 notes indicate that plaintiff was well-kempt, cooperative, 6 open and talkative, calm, good eye contact, stable mood, 7 euthymic mood, appropriate affect, normal speech, linear 8 thought process, no delusions elicited, intact judgment, good 9 insight, denied any perceptual disturbances, and although 10 there is indication of suicidal ideation or even attempts at 11 times, most of the reports from those physicians of the 12 treating sources indicate no suicidal or homicidal ideation. 13 The -- Dr. Long and Dr. Inman-Dundon's opinions are 14 both contrary to the opinions of Dr. Togias. A careful 15 review of the notes indicate that while plaintiff's condition 16 was somewhat cyclical, there was not a significant 17 deterioration after those individuals gave their opinions 18 that would require revisiting or minimize the impact of those 19 opinions. 20 So in summary, I don't find that the treating 21 source rule was violated. I think essentially the Burgess 22 factors, the regulatory factors were considered, but even if 23 they were not, as Estrella teaches, if the court, after a 24 searching review of the record, finds that the treating 25 source rule was not violated, then the error is harmless and 1 remand is not required. That is based on Estrella v. 2 Berryhill,

from 2019 Second Circuit. In this 3 court one of my colleagues recognized similarly in Reed v. 4 Commissioner of Social Security, it is 5:16-CV-1134, found at 5

from the Northern District of New York, 6 March 6, 2018. It was also noted in Reed by Magistrate Judge 7 Carter that it is appropriate to rely on sources such as 8 Dr. Long, Dr. Inman-Dundon, and those opinions can provide 9 substantial evidence sufficient to overcome a treating source 10 opinion. 11 So I conclude, based on all of my review of the 12 record, the opinions of those sources, treatment notes of PA 13 Hill, Dr. Togias, and Rason, Therapist Rason, that no 14 reasonable -- a reasonable fact finder would not have to 15 conclude that the treating source opinions should be 16 accepted, and so I -- and I note that this case is not 17 similar to Estrella. Estrella involved a very different 18 situation where the administrative law judge cherrypicked two 19 positive treatment notes, and in light of those and GAF 20 scores and consultative examiner in the face of treatment 21 notes that showed a very different situation for that 22 plaintiff. So in conclusion I find plaintiff failed to show 23 that no reasonable fact finder could have reached the 24 administrative law judge's conclusions concerning the 25 treating source issue. 1 The second issue raised by the plaintiff concerns 2 the treatment of plaintiff's subjective complaints. 3 Obviously an ALJ must take into account plaintiff's 4 subjective complaints in rendering the five-step disability 5 analysis. 20 C.F.R. Sections 404.1529 and 416.929. However, 6 when examining the question, the ALJ is not required to 7 blindly accept the subjective testimony of a complainant -- a 8 claimant, and rather, retains discretion to weigh the 9 credibility in light of other evidence in the record. 10 The regulations and the case law provide a two-step 11 analysis to be made when reviewing credibility which is 12 governed by SSR 16-3p. When assessing credibility and a 13 plaintiff's subjective symptomology, an ALJ must consider 14 certain relevant factors including the claimant's daily 15 activities, the location, duration, frequency, and intensity 16 of any symptoms, any precipitating and aggravating factors, 17 the type, dosage, effectiveness and side effects of any 18 medication taken and other treatment received as well as 19 other measures taken to relieve the symptoms. There are 20 other factors as well. 21 In this case, the administrative law judge 22 recounted plaintiff's claims at page 18 and concluded that, 23 after careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned, 24 ALJ Leary, finds that the claimant's medically determinable 25 impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged 1 symptoms. However, the claimant's statements concerning the 2 intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms 3 are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and 4 other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in 5 this decision. If the administrative law judge had stopped 6 there, the case law is clear that that would be insufficient 7 to provide meaningful judicial review of the ALJ's thinking. 8 The ALJ, however, went on to discuss treatment notes, the 9 conservative treatment undergone by the plaintiff, her 10 activities of daily living, and the medical evidence in the 11 record. At page 20, ALJ Leary summarizes, "Overall, the 12 evidence in the record consists primarily of documentation of 13 the claimant's subjective complaints with little in the way 14 of objective findings to support functional limitations of 15 the severity the claimant has alleged. The claimant received 16 far less treatment than one would expect of someone 17 experiencing pain and limitation of the severity she has 18 reported. Considering the objective evidence in light of the 19 claimant's self-described activities of daily living, the 20 record as a whole, and the consistency of claimant's 21 statements and testimony, the undersigned finds the claimant 22 can perform work within the limitations described in the 23 residual functional capacity assessment set forth herein." 24 Having reviewed carefully the decision, I find that 25 the SSR 16-3p has been followed and that the explanation 1 given for rejecting plaintiff's claims of symptomology afford 2 the court a basis for meaningful judicial review. I find 3 that the plaintiff has not demonstrated that no reasonable 4 fact finder could reach the same conclusion that the ALJ 5 reached when considering plaintiff's symptomology. 6 In summary, I find that correct legal principles 7 were applied, and the resulting determination is supported by 8 substantial evidence. I will therefore grant judgment on the 9 pleadings to the defendant and direct dismissal of 10 plaintiff's complaint. 11 Thank you both again, I hope you stay safe in these 12 interesting times. 13 MS. KRUPER: Thank you. 14 MS. BLAND: Thank you, your Honor, everyone stay 15 safe. 16 (Proceedings Adjourned, 2:52 p.m.) 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER 2 3 4 I, JODI L. HIBBARD, RPR, CRR, CSR, Federal 5 Official Realtime Court Reporter, in and for the 6 United States District Court for the Northern 7 District of New York, DO HEREBY CERTIFY that 8 pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United States 9 Code, that the foregoing is a true and correct 10 transcript of the stenographically reported 11 proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and 12 that the transcript page format is in conformance 13 with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of 14 the United States. 15 16 Dated this 6th day of July, 2020. 17 18 19 /S/ JODI L. HIBBARD

20 JODI L. HIBBARD, RPR, CRR, CSR Official U.S. Court Reporter 21 22 23 24 25