Brody v. Commissioner of Social Security
Trial Court Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK --------------------------------------------------------------- X :
AVROHOM BRODY o/b/o LEAH BRODY, :
Plaintiff, : MEMORANDUM
DECISION AND ORDER - against - : : 19-CV-5659 (AMD)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, :
Defendant. : : --------------------------------------------------------------- X ANN M. DONNELLY, United States District Judge:
The plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, chall enges the Social Security Commissioner’s decision denying his deceased wife’s request for a wai ver of overpayment of Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits. (ECF No. 1.) Before the Court is the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint on standing and statute of limita tions grounds. (ECF No. 11.) For the reasons set forth below, I grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff’s late wife, Leah Brody, was found disabled as of March 29, 2003 and received Social Security benefits. (ECF No. 12-1, Declaration of Janay Podraza (“Decl.”) at ¶ 3(a).) On March 2, 2015, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) notified Ms. Brody that her failure to include her “spouse’s Social Security benefits” in her reported monthly income resulted in an overpayment of $2,827 from June of 2014 through February of 2015. (Id. at ¶ 3(b); ECF No 12-1 at 19.) She requested a waiver of overpayment because she was separated from the plaintiff; the agency denied her request. (Decl. at ¶¶ 3(c)-(e).)
The plaintiff completed an Appointment of Representative form on February 12, 2017 and filed a request for a hearing on May 15, 2017. (Decl. at ¶ 3(f).) Ms. Brody died on February 22, 2018, before the hearing took place. (Decl. at ¶ 3(g).) Administrative Law Judge James Kearns found that there were “no other parties of record,” “no information to show that a survivor who may be paid benefits due to the claimant under 20 CFR 416.542(b) wishes to pursue the request for a hearing,” and that Ms. Brody “did not authorize interim assistance reimbursement.” (ECF No. 12-1 at 49.) Accordingly, he dismissed the plaintiff’s request for a hearing.
On June 14, 2018, the plaintiff appealed ALJ Kearns’s dismissal. (Decl. at ¶ 3(h).) The Appeals Council denied his request for review on November 2, 2018. (Id.) The plaintiff filed this action on October 4, 2019, seeking review of the ALJ’s dismissal. (ECF No. 1.) The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims on April 3, 2020. (ECF Nos. 11, 12.) STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Determining the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry,” Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 561 U.S. 247 (2010), and dismissal is proper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate” the claim, Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). “A plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists.” Id. A court deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) may consider evidence outside of the pleadings, Kamen v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d Cir. 1986), but must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, Lunney v. United States, 319 F.3d 550, 554 (2d Cir. 2003). The requirements for standing “apply with equal force to applications for Social Security benefits.” Webb v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 08-CV-82, 2009 WL 3719398, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2009).
In order to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Similarly, a complaint is insufficient to state a claim “if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Pleadings are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010).
DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdiction1
“Agency regulations drastically limit the categories of individuals who can recover benefit[s]” on behalf of a deceased individual. Gregorka v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 13-CV-1408,
The record in this case does not establish that the defendant was an eligible spouse for the purpose of pursuing a hearing on behalf of his deceased wife, because he cannot establish that he was “living continuously” with her for at least six months before her death. By the plaintiff’s own admission, he had not lived in Ms. Brody’s house since 2013. (ECF No. 12-1 at 45.) Moreover, Ms. Brody challenged the SSA’s overpayment decision because the agency included the plaintiff’s SSI benefits as part of her household income; she argued that the plaintiff’s SSI income should not be included in her calculation because she was “physically separated” from him. (Id. at 30.) Indeed, if the plaintiff was living with his wife, the agency’s calculation of overpayment would have been accurate, and he would not have a claim.
Nor was the plaintiff’s absence “temporary” as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 404.347. 20 C.F.R. § 404.347 (temporary absences are limited to “service in the U.S. Armed Forces;” an absence of six months or less due to “business, employment, or confinement in a hospital, nursing home, other medical institution, or a penal institution;” a separation “solely for medical reasons;” or a separation in which both parties “reasonably could have expected to live together in the near future.”).2
Because the plaintiff lacks standing to assert claims on behalf of the claimant, the Appeals Council’s decision was correct. See Social Security Administration, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Litigation Law Manual (“HALLEX”) I–3–4–4(B)(2)(a), 1993 WL 643136 (“The Appeals Council may dismiss a request for review when the . . . (SSI) applicant or recipient dies if: there is no eligible spouse . . . and the applicant . . . did not authorize interim assistance reimbursement . . . .”).3
II. Statute of Limitations
Aside from the standing issue, the action is clearly time barred. Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) provides in pertinent part: Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Secretary may allow.
The “mailing” date is the date the individual receives the Appeals Council’s notice or decision, which is presumed to be five days after the notice’s date unless “there is a reasonable showing to
The Appeals Council sent the plaintiff notice that it denied his request to review the ALJ’s decision on November 2, 2018. The plaintiff concedes that he received the notice on November 6, 2018. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) As a result, the last day to file a timely complaint was sixty days later, or by January 5, 2019. The plaintiff filed his complaint on October 4, 2019 and did not provide a reason for the delay. Nor did he request “further time” from the Commissioner to file his action. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). As a result, his complaint is untimely.
To obtain the benefit of equitable tolling, the plaintiff must prove two things. First, “extraordinary circumstances” must have prevented him from filing on time. Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Johnson v. Nyack Hospital, 86 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1996)). “This requires demonstrating both the existence of extraordinary circumstances and a ‘causal relationship between the extraordinary circumstances on which the claim for equitable tolling rests and the lateness of [the] filing.’” Liranzo v. Astrue, 07-CV-5074, 2010 WL 626791, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2010), aff'd sub nom. Liranzo v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 411 F. App’x 390 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2000). Second, the plaintiff must have acted with “reasonable diligence” in pursuing his application during the period he seeks to toll. Johnson, 86 F.3d at 1; see also Torres v. Barnhart, 417 F.3d 276, 279 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that a plaintiff must demonstrate “both extraordinary circumstances and due diligence”).
The Second Circuit has found equitable tolling warranted when a claimant fails to seek judicial review in a timely manner because of mental impairment, Canales v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 755, 758-59 (2d Cir. 1991), when government misconduct keeps plaintiffs from appreciating the scope of their rights, New York v. Sullivan, 906 F.2d 910, 917 (2d Cir. 1990), or when the claimant is “seriously misled by an attorney in whom he placed his trust,” Torres v. Barnhart, 417 F.3d 276, 281 (2d Cir. 2005) (“With one exception, every case in this Circuit that has applied Bowen’s equitable tolling doctrine is one in which a defect in the administrative process inhibits the claimant’s ability to utilize the agency’s (lenient) time extension procedure.”). None of these circumstances are applicable.
The plaintiff claims that his filing was late because he is “disabled and blind.” (ECF No. at 1.) These conditions do “not rise to the level of extraordinary circumstances.” Bender v. Astrue, 09-CV-5738, 2010 WL 3394264, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2010). See, e.g., Wong v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 630, 631 (2d Cir. 1988) (declining to toll the deadline due to claimant’s assertion of poor health); Twumwaa v. Colvin, 13-CV-5858, 2014 WL 1928381, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2014) (declining to toll the deadline where the claimant stated only that she was “stressed,” “in pain,” and “gave the motion to [her] former attorney to respond”); Marquez v.Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 12-CV-8151, 2013 WL 3344320, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2013) (declining to toll the deadline where claimant did “not allege a misunderstanding or incapacity . . . nor . . . any diligence”). Indeed, the plaintiff’s “compliance with the statute of limitations at earlier stages of the appeals process—namely his request to the Appeals Council—‘indicates that he was accustomed to operating under time constraints and capable of doing so, even when acting pro se.’” Borrero, 2015 WL 1262276, at *6 (quoting Monje v. Shalala, 1995 WL 540028, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1995)).4
The record does not demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances prevented the plaintiff from filing a claim within the 60-day statutory period. Thus, equitable tolling is not appropriate. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this order to the pro se plaintiff, enter judgment in favor of the defendant and close this case.
SO ORDERED. __s_/A__n_n_ M__. _D_o_n_n_e_l_ly______ ANN M. DONNELLY
United States District Judge
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
April 13, 2021
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.