IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SHERRIE ANN C.,

Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 5:19-CV-1445 (DEP)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

FOR PLAINTIFF

OLINSKY LAW GROUP ANDREW FLEMMING, ESQ. Attorneys at Law 250 South Clinton St., Suite 210 Syracuse, New York 13202

FOR DEFENDANT

HON. ANTOINETTE BACON NICOLE SONIA, ESQ. Acting United States Attorney Special Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of New York P.O. Box 7198 100 S. Clinton Street Syracuse, NY 13261-7198

DAVID E. PEEBLES U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ORDER Currently pending before the court in this action, in which plaintiff seeks judicial review of an adverse administrative determination by the Commissioner, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. '' 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), are cross-

motions for judgment on the pleadings.1 Oral argument was conducted in connection with those motions on February 4, 2021, during a telephone conference held on the record. At the close of argument, I issued a bench

decision in which, after applying the requisite deferential review standard, I found that the Commissioner=s determination did not result from the application of proper legal principles and is not supported by substantial evidence, providing further detail regarding my reasoning and addressing

the specific issues raised by the plaintiff in this appeal. After due deliberation, and based upon the court=s oral bench decision, a transcript of which is attached and incorporated herein by

reference, it is hereby ORDERED, as follows: 1) Plaintiff=s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED. 2) The Commissioner=s determination that plaintiff was not

disabled at the relevant times, and thus is not entitled to benefits under the

1 This matter, which is before me on consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636(c), has been treated in accordance with the procedures set forth in General Order No. 18. Under that General Order once issue has been joined, an action such as this is considered procedurally, as if cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings had been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Social Security Act, is VACATED. 3) The matter is hereby REMANDED to the Commissioner, without a directed finding of disability, for further proceedings consistent with this determination. 4) The clerk is respectfully directed to enter judgment, based

upon this determination, remanding the matter to the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of

(g) and closing this case.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Dated: February 9, 2021 Syracuse, NY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK --------------------------------------------x SHERRIE ANN C.,

Plaintiff,

vs. 5:19-CV-1445

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant. --------------------------------------------x Transcript of a Decision held during a Telephone Conference on February 4, 2021, the HONORABLE DAVID E. PEEBLES, United States Magistrate Judge, Presiding. A P P E A R A N C E S (By Telephone) For Plaintiff: OLINSKY LAW GROUP Attorneys at Law 250 South Clinton St., Suite 210 Syracuse, New York 13202 BY: ANDREW AUSTIN FLEMMING, ESQ.

For Defendant: SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION Office of General Counsel J.F.K. Federal Building Room 625 Boston, Massachusetts 02203 BY: NICOLE SONIA, ESQ.

Jodi L. Hibbard, RPR, CSR, CRR Official United States Court Reporter 100 South Clinton Street Syracuse, New York 13261-7367 (315) 234-8547 1 (The Court and all counsel present by 2 telephone.) 3 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Let me begin by 4 expressing my appreciation for excellent presentations, both 5 written and verbal, I enjoyed working with you on this case. 6 I have before me a challenge to a determination by 7 the Commissioner finding that plaintiff was not disabled 8 within the relevant times and therefore ineligible for the 9 benefits which she's sought. The background -- and the 10 challenge is brought pursuant to 42 United States Code 11 Sections 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). 12 The background is as follows: Plaintiff was born 13 in September of 1970 and is currently 50 years old. She was 14 41 at the alleged onset of disability on April 28, 2012. 15 Plaintiff lives in a trailer in Richland, New York with her 16 son who by my calculations is now 19 years of age. She 17 stands 5 foot 4 inches in height and weighs -- has weighed at 18 various times between 140 and 155 pounds. Plaintiff has two 19 children, they were 13 and 15 years old in August of 2012. 20 She also, according to the records, was in an abusive 21 relationship of approximately seven years with the father of 22 her children. Plaintiff stopped attending high school in 23 10th grade and was in regular classes while she did attend. 24 She did subsequently achieve a GED and went to college for 25 approximately two years. Plaintiff has a driver's license 1 and owns a car. There is reference, including at page 713 of 2 the administrative transcript, that she doesn't like driving 3 due to panic attacks. 4 Plaintiff stopped working in April of 2010. Her 5 past relevant work includes as a baby-sitter, census taker, 6 school janitor, retail cashier, and a laborer. She worked 7 for a significant period of time as a laborer in the floor 8 business. She left that position when her boss retired, the 9 owner of the business. 10 Physically, plaintiff suffers from arthritis, 11 fibromyalgia, a history of reported seizures, a right 12 shoulder injury which was exacerbated in May or early June of 13 2018 when she lifted a gate, that appears at page 248 of the 14 administrative transcript. She also experiences degenerative 15 disk disease of the lumbar spine, a history of Lyme disease, 16 and hiccups extending over a period of time. Plaintiff 17 underwent surgery in 2007 to repair a right leg fracture. 18 She has for her shoulder and neck injury underwent, has 19 undergone physical therapy, injections but no surgery. The 20 plaintiff's right shoulder was x-rayed on June 8, 2018 and 21 report is at page 730 of the administrative transcript. The 22 finding was there minimal arthritis in the glenohumeral 23 joint, moderate AC joint arthritis but no fractures or 24 dislocations. Magnetic resonance imaging or MRI testing on 25 June 11, 2018 was conducted. The findings were as follows: 1 "Multiple complex findings of the right shoulder include a 2 9-millimeter full-thickness or nearly full-thickness 3 articular-sided anterior leading edge supraspinatus tendon 4 tear overlying a relatively large anterior enthesopathic 5 cortical erosion. The more posterior and medial rotator cuff 6 exhibits tendonosis with tendon enlargement, interstitial 7 mucoid degeneration, and undersurface fraying. There was a 8 finding of intact rotator cuff and deltoid musculature, no 9 bony overgrowth of the AC joint. There is a type I distal 10 acromion morphology. No evidence of an AC joint or 11 coracoclavicular separation but an edematous AC joint with an 12 effusion and capsulitis could be associated with a 13 symptomatic arthropathy. Suspected low-grade SLAP lesion. 14 The long biceps tendon is torn and likely retracted. 15 Low-grade subscapularis delaminating thinning without a 16 full-thickness tear. Correlation for any biceps tendon 17 dysfunction, pain at the biceps groove, or deformity at the 18 upper arm is suggested." I should have practiced that before 19 I read it. 20 Mentally, plaintiff has experienced depression, 21 anxiety, panic disorder with agoraphobia, insomnia, and 22 hallucinations. She receives health care treatment at 23 Pulaski Health Care. Her primary is Nurse Practitioner 24 Rachel Isabelle. She also has seen neurologist Ijaz Rashid. 25 She sees orthopedists including Dr. Andrew Markwith and 1 Dr. Peter Vaneenenaam. And she sees Dr. Teresa Piotrowicz 2 and LMSW Jennifer Koon approximately one time per month for 3 her mental treatment. 4 Medications prescribed to the plaintiff include 5 citalopram, Cymbalta, metazine, quistane, Xanax, Duloxetine, 6 hydroxyzine, Risperdal, Naproxen, Mobic, Effexor, meloxicam, 7 and gabapentin. 8 Plaintiff's activities of daily living include the 9 ability to dress, bathe, groom, shop, do laundry, cook, 10 clean, she sees friends, she cares for four dogs, she cares 11 for or has cared for horses. There was an indication she may 12 be giving the horse up. She gardens. Plaintiff smokes one 13 pack of cigarettes per day and marijuana three times per 14 week. 15 Procedurally, plaintiff applied for Title II 16 benefits on July 11, 2016, and Title XVI benefits on July 21, 17 2016. There is indication that there were prior unsuccessful 18 applications for Social Security benefits. In her 19 applications in July 2016, she alleged an onset date of 20 April 28, 2012 and claimed disability due to anxiety, 21 depression, lesion on brain, growth on thyroid, hiccups for 22 two years, water on knees, Lyme disease, and fibromyalgia. 23 A hearing was conducted on October 24, 2018 by 24 Administrative Law Judge Kenneth Theurer. Administrative Law 25 Judge Theurer issued an unfavorable decision on November 5, 1 2018. The Social Security Administration Appeals Council 2 denied the request for review on September 24, 2019. This 3 action was commenced on November 21, 2019 and is timely. 4 In his decision, ALJ Theurer applied the familiar 5 five-step test for determining disability. He first noted 6 that plaintiff's insured status ended on September 30, 2014. 7 At step one, he concluded plaintiff had not engaged 8 in substantial gainful activity since April 28, 2012. 9 At step two, he found that plaintiff does suffer 10 from severe impairments that impose more than minimal 11 limitation on her ability to perform basic work functions, 12 including degenerative disease of the lumbar spine, 13 osteoarthritis, fibromyalgia, a history of seizures, 14 depression, and anxiety. 15 At step three, ALJ Theurer concluded that none of 16 plaintiff's conditions, either singly or in combination, meet 17 or medically equal any of the listed presumptively disabling 18 conditions set forth in the Commissioner's regulations. 19 Fibromyalgia was considered under Listing 14.09D and Social 20 Security Ruling 12-2p. The mental components were examined 21 under 12.04 and 12.06 and a finding was made that neither the 22 B nor the C criteria of those listings are met. Plaintiff's 23 lumbar spine condition was examined under Listing 1.04, and 24 the history of seizures under Listing 11.02. 25 The administrative law judge next concluded that 1 plaintiff retains the ability to perform light work with 2 physical and mental-related limitations. Physically, the 3 limitation is she can occasionally lift and carry 20 pounds, 4 frequently lift and carry 10 pounds, sit for up to six hours, 5 stand or walk for approximately six hours in an eight-hour 6 day with normal breaks, occasionally climb ramps or stairs, 7 never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and can perform 8 occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and 9 crawling. She should avoid working in unprotected heights or 10 in conjunction with dangerous machinery. 11 The mental-related limitations are as follows: She 12 retains the ability to understand and follow simple 13 instructions and directions, perform simple tasks with 14 supervision and independently, maintain attention and 15 concentration for simple tasks, regularly attend to a routine 16 and maintain a schedule. She relates to and interacts with 17 coworkers and supervisors to the extent necessary to carry 18 out simple tasks, i.e., she can ask for help when needed, 19 handle conflicts with others, state her own point of view, 20 initiate or sustain a conversation and understand and respond 21 to physical, verbal, and emotional social cues. But she 22 should avoid work requiring more complex interaction or joint 23 efforts with coworkers to achieve goals. She should have no 24 more than occasional contact with coworkers, supervisors, and 25 the public. Claimant can handle reasonable levels of simple 1 work-related stress in that she can make occasional simple 2 decisions directly related to the completion of tasks in a 3 stable, unchanging work environment. 4 Applying that residual functional capacity or RFC 5 finding at step four, Administrative Law Judge Theurer 6 concluded that plaintiff is incapable of performing her past 7 relevant work as a sander/finisher which was performed at the 8 heavy level and a child monitor at the medium level. 9 At step five, Administrative Law Judge Theurer 10 initially noted that if plaintiff could perform a full range 11 of light work, the finding of not disabled would be directed 12 by the Medical-Vocational Guidelines set forth in the 13 Commissioner's regulations and specifically Grid Rule 202.21. 14 Noting additional exertional and nonexertional limitations 15 that would erode the job base on which the Grids were 16 predicated, he found based on the testimony of a vocational 17 expert that notwithstanding her conditions and limitations, 18 plaintiff is capable of performing jobs available in the 19 national economy, including as a routing clerk, a cleaner, 20 housekeeping, and an order caller and found that she was 21 therefore not disabled at the relevant times. 22 The court's review in this matter of course is 23 deferential. It is the task of the court to determine 24 whether correct legal principles were applied and the 25 determination is supported by substantial evidence defined as 1 such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would find 2 sufficient to support a conclusion. The Second Circuit has 3 noted, including in Brault v. Social Security Administration 4 Commissioner,

from the Second Circuit, June 29, 5 2012, that this is a very deferential standard even more 6 stringent than the clearly erroneous standard that we are all 7 familiar with. As the court went on to note in Brault, the 8 substantial evidence standard means once an ALJ finds facts, 9 we can reject those facts only if a reasonable fact finder 10 would have to conclude otherwise. 11 Plaintiff in this case raises two basic 12 contentions. One related to the step two finding which 13 failed to acknowledge plaintiff's shoulder and neck injury as 14 severe which would result, according to the plaintiff, in a 15 limitation on her ability to reach; and secondly, she 16 challenges the weighing of opinion evidence regarding 17 plaintiff's mental health, including opinions from 18 Dr. Piotrowicz, a treating source, and Dr. Grassl, an 19 examining -- consultative examiner. 20 The -- I'll take the step two argument first. Of 21 course, the governing regulations provide that an impairment 22 or combination of impairments is not severe if it does not 23 significantly limit plaintiff's physical or mental ability to 24 do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. Section 404.1521(a). 25 That section goes on to describe what is meant by the phrase 1 basic work activities defining that term to include "the 2 abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs." 3 The step two requirement is de minimus and intended 4 only to screen out the truly weakest of cases. Dixon v. 5 Shalala,

, Second Circuit 1995. It is 6 noted, however, that the mere presence of a disease or 7 impairment or establishing that a person has been diagnosed 8 or treated for a disease or an impairment is not by itself 9 sufficient to establish a condition as severe. Coleman v. 10 Shalala,

at 53 from the Southern District of 11 New York, 1995. 12 In this case, the plaintiff bears the burden at all 13 steps up until step five, and including at step two, to 14 establish the existence of a condition which meets the 15 definition at step two, and significantly, it is plaintiff's 16 burden to show that the condition has lasted or is expected 17 to last at least 12 contiguous months. 42 United States Code 18 Section 423(d)(1)(A) and 1382c(a)(3)(A). The administrative 19 law judge rejected the shoulder condition at step two at 20 page 21 of the administrative transcript relying principally 21 upon 16F, which is the exhibit reflecting physical therapy as 22 well as the fact that she works with horses and in a 23 campground. 24 As the Commissioner -- as the plaintiff argues, it 25 is noted that Dr. Lorensen, an examining consultant, issued 1 an opinion back in August of 2016 in which, pertinently, she 2 found that plaintiff had a moderate limitation for bending, 3 lifting, and reaching. That's at page 707 of the 4 administrative transcript. So plaintiff has had an 5 impairment of the shoulder certainly for more than 18 6 months -- 12 months, and clearly it was exacerbated by the 7 injuries she experienced in May of 2018, late May or early 8 June, the record is unclear. I think that the plaintiff, 9 when you consider that the step two requirement is modest, I 10 think the record supports the plaintiff has a limitation on 11 her ability to perform basic work activities based on the 12 shoulder and neck injury. The shoulder injury has been 13 confirmed by objective testing including x-ray and MRI that I 14 referenced earlier. The issue of course is the duration. 15 The plaintiff's injury was in May of 2018. She testified on 16 October 24, 2018, some five months later, that it was still 17 an issue. On October 1, 2018, it is true at page 1110 -- 18 1104 to 1110 that she did not report any issue regarding her 19 neck or shoulder to Nurse Practitioner Isabelle, but she did 20 on September 27, 2018 reference shoulder pain and that she 21 was in a lot of pain over the past two weeks, that's at 1111 22 to 1114. The -- I believe that there was error at step two. 23 The real issue is whether it was harmless or not. 24 Of course the -- pivotal to the finding of no 25 disability was the residual functional capacity determination 1 by the administrative law judge. A claimant's RFC represents 2 a finding of the range of tasks she is capable of performing 3 notwithstanding the impairments at issue. An RFC is 4 determined and informed by consideration of all of the 5 relevant medical and other evidence. To properly ascertain a 6 claimant's RFC, an ALJ must assess plaintiff's exertional 7 capacities and that would include the ability to reach, and 8 of course the residual functional capacity finding must be 9 supported by substantial evidence. 10 In this case, as the plaintiff has noted, all three 11 jobs that the ALJ found plaintiff capable of performing 12 require frequent reaching. That's for the cashier, cleaner, 13 housekeeper, and routing clerk. Frequent reaching is defined 14 as one-third to two-thirds of the time. I do acknowledge the 15 Commissioner's -- the case that the Commissioner has cited 16 that bears some similarity to this case, that being Linda S. 17 v. Commissioner of Social Security, it is 5:18-CV-726, 18 reported at

, from the Northern District of 19 New York. It was an opinion of Magistrate Judge, now Chief 20 Magistrate Judge Andrew T. Baxter, issued on July 29, 2016. 21 But I think in this case, there was error. I think that 22 there was no limitation presented to the vocational expert 23 regarding reaching, and I think there should have been and I 24 think that is a failure on the part of the Commissioner to 25 carry his burden at step five. 1 The plaintiff also raised a treating source 2 argument. The opinions of treating sources and other medical 3 sources are subject to, under the old regulations that do 4 apply in this case, 20 C.F.R. Sections 404.1527 and 416.927. 5 Treating sources of course are given special consideration 6 under those regulations. The opinion of a treating physician 7 regarding the nature and severity of an impairment ordinarily 8 is entitled considerable deference, provided it is supported 9 by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 10 techniques and not inconsistent with other substantial 11 evidence. Veino v. Barnhart,

, Second 12 Circuit, 2002. Such opinions are not controlling, however, 13 if they are contrary to other substantial evidence in the 14 record including the opinions of other medical experts. Any 15 conflicts arising in the form of medical evidence is a matter 16 properly entrusted to the Commissioner. 17 If controlling weight is not given to a treating 18 source opinion, the administrative law judge must consider 19 several factors specified in those regulations. In the 20 Second Circuit we refer to those sometimes as the Burgess 21 factors. It is noted, however, that in most instances, the 22 Burgess factors are not neatly laid out in administrative law 23 judge decisions. The Second Circuit has noted that if that 24 is -- that is not fatal if the court, reviewing the entire 25 record and the administrative law judge's decision, is firmly 1 convinced that the treating source rule was not violated. 2 Estrella v. Berryhill,

, that is from the Second 3 Circuit Court of Appeals, May 2019. 4 So in this case, Dr. Chapman's opinion, a 5 nonexamining consultant, was given great weight at page 26 of 6 the administrative transcript. Clearly he's a specialist 7 familiar with Social Security program, and his opinions can 8 constitute substantial evidence. Now I don't agree with the 9 plaintiff that the opinions of Dr. Chapman are stale because 10 I didn't see in the record any evidence of significant 11 deterioration in plaintiff's mental condition. Oddly, or 12 based on the unique facts of this case, Dr. Chapman gave two 13 opinions. One was given on October 6, 2013 and related to 14 the period prior to the date of last insured status of 15 September 30, 2014 and addressed the application for 16 Disability Insurance benefits. The other was given on 17 October 12, 2016 and it relates to the Title XVI application. 18 They appear at Exhibits 1A and 2A in the administrative 19 transcript. 20 When considering the period prior to the date of 21 last insured status, Dr. Chapman concluded that there was 22 insufficient evidence to properly rate severity of alleged 23 psychiatric impairment or DLI in the past, that's at page 73. 24 In the later opinion related to the Title XVI application, he 25 first went through considering the B criteria, found a 1 moderate limitation in the activities of daily living, a mild 2 limitation in maintaining social functioning, moderate 3 limitation in maintaining concentration, but no episodes of 4 decompensation each of extended duration, that's at page 81. 5 In the mental RFC finding that appears at page 85, he 6 concludes plaintiff retains the capacity to perform the basic 7 mental demands of unskilled work. 8 I think that Dr. Chapman's opinion was properly 9 weighed, but not necessarily against the opinions of 10 Dr. Piotrowicz and Dr. Grassl. Dr. Piotrowicz issued an 11 opinion on December 22, 2016, it is Exhibit 8F of the 12 administrative transcript, that is extremely limiting. It 13 contains several marked limitations which is defined as there 14 is serious limitation in this area, individual cannot 15 generally perform satisfactorily in this area, and some 16 extreme limitations which is defined as there is major 17 limitation in this area, there is no useful ability to 18 function in this area. Significantly, one of the extreme 19 limitations again applied by Dr. Piotrowicz is the ability to 20 perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular 21 attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances. It 22 is true that as a check box form, Dr. Piotrowicz' opinion is 23 entitled to less weight. It is also true, as the 24 administrative law judge noted, that on each occasion when 25 Dr. Piotrowicz was asked to describe the medical/clinical 1 findings that support this assessment, that portion of the 2 opinion was left blank. The administrative law judge noted 3 that the opinions of Dr. Piotrowicz were inconsistent with 4 the treatment notes from that provider, and that is certainly 5 a proper consideration, Second Circuit reaffirmed that 6 recently in Medina v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2020

from December 18, 2020. The opinion was 8 discounted also because it was based largely on self-reports, 9 and I would say I acknowledge that that's a proper 10 consideration based on Merkley v. Commissioner of Social 11 Security,

from the Northern District of 12 New York, October 10, 2017. However, I will also note I 13 agree with plaintiff that self-reports are important, 14 particularly in mental health cases. I don't think that 15 necessarily the treating source rule was violated by 16 consideration of Dr. Piotrowicz' opinions, but I note that it 17 was not wholly rejected, it was given little weight and 18 there's no explanation as to what parts were and were not 19 considered by the administrative law judge. 20 Dr. Grassl's report, she is an examining 21 consultant, or he I guess -- Corey Anne, it's a her. The 22 administrative law judge actually found that plaintiff was 23 more limited than Dr. Grassl concluded. I think that that 24 was properly weighed. 25 The issue here really is the ability to perform 1 under stress and the ability to maintain a regular schedule. 2 In terms of stress, I think the unskilled work in the RFC 3 properly accounts for this limitation. The problem is 4 maintaining a schedule. Dr. Piotrowicz, as I alluded to a 5 moment ago, found an extreme limitation in this area. 6 Dr. Grassl, who also examined the plaintiff, found a moderate 7 limitation in this area, and yet there is a finding in the 8 RFC that plaintiff was able to perform and maintain a regular 9 schedule. The two examining, a treating source and an 10 examining source disagree. I think that those should have 11 been given more deference than Dr. Chapman, a nonexamining 12 physician. So -- and unfortunately, the hypothetical posed 13 to the vocational expert was based on the RFC which was 14 erroneous and did not account for plaintiff's inability to 15 perform while maintaining a schedule, and therefore I find 16 that this is also error. 17 I don't find any persuasive evidence of disability 18 and I will also say this was a very close case, so in the 19 event I were to be confronted with an Equal Access to Justice 20 Act application, I would not foreclose the ability of 21 plaintiff to argue it, but I probably would find that the 22 government's position is substantially justified in this 23 case. 24 So in conclusion, I do find that the resulting 25 determination was not supported by substantial evidence and I 1 think the matter should be remanded for a closer look at the 2 shoulder injury and its effect on ability to perform basic 3 work functions and the ability of plaintiff to perform while 4 maintaining a regular schedule. So I will grant judgment on 5 the pleadings to the plaintiff, remand the matter for further 6 examination on these issues, and again, thank you both for 7 excellent presentations. I hope you have a good day. Thank 8 you. 9 MR. FLEMMING: Thank you, your Honor. 10 MS. SONIA: Thank you. 11 (Proceedings Adjourned, 11:52 a.m.) 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 2 CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER 3 4 5 I, JODI L. HIBBARD, RPR, CRR, CSR, Federal 6 Official Realtime Court Reporter, in and for the 7 United States District Court for the Northern 8 District of New York, DO HEREBY CERTIFY that 9 pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United States 10 Code, that the foregoing is a true and correct 11 transcript of the stenographically reported 12 proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and 13 that the transcript page format is in conformance 14 with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of 15 the United States. 16 17 Dated this 4th day of February, 2021. 18 19 20 /S/ JODI L. HIBBARD

21 JODI L. HIBBARD, RPR, CRR, CSR Official U.S. Court Reporter 22 23 24 25