UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MR. CHRISTOPHER P. ANDRETTA, Plaintiff, 21-CV-7095 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL CARMEN HENDRICKSON, et al., Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se and is currently detained on Rikers Island, brings this action invoking the Court’s federal question jurisdiction,

. By order dated September 16, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP). For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court dismisses the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon,

(2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills,

(2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

(2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases,

(citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly,

. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court

must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief.

BACKGROUND This action arises from events involving Plaintiff’s Bronx apartment following his arrest and subsequent detention on Rikers Island. He names as Defendants Carmen Hendrickson, the Senior Director of Courtlandt Housing; Aquina Valentin, Plaintiff’s case manager for mental health at Courtlandt Housing; and the management office at Courtlandt Housing. The following facts are taken from the complaint: on an unspecified date, Plaintiff, who alleges that he has mental disabilities, was arrested and subsequently detained on Rikers Island. After his arrest, Plaintiff contacted Defendant Hendrickson to retrieve his Section 8 recertification application, but was unsuccessful because Hendrickson “is under the assumption [that Plaintiff] will be in jail for years.” (ECF 2, at 4.) Both Plaintiff’s attorney and the mother of his children, who has power of attorney over Plaintiff, also attempted to retrieve the application, but both Hendrickson and Valentin have refused to provide the recertification application to

these individuals or allow them to access Plaintiff’s apartment to retrieve his belongings. Plaintiff does not specify the relief he seeks. DISCUSSION The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth generally in

and 1332. Under these statutes, federal jurisdiction is available only when a “federal question” is presented or when plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. “‘[I]t is common ground that in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.’” United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 919, AFL-CIO v. CenterMark Prop. Meriden Square, Inc.,

(2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Manway

Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Hartford,

(2d Cir. 1983)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,

(1999) (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative . . . .”). To invoke federal question jurisdiction, a plaintiff’s claims must arise “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”

. A case arises under federal law if the complaint “establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain,

, 734-35 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh,

(2006)). Mere invocation of federal jurisdiction, without any facts demonstrating a federal law claim, does not create federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund,

(2d Cir. 1996). Plaintiff’s claims do not suggest a violation of any federal law. The Court therefore cannot exercise federal question jurisdiction over the claims.1 Plaintiff also does not allege facts demonstrating that the Court has diversity jurisdiction of this action. To establish jurisdiction under

, a plaintiff must first allege that the plaintiff and the defendant are citizens of different states. Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht,

(1998). In addition, the plaintiff must allege to a “reasonable probability” that the claim is in excess of the sum or value of $75,000.00, the statutory jurisdictional amount. See

(a); Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc.,

, 221 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff does not state facts suggesting that Defendants violated any law or caused any injury that could satisfy the jurisdictional amount.

This Court therefore cannot exercise diversity jurisdiction of Plaintiff’s claims. CONCLUSION Plaintiff’s complaint, filed IFP under

(a)(1), is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The Court certifies under

(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States,

(1962).

1 Plaintiff may contact the New York Regional Office for Housing and Urban Development with questions regarding his Section 8 housing at: Jacob K. Javits Federal Building, 26 Federal Plaza, Suite 3541, New York, NY 10278-0068. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on the docket. SO ORDERED. Dated: September 20, 2021 New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge