Hunter v. McMahon
Trial Court Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DOMINIQUE HUNTER,
Plaintiff, v. 20-CV-0018-LJV-MJR
DECISION & ORDER
CHERYL MCMAHON, et al.,
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION On January 30, 2020, the pro se plaintiff, Dominique Hunter, filed an amended complaint alleging various federal and state law claims arising from the removal of her minor child, C.W., from her care and the termination of her parental rights.1 Docket Item 6.
On April 14, 2020, defendants Niagara County Department of Social Services, Child Protective Services (“Niagara County CPS”), Assistant Public Defender Lawrence Lindsay,2 Niagara County CPS Employee Cheryl McMahon, Niagara County, and
Meanwhile, Hunter requested an extension of time to serve the remaining two defendants (and the only defendants who did not move to dismiss), Carol Henderson and Vanessa Guite, Docket Item 26, and Judge Roemer granted that request, Docket Item 30. On December 7, 2020, after the summonses were returned unexecuted as to Henderson and Guite, Hunter requested a second extension of time to serve them. Docket Item 33.
On February 22, 2021, Judge Roemer issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) finding that the county defendants’ and the judicial defendants’ motions to dismiss should be granted and that Hunter’s second request for an extension of time to serve Henderson and Guite should be denied. Docket Item 34. On March 10, 2021, Docket Item 6 at 1-2. The Clerk of the Court shall correct their names on the electronic docket.
Hunter objected to the R&R.3 Docket Item 35. On March 25, 2021, the county defendants responded, Docket Item 37; on April 1, 2021, the judicial defendants responded, Docket Item 38; and on April 15, 2021, Hunter replied, Docket Item 39.
A district court may accept, reject, or modify the findings or recommendations of a magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The court must review de novo those portions of a magistrate judge’s recommendation to which a party objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
This Court has carefully and thoroughly reviewed the R&R; the record in this case; the objection, responses, and reply; and the materials submitted to Judge Roemer. Based on that de novo review, the Court accepts and adopts Judge Roemer’s recommendation to grant the county and judicial defendants’ motions to dismiss and to deny Hunter’s request for a second extension of time to serve Henderson and Guite.
DISCUSSION Hunter alleges that the defendants illegally removed C.W. from her custody and terminated her parental rights in an “extra-judicial conspiracy” to violate her parental rights and commit various torts against her.4 Docket Item 6 at 6-7. She asks this Court
This Court, however, cannot order C.W.’s return or take any other action that would overturn the Family Court decisions removing C.W. and terminating Hunter’s parental rights. Federal courts are not courts of appeal for litigants unhappy with a state court decision. In fact, as Judge Roemer correctly observed, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal court jurisdiction over such matters. See Docket Item 34 at 14; see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-15 (1923). In other words, this Court does not have the power to do what Hunter asks it to do.
Rooker-Feldman applies when four factors are present: (1) the federal-court plaintiff lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff seeks redress for injuries caused by the state court judgment, (3) the plaintiff seeks federal court review of the state court judgment, and (4) the state court judgment was issued before the federal action was filed. Hoblock v. Albany Cty Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005). This Court agrees with Judge Roemer that all four factors are met here.
Hunter “lost” in Family Court when Judge DiMillio issued a temporary removal order and when Judge Wojtaszek-Gariano terminated her parental rights. Those Family Court judgments were the vehicles by which Hunter claims she was injured. The remedies Hunter seeks—C.W.’s return, expungement of records, and money damages—would require this Court to review and reject the merits underlying the Family Court judgments. See Lomnicki v. Cardinal McCloskey Servs., 2007 WL 2176059, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2007) (“[A p]laintiff does not avoid Rooker-Feldman by seeking damages instead of injunctive relief. In order to award damages to [the p]laintiff, the Court would have to review the decision of the Family Court.”). Finally, the Family Court judgments were issued well before Hunter filed the instant lawsuit. See Docket Item 6 at 3-5.
Even if Hunter has not argued in a state court every issue that she now raises, Rooker-Feldman still bars this Court’s jurisdiction over her claims. By asking this Court to return C.W. to her, and to award damages based on what the state court did, Hunter asks this Court to review and reject the decision to remove C.W. and terminate Hunter’s parental rights. Hunter therefore explicitly attacks the Family Court judgments rendered against her. As Judge Roemer correctly explained,
[Hunter’s] allegations that [the] defendants engaged in an “extra[-]judicial conspiracy” to violate her civil rights and commit various torts against her are premised entirely upon [the] defendants’ actions in the course of the underlying Family Court custody proceedings. Thus, these claims are, in fact, “inextricably intertwined” with the state court custody proceedings and judgment.
Docket Item 34 at 17.
This Court therefore agrees with Judge Roemer that “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits this Court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in the amended complaint because those claims either already have been decided by the Family Court . . . or are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the claims already decided by the Family Court.” See id. at 14. The defendants’ motions to dismiss therefore are granted.5
Because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Hunter’s claims, it also agrees with Judge Roemer that leave to amend should be denied. See Docket Item 34 at 37. “Generally, leave to amend should be freely given, and a pro se litigant in particular should be afforded every reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that [s]he has a valid claim.” Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2000)). “A pro se complaint should not be dismissed without the Court granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Id. (quoting Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010)). But leave to amend pleadings may be denied when any amendment would be “futile.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
Hunter says that if she is given leave to amend, she “can cure any alleged deficiencies in the [] complaint.” Docket Item 35 at 7. Everything that Hunter asks of this Court, however, would require it to review and reject the Family Court judgments, something it does not have the power to do. Indeed, the very essence of Hunter’s
Finally, this Court agrees with Judge Roemer that Hunter’s request for a second extension of time to serve Henderson and Guite should be denied as “futile.” See Docket Item 34 at 4. A federal court is “obligated to consider sua sponte”—that is, on its own motion—whether it has jurisdiction over any case brought before it. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012). “Where jurisdiction is lacking, the district court must dismiss the [c]omplaint without regard to the merits of the lawsuit.” Rene v. Citibank N.A., 32 F. Supp. 2d 539, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1188 (2d Cir. 1996)). Because this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Hunter’s claims, the Court dismisses, sua sponte, the amended complaint against Henderson and Guite.
This Court does not doubt Hunter’s unhappiness with being separated from C.W. or the difficulty that she has experienced because of that separation. And this Court understands the depth of the emotions that a parent might experience after being separated from a child. But this Court simply does not have jurisdiction—that is, the power—to review Hunter’s claims no matter how unhappy she is or how strong her feelings are.
CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above and in the R&R, the defendants’ motions to dismiss, Docket Items 18, 22, are GRANTED; Hunter’s motion for an extension of time to serve Henderson and Guite, Docket Item 33, is DENIED; the amended complaint, Docket Item 6, is DISMISSED; and the Clerk of the Court shall close the file.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 19, 2021
Buffalo, New York
/s/ Lawrence J. Vilardo LAWRENCE J. VILARDO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.