UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ALEXA ROSE GARBER, Plaintiff, 22-CV-2967 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL ALISON TAYLOR BURKE, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action invoking the Court’s federal question jurisdiction,

. By order dated June 1, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court dismisses the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co.,

(2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills,

(2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

(2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases,

(citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough

facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly,

. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief.

BACKGROUND Plaintiff Alexa Rose Garber, who resides in New York, New York, brings this action

against Defendant Alison Taylor Burke, who also resides in New York, New York. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant “is guilty of various civil and criminal wrongdoings against the plaintiff that caused [her] to suffer psychological trauma, mental anguish, embarrassment, defamation and pain and suffering through intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress . . ..” (ECF No. 2 at 6-7.) Plaintiff accuses Defendant of engaging in “harassment, cyber harassment, defamation, invasion of privacy, illegal surveillance/stalking, cyber identity/information theft, libel and slander, and false claims and accusations.” (Id. at 7.) She seeks unspecified monetary damages and injunctive relief. DISCUSSION A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth generally in

and 1332. Under these statutes, federal jurisdiction is available only when a “federal question” is presented or when plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. “‘[I]t is

common ground that in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.’” United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 919, AFL-CIO v. CenterMark Prop. Meriden Square, Inc.,

(2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Manway Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Hartford,

(2d Cir. 1983)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,

(1999) (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative . . . .”).

Federal Question To invoke federal question jurisdiction, a plaintiff’s claims must arise “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”

. A case arises under federal law if the complaint “establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain,

, 734-35 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh,

(2006)). Mere invocation of federal jurisdiction, without any facts demonstrating a federal law claim, does not create federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund,

(2d Cir. 1996). Plaintiff does not plead facts showing that her claim that Defendant engaged in “various civil and criminal wrongdoings against [her]” arises under federal law. There is, therefore, no basis for federal question jurisdiction. Diversity of Citizenship Plaintiff also does not allege facts demonstrating that the Court has diversity jurisdiction

over this action. To establish jurisdiction under

, a plaintiff must first allege that the plaintiff and the defendant are citizens of different states. Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht,

(1998). In addition, the plaintiff must allege to a “reasonable probability” that the claim is in excess of the sum or value of $75,000.00, the statutory jurisdictional amount. See

(a); Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc.,

, 221 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff indicates in the complaint that both she and Defendant reside in New York, precluding complete diversity of citizenship. B. Leave to Amend Denied District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione,

, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo,

(2d Cir. 1988). Because the jurisdictional defects in Plaintiff’s complaint cannot be cured with an amendment, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint. CONCLUSION Plaintiff’s complaint, filed IFP under

(a)(1), is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The Court certifies under

(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States,

(1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue). SO ORDERED. Dated: June 27, 2022 New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge