UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JOE W. JEAN-LOUIS, Plaintiff, 22-CV-9679 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL UNDER GOVERNOR STATE OF NEW YORK;

(g) MAYOR CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at the North Infirmary Command on Rikers Island, brings this action pro se. Plaintiff also requests leave to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Plaintiff is barred, however, from filing any new action IFP while he is a prisoner. See Jean-Louis v. Onafer Nuclear Power Plant, No. 12-CV-1071 (JEM) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2012) (listing strikes). That order relied on the “three-strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”),

(g), which provides that: In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action [IFP] if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. Although Plaintiff has filed this new action seeking IFP status, his complaint does not show that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.1 Instead, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have been negligent for “not building underground nuclear fall-out shelters near elementary schools,” and “not conducting mock civil defense emergency evacuation disaster

1 An imminent danger is one “existing at the time the complaint is filed.” Malik v. McGinnis,

(2d Cir. 2002). A danger “that has dissipated by the time a complaint is filed” is not sufficient. Pettus v. Morgenthau,

(2d Cir. 2009). drills at elementary schools in New York City.” (ECF 1 at 1.) Plaintiff is therefore barred from filing this action IFP. CONCLUSION The Court denies Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP, and the complaint is dismissed without prejudice under the PLRA’s “three-strikes” rule. See

(g).2 Plaintiff

remains barred from filing any future action IFP while he is in custody, unless he is under imminent threat of serious physical injury.

The Court certifies, pursuant to

(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States,

(1962). SO ORDERED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in this case.

Dated: November 14, 2022 New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge

2 Plaintiff may commence a new action by paying the filing fee. If Plaintiff does so, that complaint will be reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to dismiss any civil rights complaint from a prisoner if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).