UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JAMAR PARHAM, Plaintiff, 22-CV-10568 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action invoking the Court’s federal question jurisdiction. He sues the United States Government, asserting that his human rights have been violated. By order dated February 6, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court dismisses the action. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co.,

(2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills,

(2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

(2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases,

(citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly,

. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief.

BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this action against the United States Government alleging that his human

rights have been violated. He asserts the following as the facts giving rise to his claims: First quarter of the year (winter) 1989, I was sexually assulted (sodomized) by an older cousin. Plotted by my aunt and grandmother. I was five years old and he was eleven years old. I suffered a great deal of emotional distress, leading to surgery in my late twenties (age). Since the crime they took advantage of my ignorance[,] killed my father, and been trying to frame me in order to exempt themselves from their crime. I have been hexed with magic since around twenty- two years old. It has been controlling my life and conditioning my health in many forms. (ECF 2, at 5.)1 Plaintiff does not specify the relief he seeks.

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. Unless otherwise indicated, all grammar, spelling, punctuation, and emphasis are as in the original. DISCUSSION “Under settled principles of sovereign immunity, ‘the United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit, save as it consents to be sued and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.’” United States v. Dalm,

(1990) (citations omitted). The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars federal courts from

hearing all suits against the United States, including suits against federal agencies and federal officers sued in their official capacities, unless sovereign immunity has been waived. United States v. Mitchell,

(1980); see Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp.,

(2d Cir. 1994) (“Because an action against a federal agency . . . is essentially a suit against the United States, such suits are . . . barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, unless such immunity is waived.”). The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the United States Government under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.2 See

(e)(2)(B)(iii District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione,

, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo,

(2d Cir. 1988).

Because the defects in Plaintiff’s complaint cannot be cured with an amendment, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint.

2 Plaintiff’s claims do not appear to fall under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”),

(b), 2671-80, which provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for injuries arising from the tortious conduct of federal officers or agents acting within the scope of their office or employment.

(b)(1). Although Plaintiff names the United States Government as the defendant, he does not allege any facts suggesting that any federal entity or individuals were involved in the alleged violations. CONCLUSION The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See

(e)(2)(B)(iii). All other pending matters in this case are terminated. The Court certifies under

(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See

Coppedge v. United States,

(1962). The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in this case. SO ORDERED. Dated: March 6, 2023 New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge