Ne Ae ete ee OW OZ NO ew Ne I UNA WEN ee ,puyY ae WT Ww JONES DAY 250 VESEY STREET * NEW YORK, NEWYORK 10281.1047 TELEPHONE: +1.212.326.3939 »* JONESDAY.COM me eemamnt meen DIRECTNUMBER: 2123263786 i| | [email protected] □ DOCUMENT July 5, 2023 2 || ELECTRONICALLY FILED SOC He BY ECF YP || DOC #:_ Velde 4 b DATE FILED: Hon. Colleen McMahon : United States District Court Southern District of New York 500 Pearl Street, Room 24A New York, New York 10007 Re: = Cochran v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 1:23-cv-04536-CM Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc.’s Motion to Stay Discover Dear Judge McMahon: FP PR Fob mee dal eh. hes Hor’, 7a . ; Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”) respectfully asks that the Court stay discovery pending resolution of Experian’s motion to dismiss. On July 5, 2023, Experian filed its Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). (ECF Nos. 11, 12.) Experian requested Plaintiff's consent to the stay pending resolution of the motion to dismiss, but, as of this filing, Experian has not received a response. There is good cause to stay discovery here, pending resolution of the motion to dismiss. The Court has “considerable discretion to stay discovery pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).” Bennett v. Cuomo, No. 22-cv-7846-VSB,

, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2023) (internal quotations omitted). In determining good cause, courts “look to the particular circumstances and posture of each case.” Ruocchio v. Panera LLC, No. 22-cv-2564-DG-JMW,

, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2023) (internal quotations omitted). While a pending motion to dismiss does not automatically stay discovery, pending motion to dismiss may constitute the good cause required for a stay of discovery.” Ruilova v. 443 Lexington Ave, Inc., No. 19-cv-5205-AJN,

, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2020) (internal quotations omitted). Courts evaluating good cause generally consider: “(1) the breadth of discovery sought (and the burden of responding to it), (2) the strength of the underlying motion, and (3) the risk of prejudice to the party opposing the stay.” K.A. v. City of New York, No. 16-cv-04936-LTS-JW,

, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2022); see also Hong Leong Fin. Ltd. (Singapore) v. Pinnacle Performance Lid.,

(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (same). The “strength of the motion” prong can also be described as requiring the “party seeking a stay [to] present substantial arguments for dismissal” or to make a “strong showing that the plaintiff's claim is unmeritorious.” Kaplan v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 610 F. Supp. 3d

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Nt Tr NN RES □□ NA EEN NA NE AED A eee JONES DAY

Hon. Colleen McMahon July 5, 2023 Page 2

533, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (internal quotations omitted). As Experian explains more fully in its motion to dismiss, Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed on two independent grounds. First, Plaintiff fails to allege specific information on her consumer credit report that is inaccurate. (See ECF No. 12 at 3-6.) Second, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that Experian’s procedures were unreasonable. (See id. at 6-8.) Each of those is a requirement for pleading a claim. (See id. at 3— 6, 6-8.) Accordingly, Experian has made a strong showing that Plaintiff's claim is unmeritorious, and this Court should grant Experian’s motion to stay. See e.g., Samuel v. City of New York, No. 22-cv-2404-GHW,

, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2022) (granting defendant's motion to stay discovery pending briefing and resolution of the motion to dismiss because “‘of the nature of [d]efendant’s arguments that [p]laintiff's claims [we]re unmeritorious’”); Cofa v. Art Brand Studios, LLC, No. 21-cv-1519-LJL,

, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2022) (granting motion to stay because “without prejudging the merits, it appear[ed] that the motion to dismiss [would] likely succeed on the merits”); Am. Fed'n of Musicians & Employers' Pension Fund v. Atl. Recording Corp., No. 15-cv-6267-GHW,

, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2016) (granting motion to stay because defendants’ motion to dismiss appeared “to have substantial grounds”). As to the second and third factors, breadth of discovery and potential prejudice to the party opposing the stay, Hong Leong Fin. Ltd.,

, no party in this action has sought discovery yet and no discovery schedule has been ordered by the Court. There is no prejudice beyond the passage of reasonable time, which without more, “cannot itself constitute prejudice sufficient to defeat a motion to stay discovery.” O'Sullivan v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 17-cv- 8709-LTS-GWG,

, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2019). Staying discovery until the Court decides the motion will conserve the Court’s and the parties’ resources by avoiding unnecessary discovery. The motion to dismiss will likely dispose of Plaintiff's insufficiently-pled claims, entirely obviating the need for discovery. See Josie- Delerme vy. Am. Gen. Fin. Corp., No. 08-cv-3166-NG-MDG,

, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2009) (granting defendants’ motion to stay discovery pending the outcome of their motion to dismiss on balance in part because the “resolution of the motion to dismiss may obviate the need for potentially onerous discovery”). Accordingly, Experian asks that the Court stay discovery until the Court decides Experian’s motion to dismiss. The requested stay would include deferring the parties’ submission of a proposed Case Management Scheduliag Order, which is currently due on July 12, 2023 (ECF No. 10).

—V_e Oe Ee eNO ee eZ et PN le □□□ NAON PEN Eo qt JONES DAY Hon. Colleen McMahon July 5, 2023 Page 3

Respectfully submitted, /s/ Michael T. Paslavsky Michael T. Paslavsky ce: Ms. Thomasina Tara Cochran (by CM/ECF and Priority mail)