UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK GEORGE BURNS, Plaintiff, 23-CV-8659 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL UNDER

(g) COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Westchester County Jail, brings this action pro se. Plaintiff asks to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. Plaintiff is barred, however, from filing any new action IFP while he is a prisoner. See Burns v. Schell, ECF 1:20-CV-5582, 7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2020). That order relied on the “three-strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),

(g), which provides: In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action [IFP] if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. Plaintiff’s complaint does not show that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.1 Instead, Plaintiff alleges that the facility is improperly exercising its discretion to impose fines for disciplinary proceedings because of a budget shortfall. Because Plaintiff has three strikes for purposes of Section 1915(g), and he does not allege that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury, he is therefore barred from filing this action IFP.

1 An imminent danger is one “existing at the time the complaint is filed.” Malik v. McGinnis,

(2d Cir. 2002). A danger “that has dissipated by the time a complaint is filed” is not sufficient. Pettus v. Morgenthau,

(2d Cir. 2009). CONCLUSION The Court denies Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP, and the complaint is dismissed without prejudice under the PLRA’s “three-strikes” rule. See

(g).2 Plaintiff remains disqualified from filing any future action IFP while he is a prisoner, unless he is under imminent threat of serious physical injury.3

The Court certifies, pursuant to

(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States,

(1962). The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in this matter. SO ORDERED. Dated: October 3, 2023 New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge

2 Plaintiff may commence a new action by paying the filing fee. If Plaintiff does so, that complaint will be reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to dismiss any civil rights complaint from a prisoner if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 3 The Court may bar any vexatious litigant (including a nonprisoner) from filing future actions (even if the filing fee is paid) without first obtaining leave from the Court. See In re Martin-Trigona,

(2d Cir. 1993) (discussing sanctions courts may impose on vexatious litigants, including “leave of court” requirement).