Jackson v. State of Massachusetts
Jackson v. State of Massachusetts
Trial Court Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MARQUISE JACKSON, Plaintiff, -against- 23-CV-9426 (LTS) STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS; DIOCES TRANSFER ORDER OF SPRINGFIELD CHURCH; C&S WHOLESALE WHAREHOUSE; WESTFIELD PD, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff brings this action pro se. He asserts claims arising primarily from abuse that he alleges that he suffered as a child in Hampden County, Massachusetts. For the following reasons, the Court transfers this action under
28 U.S.C. § 1406to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. DISCUSSION Under the general venue provision, a civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). For purposes of venue, a “natural person” resides in the district where the person is domiciled, and an “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued” resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. See
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1), (2). Plaintiff alleges that he was sexually abused and mistreated, beginning at the age of six years old. This took place in Massachusetts, at a church in Springfield and at a hospital and other locations. Plaintiff seeks damages for his pain and suffering. Plaintiff alleges that these events took place outside this district and involved defendants outside this district. Venue thus is not
proper in this district under Section 1391(b)(1), (2). Under
28 U.S.C. § 1406, if a plaintiff files a case in the wrong venue, the Court “shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.”
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Plaintiff’s claims arose in Hampden County, Massachusetts, which is in the District of Massachusetts. See
28 U.S.C. § 101. Accordingly, venue lies in the District of Massachusetts,
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), and in the interest of justice, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts,
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). CONCLUSION The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further
without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court. A summons shall not issue from this Court. This order closes the case in the Southern District of New York. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States,
369 U.S. 438, 444-45(1962). Dated: October 31, 2023 New York, New York
/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge
Reference
- Status
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