UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK VALMIKI RAMANI, Plaintiff, 1:24-CV-7903 (LTS) -against- TRANSFER ORDER MACY’S INC., Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Valmiki Ramani of Briarwood, Queens County, New York, brings this pro se action asserting claims of civil rights violations and of malicious prosecution; he seeks damages. Plaintiff sues Macy’s Inc. His claims arise, in large part, from events that allegedly took place at a Macy’s department store in Queens County, New York. For the following reasons, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. DISCUSSION The applicable venue provision for Plaintiff’s claims is found at

(b), which provides that, except as otherwise provided by law, a federal civil action must be brought in: (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

(b). For venue purposes, a “natural person” resides in the judicial district where the person is domiciled, and any other “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued,” if a defendant, resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.1 § 1391(c)(1), (2). Plaintiff does not allege where Macy’s Inc. resides, though it is very possible that Macy’s Inc., which owns and operates a nationwide department-store chain, resides within this judicial district.2 Accordingly, this court could be a proper venue for this action under Section

1391(b)(1). Plaintiff does allege, however, that a substantial portion, if not all, of the alleged events giving rise to his claims occurred in Queens County, New York (ECF 1, at 1-2), which lies within the Eastern District of New York,

(c). Accordingly, even if this court is a proper venue for this action under Section 1391(b)(1), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York is also a proper venue for this action under Section 1391(b)(2). Under

(a), even if a case is filed in a federal district court where venue is proper, a court may transfer that case to any other federal district court where it might have been brought “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.”

(a). In determining whether transfer is appropriate, courts consider the following

1 With respect to a defendant that is a corporation, for venue purposes: in a State which has more than one judicial district and in which a defendant that is a corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time an action is commenced, such corporation shall be deemed to reside in any district in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State, and, if there is no such district, the corporation shall be deemed to reside in the district within which it has the most significant contacts. § 1391(d). 2 The judicial district for this court, the Southern District of New York, is comprised of the following New York State counties: (1) New York (New York City Borough of Manhattan);(2) Bronx (New York City Borough of the Bronx); (3) Westchester; (4) Dutchess; (5) Rockland; (6) Orange; (7) Putnam; and (8) Sullivan. See

(b). ten factors: (1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of the unwilling witnesses; (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law;

(8) the weight accorded to the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the interest of justice, based on the totality of circumstances. Keitt v. N.Y. City,

(S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge No. Am., Inc.,

(2d Cir. 2010) (setting forth similar factors). Under Section 1404(a), transfer of this action appears to be appropriate. A substantial portion, if not all, of the alleged events occurred in Queens County, New York, within the Eastern District of New York. It is also reasonable to expect that relevant documents and witnesses would be located within that judicial district. Thus, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York appears to be a more convenient forum for this action. Accordingly, this Court transfers this action to that court. See § 1404(a); D.H. Blair & Co. v.

Gottdiener,

(2d Cir. 2006) (“District courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.”). CONCLUSION The Court directs the Clerk of Court to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. See

(a). Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court. A summons shall not issue from this court. This order closes this action in this court. The Court certifies, under

(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and, therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States,

(1962). SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 22, 2024 New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge