UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK CHRISTOPHER TAYLOR, Plaintiff, 23-CV-10709 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL UNDER

(g) ALL COMPANYS AND NAMES, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Colorado State Penitentiary, in Cañon City, Colorado, brings this action pro se. Plaintiff also requests to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Plaintiff is barred, however, from filing any new action IFP while he is a prisoner. See Taylor v. Biden, ECF 1:23-CV-9083, 5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2024).1 That order relied on the “three- strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),

(g), which provides that: In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action [IFP] if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

1 That order lists the following cases: Taylor v. FBI NY, No. 19-3972 (2d Cir. Apr. 30, 2020) (dismissing appeal as frivolous); Taylor v. Kings Cnty WA, No. 21-CV-1182 (MJP) (W.D. Wash. Oct. 14, 2021) (dismissing complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a claim); Taylor v. Ferguson, No. 20-CV-1262 (BHS) (W.D. Wash. Nov. 16, 2020) (dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim); Taylor v. Microsoft, No. 19-CV-0403 (RMS) (W.D. Wash. Mar. 22, 2019) (dismissing amended complaint for failure to state a claim and as frivolous); Taylor v. DEA, No. 18-CV-0687 (RSM) (W.D. Wash. Nov. 19, 2018) (dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim). Although Plaintiff has filed this new action seeking IFP status, he does not show that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.1 Plaintiff did not file a complaint in this action. On his IFP application, Plaintiff lists the Defendants as “All Companys and Names.” (ECF 1.) He checks a box on the IFP application form indicating that he is in imminent danger of serious

physical injury, and writes “National & Homeland Security Threat plus obstructing justice of communication.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff is therefore barred from filing this action IFP. CONCLUSION The Court denies Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP, and the complaint is dismissed without prejudice under the PLRA’s “three-strikes” rule. See

(g).2 Plaintiff remains barred from filing any future action IFP while he is in custody, unless he is under imminent threat of serious physical injury.3

The Court certifies, pursuant to

(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States,

(1962).

1 An imminent danger is one “existing at the time the complaint is filed.” Malik v. McGinnis,

(2d Cir. 2002). A danger “that has dissipated by the time a complaint is filed” is not sufficient. Pettus v. Morgenthau,

(2d Cir. 2009). 2 Plaintiff may commence a new action by paying the filing fee. If Plaintiff does so, that complaint will be reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to dismiss any civil rights complaint from a prisoner if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 3 The Court may bar any vexatious litigant (including a nonprisoner) from filing future actions (even if the filing fee is paid) without first obtaining leave from the Court. See In re Martin-Trigona,

(2d Cir. 1993) (discussing sanctions courts may impose on vexatious litigants, including “leave of court” requirement). The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in this case. SO ORDERED. Dated: January 8, 2024 New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge