UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ---------------------------------------------------------------------- X : MADELEINE CEDENO, individually, and on behalf of : all others similarly situated, : : Plaintiff, : 24-CV-1186 (JMF) : -v- : : MEMORANDUM OPINION BLUEMERCURY, INC., : AND ORDER : Defendant. : : ---------------------------------------------------------------------- X

JESSE M. FURMAN, United States District Judge: On February 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in which she invoked the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”),

(d)(2). See ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”), ¶ 7. On preliminary review, the Complaint appears to suffer from several potentially fatal jurisdictional defects. First, federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to CAFA only where the amount in controversy “exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs.”

(d)(2). A party invoking federal jurisdiction must show a “a reasonable probability that the claim is in excess of the statutory jurisdictional amount,” but courts “recognize a rebuttable presumption that the face of the complaint is a good faith representation of the actual amount in controversy.” Scherer v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S.,

(2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ebin v. Kangadis Food Inc., No. 13-CV-2311 (JSR),

, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2013). Here, Plaintiff fails to meet even this minimal burden, as she alleges only conclusorily that “the total claims of individual members of the proposed Class . . . are well in excess of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” Compl. ¶ 7; see Ballard v. U.S. Bank N.A., No. 20-CV-5129 (NSR),

, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2020). Further, given the nature of Plaintiff’s claims, which relate only to the timing of her pay, it seems unlikely that the amount in controversy would exceed $5,000,000. Therefore, the Court is unable to exercise jurisdiction under CAFA

based on the allegations in the Complaint. In addition, it is not clear that the Complaint alleges an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer Article III standing. A statutory violation alone, without a tangible injury or close parallel to a traditional cause of action, does not constitute an injury that can be recognized by the federal courts. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,

(2021). In the wage-and-hour context, plaintiffs have been found to allege a sufficient tangible injury where they plausibly connect the statutory violation to “the underpayment of wages.” See Mateer v. Peloton Interactive, Inc., 22-CV-740 (LGS),

, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2022); Imbarrato v. Banta Mgmt. Servs., Inc.,

, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2020). Short of that, however, courts routinely dismiss such cases for lack of standing where the

plaintiffs allege only “technical violations of the NYLL.” Francisco v. NY Tex Case, Inc., No. 19-CV-1649 (PKC),

, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2022); see also Metcalf v. TransPerfect Translations Int’l, Inc.,

, 341 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022); Sevilla v. House of Salads One LLC, No 20-CV-6072 (PKC),

, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2022); Wang v. XBB, Inc., No. 18-CV-7341 (PKC),

, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2022). Here, Plaintiff alleges that she “lost the time-value of [her] money” when Defendant paid her on a bi-weekly (as opposed to weekly) basis, as she “could not invest, earn interest on, or otherwise use [the] monies that were rightfully hers.” Compl. ¶ 10. But that claimed monetary harm appears to be “purely hypothetical” in this case, as Plaintiff does not demonstrate how a one-week delay in her ability to “invest, earn interest on, or otherwise use [the] monies” resulted in his being “underpaid.” /d.; see Shi v. TL & CG Inc., No. 19-CV-8502 (SN),

, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2022). In light of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff show cause in writing by March 1, 2024, why this case should not be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Defendant may file a response no later than March 8, 2024. If Plaintiff fails to show cause or does not file anything by the deadline, the Court will dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction without further notice to the parties. Finally, Plaintiff is directed to serve on Defendant a copy of this Order, and to file proof of such service on the docket, within two business days of this Order. SO ORDERED. Dated: February 21, 2024 hlfe— New York, New York JESSE MAN Ufited States District Judge