Kenton v. The City of New York

District Court, S.D. New York

Kenton v. The City of New York

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ALISHA KENTON, Plaintiff, 1:24-CV-1239 (LTS) -against- TRANSFER ORDER THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Alisha Kenton, of the Bronx, New York, filed this pro se action invoking the court’s federal question jurisdiction; she names the City of New York as the sole defendant. The claims in Plaintiff’s complaint arise from allegations that Plaintiff was sexually harassed and assaulted on May 22, 2021, in an elevator of a “Covid Isolation Shelter” located in Long Island City, Queens County, New York. For the following reasons, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. DISCUSSION Under the applicable venue provision for Plaintiff’s claims, such claims may be brought in: (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

28 U.S.C. § 1391

(b). For the purposes of Section 1391, a “natural person” resides in the judicial district where the person is domiciled, and any other “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued,” if a defendant, resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. See § 1391(c)(1), (2). As to a defendant that is a corporation: in a State which has more than one judicial district and in which a defendant that is a corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time an action is commenced, such corporation shall be deemed to reside in any district in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State, and, if there is no such district, the corporation shall be deemed to reside in the district within which it has the most significant contacts. § 1391(d). Because the City of New York, a municipal corporation, resides within this judicial district and within the Eastern District of New York, both this court and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York are proper venues for this action under Section 1391(b)(1).1 It is also clear that, because the alleged events occurred in Long Island City, Queens County, New York, the Eastern District of New York is also a proper venue for this action under Section 1391(b)(2). Under

28 U.S.C. § 1404

(a), even if an action is filed in a federal district court where venue is proper, a court may transfer the action to any other federal district court where it might have been brought “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.”

28 U.S.C. § 1404

(a). In determining whether transfer is appropriate, courts consider the following ten factors: (1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses;

1 This judicial district, the Southern District of New York, is comprised of the following New York State counties: (1) New York (New York City Borough of Manhattan); (2) Bronx (New York City Borough of the Bronx); (3) Westchester; (4) Dutchess; (5) Rockland; (6) Orange; (7) Putnam; and (8) Sullivan.

28 U.S.C. § 112

(b). The Eastern District of New York is comprised of the following New York State counties: (1) Kings (New York City Borough of Brooklyn); (2) Queens (New York City Borough of Queens); (3) Richmond (New York City Borough of Staten Island); (4) Nassau; and (5) Suffolk. § 112(c). (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded to the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the interest of justice, based on the totality of circumstances. Keitt v. N.Y. City,

882 F. Supp. 2d 412, 458-59

(S.D.N.Y.

2011); see also N.Y. Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge N. Am., Inc.,

599 F.3d 102, 112

(2d Cir. 2010) (setting forth similar factors). Under Section 1404(a), transfer to the Eastern District of New York is appropriate for this action. Plaintiff asserts that the underlying events allegedly occurred in Queens County, in the Eastern District of New York. It is also reasonable to expect that relevant documents and witnesses would be located in that judicial district. Thus, the Eastern District of New York appears to be a more convenient forum for this action. Accordingly, this Court transfers this action to that court. See § 1404(a); D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener,

462 F.3d 95, 106

(2d Cir. 2006) (“District courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case

basis.”). CONCLUSION The Court directs the Clerk of Court to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

28 U.S.C. § 1404

(a). Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court.2 A summons shall not issue from this court. This order closes this action in this court.

2 Under Rule 5.2(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, court submissions must not refer to the full name of a minor child; they may only refer to a minor child by using the child’s name’s initials. Plaintiff, in her in forma pauperis (“IFP”) application, however, reveals The Court certifies, under

28 U.S.C. § 1915

(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States,

369 U.S. 438, 444-45

(1962). SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 28, 2024 New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge

the full name of her minor child. (ECF 2.) Thus, in light of Rule 5.2(a)(3), and in an abundance of caution, the Court has directed the Clerk of Court to restrict electronic access to Plaintiff’s IFP application to a “case participant-only” basis.

Reference

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