Mercer v. Doe

District Court, S.D. New York

Mercer v. Doe

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ANTHONY M. MERCER, Plaintiff, -against- 25-CV-2898 (LTS) JOHN DOE, Presiding Judge of the Kings TRANSFER ORDER County Criminal Court; CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Otisville Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983

. Plaintiff contends that the presiding judge of the Kings County Criminal Court denied him access to court. Plaintiff seeks damages. For the following reasons, this action is transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. DISCUSSION Under the general venue statute, a civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . ; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

28 U.S.C. § 1391

(b). For venue purposes, a “natural person” resides in the district where the person is domiciled, and an “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued” resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. See

28 U.S.C. § 1391

(c)(1), (2). Plaintiff sues John Doe presiding Judge of the Kings County Criminal Court. It is unclear where John Doe resides and thus it is not clear if venue is proper in this district, under Section 1391(b)(1), based on the residence of defendants. Venue of Plaintiff’s claims does not appear to be proper in this district under Section

1391(b)(2) based on the place where the events giving rise to the claims occurred. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights in Kings County, which is within the Eastern District of New York. See

28 U.S.C. § 112

(c). Because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred Kings County, venue is proper under Section 1391(b)(2) in the Eastern District of New York. Even if venue is proper in the district where a case is filed, a court may transfer the case “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice” to any other district where it might have been brought.

28 U.S.C. § 1404

(a). In determining whether transfer is appropriate, courts consider the following factors: (1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of operative facts; (4) the availability of process to

compel the attendance of the unwilling witnesses; (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded to the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the interest of justice, based on the totality of circumstances. Keitt v. N.Y. City,

882 F. Supp. 2d 412, 459-60

(S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge No. Am., Inc.,

599 F.3d 102, 112

(2d Cir. 2010) (setting forth similar factors). A plaintiff’s choice of forum is accorded less deference where the plaintiff does not reside in the chosen forum and the operative events did not occur there. See Iragorri v. United Tech. Corp.,

274 F.3d 65

, 72 (2d Cir. 2001). Under Section 1404(a), transfer appears to be appropriate in this case. The underlying events occurred in Kings County, and it is reasonable to expect that all relevant documents and witnesses also would be in Kings County. The Eastern District of New York appears to be a more convenient forum for this action. Accordingly, the Court transfers this action to the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

28 U.S.C. § 1404

(a); see D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener,

462 F.3d 95, 106

(2d Cir. 2006) (“District courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.”). CONCLUSION The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court. A summons shall not issue from this court. This order closes the case in this district. The Court certifies, under

28 U.S.C. § 1915

(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an

appeal. See Coppedge v. United States,

369 U.S. 438, 444-45

(1962). SO ORDERED. Dated: April 9, 2025 New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge

Reference

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