UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JEROME WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, -against- 24-CV-7928 (LTS) ERIC ADAMS; POLICE COMMISSIONER ORDER OF DISMISSAL CITY OF NEW YORK; DIRECTOR OF FDNY WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD AMBULANCE SERVICE; TAMECA SANTINI; RASHID WATTS, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court construes the complaint as asserting constitutional claims under

. Plaintiff names as defendants New York City Mayor Eric Adams; the New York Police Chief, which the Court understands to be an official with the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”); the Director of the New York Fire Department’s (“FDNY”) ambulance service; and two FDNY paramedics. By order dated December 2, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint, with 30 days’ leave to file an amended complaint. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co.,

(2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills,

(2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

(2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases,

(citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must

accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly,

. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief.

BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this action against five defendants: Mayor Eric Adams; “New York Police Chief,” (“NYPD Police Chief”) “Director of the FDNY Ambulance Service” (“FDNY Director”); and two paramedics, Tameca Santini and Rashid Watts. The following facts are drawn from the complaint.1 On May 3, 2024, “plaintiff was the victim of I suppose a hit and run.” (ECF 1, at 1.) Plaintiff alleges that “the ambulance states I hit by a vehicle, but there haven’t a police report or investigation to confirm nor has the camera footage from the scene of the incident been look at.” (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that [n]o investigator from the police have question the plaintiff about said incident which could have been attempted murder if it was a hit and run, so the police department is guilty of negligence and Mayor along [with Police chief [are] guilty because they should know [of] the inability of their underl[ings]. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that Defendants “FDNY director and paramedics Santini and Watts [are] negligent for not informing the police of the attempted murder on plaintiff.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks $2,000,000 in damages “for pain and suffering[.] [P]laintiff is left with a permanent scar over his left eye and continuous headaches.”2 (Id. at 2.) DISCUSSION A. Mayor Adams and NYPD Police Chief To state a claim under

, a plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendants’ direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’ t of Corr. Serv.,

(2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant may not be held liable under Section 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff’s rights. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their

1 The Court quotes from Plaintiff’s complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless otherwise noted. 2 Plaintiff indicates in a letter received by the Court on January 13, 2025, that “the scar is over my right eye.” (ECF 8, at 1.) subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). Rather, “[t]o hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official[.]” Tangreti v. Bachmann,

, 620 (2d Cir. 2020). Plaintiff names Mayor Adams and the NYPD Police Chief as defendants under a theory

of respondeat superior, asserting that these two supervising defendants are liable in this action because they are responsible for the conduct of their underlings. Plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting that Mayor Adams or the NYPD Police Chief were involved personally in the events underlying Plaintiff’s claims. The claims against Mayor Adams and the NYPD Police Chief are therefore dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See

(e)(2)(B)(ii). B. FDNY Director and Paramedics Santini and Watts Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants FDNY Director, Santini, and Watts failed to investigate the cause of the hit-and-run – which Plaintiff describes as possibly an attempted murder – and inform the police department of the accident does not state a claim because

generally there is no federal constitutional duty requiring a government official to investigate or protect an individual from harm. See Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales,

, 755- 56 (2005); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

(1989). Because these individuals do not have a duty to investigate Plaintiff’s accident, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claim against them for failure to state a claim. See

(e)(2)(B)(ii). C. Claims under state law A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of state law claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”

(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,

, 350 n.7 (1988)). Having dismissed the federal claims of which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting. See Kolari v. New

York-Presbyterian Hosp.,

, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.’” (quoting City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons,

(1997))). LEAVE TO AMEND GRANTED Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione,

(2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo,

(2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to

amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu,

(2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank,

(2d Cir. 1999)). Because the Court cannot say at this stage that amendment would be futile, the Court grants Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to amend his complaint to cure the deficiencies identified above. If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the time allowed, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in this action. PRO SE LAW CLINIC Plaintiff is advised that there is a Pro Se Law Clinic available to assist self-represented parties in civil cases. The Clinic may be able to provide Plaintiff with advice in connection with his case. The Pro Se Law Clinic is run by a private organization called the City Bar Justice Center; it is not part of, or run by, the Court (and, among other things, therefore cannot accept

filings on behalf of the Court, which must still be made by any self-represented party through the Pro Se Intake Unit). To make an appointment, Plaintiff must complete the City Bar Justice Center’s intake form. If Plaintiff has questions about the intake form or needs to highlight an urgent deadline already disclosed in the form, the clinic can be contacted by phone (212-382-4794) or email ([email protected]). In-person appointments in the Thurgood Marshall Courthouse in Manhattan and the Charles L. Brieant Jr. Federal Building and Courthouse in White Plains are available Monday through Thursday, 10am to 4pm. Appointments are also available remotely Monday through Friday, 10am to 4pm. CONCLUSION The Court dismisses the complaint, filed IFP under

(a)(1), under

(e)(2)(B)(ii), with 30 days’ leave to replead. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting. See

(c)(3). A City Bar Justice Center flyer is attached to this order. The Court certifies under

(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States,

(1962). The Court directs the Clerk of Court to hold this matter open on the docket until a civil judgment is entered. SO ORDERED. Dated: April 14, 2025 New York, New York

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ABOUT THE PROJECT The Federal Pro Se Legal Assistance Project (Fed Pro) provides limited assistance to self- represented litigants (plaintiffs and defendants) with cases involving civil legal matters in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (SDNY).

HOW TO SCHEDULE AN APPOINTMENT

To schedule an appointment for assistance with City Bar Justice [m] “a = □□□ Center’s Fed Pro project, you must first complete our online oi Fe ' Poss re toe Intake Form. pag ea e Our online Intake Form is accessible via one of these ap □□ methods: fg Pia o Scan the QR code to the right. 2 i Go to bit.ly/prosesdny [m] Por e Once onthe City Bar Justice Center Federal Pro Se Legal Assistance page, scroll down to " "and then click " "to be taken to the Intake Form. e When the Intake Form asks: "How can we help you", please select "Federal Court Case" from the drop-down menu. The Fed Pro SDNY office will receive your application ONLY if you select "federal court case." If you select anything else, you will need to re-complete your application. Once you complete the form, someone will contact you, usually within five business days, to schedule an appointment. If you are not able to complete the Intake Form, please call (212) 382-4794, leave a detailed message, and wait for us to call you back, typically within five business days.

HOW WE HELP

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