UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -------------------------------------------------------x TAMARA LEVY,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER - against - 25-CV-2975 (PKC) (LKE)

EXODUS MOVEMENT INC.,

Defendant. -------------------------------------------------------x PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge: Plaintiff Tamara Levy (“Plaintiff”) brings this pro se action, along with an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to

(a). (Compl., Dkt. 1; IFP Mot., Dkt. 2.) For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s IFP application is denied. In order to proceed with this action, Plaintiff is granted until June 24, 2025, to pay the $405 filing fee. DISCUSSION The purpose of the statute permitting litigants to proceed IFP is to ensure that indigent persons have equal access to the judicial system. Davis v. NYC Dept. of Educ., No. 10-CV-3812 (KAM),

, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010) (first citing Gregory v. NYC Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 07-CV-1531 (BMC),

, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2007); and then citing Cuoco v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons,

(S.D.N.Y. 2004)). A plaintiff seeking to proceed IFP must submit an affidavit stating “that [they are] unable to pay” filing fees “or give security therefor.”

(a)(1). A court is authorized to dismiss a case brought by a plaintiff requesting to proceed IFP if the “allegation of poverty is untrue,”

(e)(2)(A), and courts in this district often that dismissal provision when a litigant’s statement of assets fails to establish the level of poverty required under the IFP statute. See, e.g., Miller v. Smith, No. 21-CV-2949 (JS) (AKT),

, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 2, 2021); Humphrey v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 21-CV-1901 (RPK) (LB),

, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2021). The question of whether a plaintiff qualifies for IFP status is within the discretion of the district court. Grimes v. Sil, No. 19-CV-1066 (AMD),

, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2019). “[A] court properly exercises its discretion”

to deny an IFP application when it does not appear that an applicant’s financial condition has blocked their access to court, but instead appears that the applicant is “merely in the position of having to weigh the financial constraints posed” by pursuing their “position against the merits of [their] case.” Brooks v. Aiden 0821 Capital LLC, No. 19-CV-6823 (GRB) (AYS),

, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2020) (quoting Fridman v. City of New York,

(S.D.N.Y. 2002)). Here, Plaintiff states that she is employed and earns $3,000 a month in gross pay or wages, and also receives income from (1) business, professional, or other self-employment, (2) rent payments, interest[,] or dividends, and (3) pension, annuity, or life insurance payments. (IFP Mot., Dkt. 2, ¶¶ 2–3.) Notably, she asserts that she has $100,000 either in cash or in a checking or

savings account and has no monthly expenses or dependents. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 6–8.) Based on this information, the Court is not satisfied that Plaintiff is unable to pay the filing fee to bring this action. CONCLUSION Accordingly, Plaintiff’s IFP application is denied. In order to proceed with this action, Plaintiff is granted until June 24, 2025, to pay the $405 filing fee. All further proceedings shall be stayed. The Court certifies pursuant to

(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken

2 in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of any appeal. Coppedge v. United States,

, 444–45 (1962). SO ORDERED.

/s/ Pamela K. Chen Pamela K. Chen United States District Judge Dated: June 10, 2025 Brooklyn, New York

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