UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ENKI RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, 25-CV-1967 (LLS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE OF AMERICA, Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action invoking the Court’s federal question and diversity jurisdiction,

, 1332. By order dated July 21, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. The Court dismisses the complaint for the reasons set forth below. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co.,

(2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills,

(2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

(2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases,

(citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the complaint.1 Plaintiff’s claims arose in New York

City, during the period from 1991 to the present. (ECF 1 at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that in December 2016, the FBI and the New York City Police Department's Joint Task Force committed identity fraud with his passport, altering his name in various ways “to hide [his] real name.” (Id.) Plaintiff reported this issue to the U.S. Embassy. He attaches to the complaint several copies of the Puerto Rico Mail In Birth Certification Application. (ECF 1 at Exh. 1.) Plaintiff contends that these actions violated his rights under the “whole entire Bill of Rights and the 17 amendments thereafter.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff sues the United States Postal Service, which is not otherwise mentioned in the body of the complaint. Plaintiff does not specify the relief that he seeks but indicates that his “lady at The Federal Bureau of Investigation is handling it.” (Id. at 6.)

DISCUSSION A. Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous Under the IFP statute, a court must dismiss an action if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious.

(e)(2)(B)(i). “[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez,

(1992). A complaint is “‘factually frivolous’ if the

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise. sufficiently well-pleaded facts are ‘clearly baseless’ − that is, if they are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ or ‘delusional.’” Gallop v. Cheney,

(2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Denton,

) (finding as frivolous and baseless allegations that set forth a fantastical alternative history of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks); see also Neitzke v. Williams,

(1989) (a claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact”); Livingston,

(“[A]n action is ‘frivolous’ when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . ; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Moreover, a court has “no obligation to entertain pure speculation and conjecture.” Gallop,

. Plaintiff’s complaint is premised upon allegations that, more than a decade ago, the FBI and the New York City Police Department's Joint Task Force committed identity fraud with his passport. Plaintiff provides no factual basis for his assertions that he was the victim of a government conspiracy. See Lefkowitz v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 13-CV-6414,

, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2014) (complaint must set forth facts showing basis for

information and belief); Johnson v. Univ. of Rochester Med. Ctr.,

, 266 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (even where necessary evidence is in “exclusive control of the defendant, . . . plaintiff must still set forth the factual basis for that belief”). Plaintiff’s allegations amount to vague suspicions and conclusions that are not plausible and must be dismissed as frivolous. See Kraft v. City of New York,

, 64 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that “the district court did not err in sua sponte dismissing the complaint as frivolous,” based on the plaintiff’s allegations that he had “been the subject of 24-hour, multi- jurisdictional surveillance by federal ‘fusion centers’ and the New York State Intelligence Center, which put a ‘digital marker’ on him in order to collect his personal data and harass him”); Khalil v. United States, No. 17-CV-2652,

, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2018) (dismissing complaint where “[p]laintiff allege[d] a broad conspiracy involving surveillance of and interference with his life by the United States and various government actors” because his allegations were “irrational and wholly incredible”).

B. Leave to amend denied District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione,

(2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo,

, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Plaintiff’s complaint does not suggest that he is in possession of facts that would cure the identified deficiencies. See Gallop,

(district court did not err in dismissing claim with prejudice in absence of any indication plaintiff could or would provide additional allegations leading to different result); Fischman v. Mitsubishi Chem. Holdings Am., Inc., No. 18- CV-8188,

, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2019) (declining to grant leave to amend in the absence of any suggestion that additional facts could remedy defects in the plaintiff’s pleading). Because the defects in Plaintiff’s complaint cannot be cured with an amendment, the

Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend and dismisses the action as frivolous. See

(e)(2)(B)(i). CONCLUSION The Court dismisses this action as frivolous. See

(e)(2)(B)(i). The Court directs the Clerk of Court to enter judgment dismissing this action. SO ORDERED. Dated: July 29, 2025 New York, New York Louis L. Stanton U.S.D.J.