Kendall T. Thomas v. New York Department of Corrections, Federal Bureau of...

District Court, E.D. New York

Kendall T. Thomas v. New York Department of Corrections, Federal Bureau of...

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -------------------------------------------------------------------X KENDALL T. THOMAS,

Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

No. 24-CV-8044 (DG) (JRC) -against-

NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, AVANADE, U.S. ARMED FORCES/ DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, MICROSOFT, and CATHOLIC GUARDIAN,

Defendants. -------------------------------------------------------------------X

JAMES R. CHO, United States Magistrate Judge: On November 27, 2024, plaintiff Kendall Thomas (“plaintiff”), appearing pro se, filed this action against the New York Police Department, 79th Precinct, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Peter D. Rivera, Alberto Blanco and the Department of Defense (US Armed Forces). See Compl., Dkt. 1. Plaintiff paid the filing fee to commence the action. See Dkt. 2. On April 25, 2025, the Court directed plaintiff to show cause by May 27, 2025, why the Court should not dismiss this action as frivolous. See Order to Show Cause, Dkt. 10. To date, plaintiff has failed to respond to the Court’s Order or requested an extension. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s April 25th Order, and reiterated herein, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the District Court dismiss this action as frivolous. BACKGROUND Plaintiff commenced this action on November 27, 2024. See Dkt. 1. On December 10, 2024, plaintiff filed an amended complaint and added Michelle Pauline as a defendant. See Dkt. 5. On December 27, 2024, plaintiff refiled the amended complaint with minor changes. See Dkt. 7. On January 21, 2025, plaintiff moved to file a second amended complaint that replaced the New York Police Department with the New York Department of Corrections and added Avanade, Microsoft, the Catholic Guardian, and several new individuals as defendants. See Dkt.

9. On April 25, 2025, this Court granted plaintiff’s motion to file a second amended complaint. See Dkt. 10. However, the Court also directed plaintiff to show cause by May 27, 2025, why the Court should not dismiss this action as frivolous. Id. Plaintiff has failed to respond to the Court's April 25th Order. See Phillips v. Long Island R.R. Co., No. 22-123,

2023 WL 2317231

, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 2, 2023) (district court should provide notice and opportunity before sua sponte dismissal) (citing Catzin v. Thank You & Good Luck Corp.,

899 F.3d 77, 82

(2d Cir. 2018)). Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (Dkt. 9) consists of the following statements:1 My eyes were damaged 19 times including my retna [sic] by the FBI. The NYPD made my son slam his head on a draw [sic]. There were more incidents involving shifting of mold and toxins into my body system, through my nose and mouth while walking around and sleeping. The mold came from my roof, inside walls and the home network including the frames of the house. There are more areas of the home I cannot elaborate, because I do not know.

The mold may’ve [sic] been used to damage my brain in order to keep me from revealing the system used by the FBI to monitor the public in NYC. There are people I’ve worked with from my previous employment involved as well managing a project for the entities.

They used the technology to keep me from leaving my home. They also maimed and abused me. Hypotnized [sic] me to bring my son outdoors to arrest me and place my son into the foster care system.

1 Plaintiff’s allegations are set forth verbatim without alterations as to spelling or grammar. Second Am. Compl., Dkt. 9 at ECF page 10.2 Plaintiff alleges he sustained “major damage to the eyes and lungs, including the retna [sic].”

Id.

at ECF page 11. He seeks unspecified damages and injunctive relief, including the “profits from my sons geneomes [sic] sent to my son.”

Id.

STANDARD OF REVIEW A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Matson v. Bd. of Educ.,

631 F.3d 57, 63

(2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009)). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678

. In reviewing a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful that the plaintiff’s pleadings should be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson

v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. 97, 106

(1976)); see also Harris v. Mills,

572 F.3d 66, 72

(2d Cir. 2009) (noting that even after Twombly, courts “remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”). Regardless of whether a plaintiff has paid the filing fee, a district court has the inherent power to dismiss a case, sua sponte, if it determines that the action is frivolous or the Court lacks jurisdiction over the matter. See Frein v. Pelosi, No. 22-1063,

2023 WL 2530453

, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 16, 2023) (citing Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants Corp.,

221 F.3d 362, 364

(2d Cir. 2000)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). There are two types of federal subject-matter

2 References to the page numbers generated by the Court’s electronic case filing system appear as “ECF page.” jurisdiction. Under the first type, federal question jurisdiction, the complaint must have a claim based on a federal law. See

28 U.S.C. § 1331

. The other type is called diversity jurisdiction, and it allows federal courts to consider cases arising under state laws, but only if the money value of the lawsuit is greater than $75,000 and all the defendants live in a different state than the

plaintiff. See

28 U.S.C. § 1332

. If the court “determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier,

211 F.3d 697

, 700-01 (2d Cir. 2000). DISCUSSION There is no federal-question jurisdiction where “the purported federal claim is clearly immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” S. New England Tel. Co. v. Glob. NAPs Inc.,

624 F.3d 123, 132

(2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Hariprasad v. Master Holdings Inc.,

788 F. App’x 783

, 786 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[T]he Supreme Court has . . . instructed that federal question jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1331

is lacking where the asserted claim for relief is ‘essentially

fictitious,’ ‘wholly insubstantial,’ ‘obviously frivolous,’ and ‘obviously without merit.’”) (quoting Shapiro v. McManus,

577 U.S. 39, 45-46

(2015)). An action “is frivolous when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless, such as when allegations are the product of delusion or fantasy; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co.,

141 F.3d 434, 437

(2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez,

504 U.S. 25, 33

(1992); Gallop v. Cheney,

642 F.3d 364, 368

(2d Cir. 2011). Plaintiff’s allegations, even under the most liberal reading afforded to pro se pleadings (and even if plaintiff believes them to be true), can only be described as frivolous. In addition to the statements set forth above, plaintiff alleges that “[t]he 4 entities used the FBI equipment to harm my person including lungs, eyes and brains using technologies provided by the FBI. The

equipment was also used to harrass and hold me and my son indoors by manipulation of my mental capicity [sic] and of my well being. They burned my eyes front and back 19 times.” Second Am. Compl., Dkt. 9 at ECF page 9. Plaintiff’s allegations appear to be “the product of delusion or fantasy.” Livingston,

141 F.3d at 437

(citation omitted); see Denton,

504 U.S. at 33

. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the District Court dismiss the Second Amended Complaint and close this action. The Court further recommends that although plaintiff paid the filing fee, the Court certifies pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915

(a)(3) that any appeal from the District Court’s Order would not be taken in good faith and, therefore, in forma pauperis status be denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v.

United States,

369 U.S. 438, 444-45

(1962). Any objections to the recommendations made in this Report must be filed with the Honorable Diane Gujarati within 14 days after the filing of this Report and Recommendation and, in any event, on or before October 8, 2025. See

28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See

28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(d), 72; Small v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,

892 F.2d 15, 16

(2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (discussing waiver under the former ten-day limit). The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this report and recommendation to plaintiff and note service on the docket. SO ORDERED

Dated: Brooklyn, New York September 24, 2025

s/ James R. Cho James R. Cho United States Magistrate Judge

Reference

Full Case Name
Kendall T. Thomas v. New York Department of Corrections, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Avanade, U.S. Armed Forces/ Department of Defense, Microsoft, and Catholic Guardian
Status
Unknown