UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK CHARISS FINAN, et al., Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM & ORDER against- 22-CV-7831 (NGG) (PK) LAFARGE S.A., et al., Defendants. TAMARA FIELDS, et al., Plaintiffs, 23-CV-0169 (NGG) (PK) -against- LAFARGE S.A., et al., Defendants. DIANE FOLEY, et al., Plaintiffs, 23-CV-5691 (NGG) (PK) -against- LAFARGE S.A., et al., Defendants.

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, United States District Judge. Defendants Lafarge S.A., Lafarge Cement Holding Limited, and Lafarge Cement Syria S.A. (collectively, “Defendants”) have filed a motion to reconsider the court's Memorandum and Order en- tered on August 29, 2025 granting in part and denying in part their combined motions to dismiss the operative complaints in the three above-captioned actions (the “August 29 Order”). (See generally. Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Recons., Foley v. Lafarge S.A., No. 23-CV-5691 (NGG) (PK) (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5,

2024) (Dkt. 101-1 in Foley) (“Defs.’ Mot.”).') Plaintiffs in all three actions oppose that motion. (See Pls.’ Joint Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. (Pls. Opp.”) (Dkt. 106 in Foley).) For the following reasons, the court DENIES Defendants’ motion. I. PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS Defendants first seek reconsideration of the court’s determina- tion that it has personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k) (2). (See Defs.’ Mot. at 1.) They contend that the court “overlooked” contravening Second Circuit precedent per- mitting personal jurisdiction only when “foreign defendants have ‘sufficient affiliating contacts with the United States in general.” Ud. at 3 (quoting Porina v. Marward Shipping Co.,

(2d Cir. 2008)).) By applying the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Org., Defendants argue that this court purportedly “reached a conclusion far more sweeping than Fuld can support.” (Id. (citing

(2025)). Defendants reason that the Supreme Court’s holding in Fuld is limited to the “the specific jurisdiction-granting statute under [Rule] 4(k) (1),” which is not at issue in this case. (id. (citing Fuld, 601 U.S. at 8).) They also feel that the court’s holding “was made without the benefit of full briefing on the novel legal issue.” (Id. at 3-4 (citing Reynolds v. Giuliani, No. 98-CV-8877,

, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2005)).) Defendants also ask the court to reconsider its holding that Plain- tiffs stated plausible claims for conspiracy under the Antiterrorism Act (“ATA”),

Stat. 2250- 53 (1990), as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Ter- rorism Act (“JASTA”),

Stat. 852-56 (2016). Ud. at 1.) They argue that the court erred in “holding

1 Hereinafter, references made to Defendants’ combined and Plaintiffs’ joint briefings correspond to the docket entries in Foley, and are cited as “[Document Name] (Dkt. [Docket Number] in Foley).”

that parties with mismatched objectives can form a JASTA con- spiracy so long as their interests ‘converge’ and are not at ‘cross- purposes.” (Id. at 4 (quoting August 29 Order (Dkt. 97 in Foley) at 48).) They state that the court “overlooked” the correct stand- ard from Freeman v. HSBC Holdings PLC,

(2d Cir. 2023) (holding that a conspiracy under the ATA requires a “com- mon pursuit”), in favor of the incorrect one from United States v. Khalupsky,

, 289 (2d Cir. 2021) (holding that “[c]o- conspirators’ goals need not be congruent...so long as their goals are not at cross-purposes”). (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiffs oppose Defendants’ motion. As a preliminary matter, they state that Defendants improperly seek to “reargue points they already raised and lost.” (Pls.’ Opp. at 2 (emphases omit- ted).) They point out that Defendants’ supplemental letter brief presented the same jurisdictional arguments that they raise now. Ud. at 3 (citing Defs.’ Letter Response to Pls.’ July 10, 2025 Letter re: Suppl. Authority (“Defs.’ Resp. Letter”) (Dkt. 95 in Foley) at 2, 3).) Regarding conspiracy, Plaintiffs similarly note that “De- fendants cited Freeman throughout their opening brief and [their] reply” and that the court already rejected their arguments. (id. (citing Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt. 25 in Foley); Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt. 27 in Foley); and August 29 Order at 47-48).) Thus, Plaintiffs state that Defendants “offer no new argument for the [c]ourt to consider.” (Id.) Plaintiffs also maintain that the court’s “rulings on personal juris- diction and conspiracy liability were correct” on the merits. (Id. at 3.) To start, Plaintiffs state that Defendants’ reliance on Porina in their jurisdictional analysis is misplaced. (Id. at 4 (citing Po- rina,

and Fuld, 82 F.4th at 104).) They note that Fuld expressly “rejected” the approach articulated in Porina and “overruled ‘the Second Circuit precedent” adopting that ap- proach. Cd. (citing Fuld, 606 U.S. at 16 and quoting Fuld, 606

U.S. at 17).) According to Plaintiffs, that means the court should conclude that it “correctly held that Fuld applies here.” (Id. (citing August 29 Order at 35-37).) Plaintiffs next observe that, in deter- mining whether an ATA conspiracy exists, “Khalupsky and Freeman articulate the same test: whether the defendant ‘agreed to participate in what he knew to be a collective venture directed toward a common goal.” (Id. at 5 (quoting Khalupsky, 5 F.4th at 289 and citing Freeman,

.) Plaintiffs therefore con- clude that the court was correct to hold that the allegations meet the appropriate standard. (Id. (citing August 29 Order at 44-50).) II. DISCUSSION The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration is “strict.” Commerzbank AG v. U.S. Bank,

(2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Shrader v. GSX Transp., Inc.,

(2d Cir. 1995)). “It is well-settled that [a motion for reconsideration] is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a ‘second bite at the apple.” Analytical Survs., Inc. v. Tonga Ptrs.,

(2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp.,

(2d Cir. 1998)). Defendants here seek to do precisely that. As Plaintiffs note, De- fendants raise no arguments that the court has not already considered in full. (Pls.’ Opp. at 3.) Despite Defendants’ assertion that the court’s jurisdictional holding “was made without the benefit of full briefing” regarding Fuld, both parties submitted dedicated letters of supplemental authority discussing the case. (See generally Pls.’ Letter re: New Authority (Dkt. 94 in Foley); Defs.’ Resp. Letter.) Indeed, Defendants’ letter raised the exact jurisdictional arguments they now present to the court. (See Defs.’ Resp. Letter at 3.) Considering this, the issue of whether Flud controls was adequately presented before the court issued the August 29 Order. (See August 29 Order at 35-37.)

So too for Defendants’ conspiracy argument. As Plaintiffs explain, Defendants presented the same argument in their motion to dis- miss and the court squarely addressed it in its August 29 Order. (See Pl.’s Opp. at 3.) Thus, Defendants’ motion for reconsidera- tion seeks for nothing more than a “second bite at the apple.” Sequa Corp.,

. It must be denied.” See Analytical Survs.,

(“({Rleconsideration will generally be de- nied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked.” (quoting Shrader,

)). Ill, CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES Defendants’ motion for reconsideration. SO ORDERED.

Dated: — Brooklyn, New York October4 §, 2025 s/Nicholas G. Garaufis NICHOLAS G. GARAUFISV United States District Judge

2 Consequently, the court does not reconsider the underlying substance of Defendants’ arguments, or Plaintiffs’ response that the “rulings on personal jurisdiction and conspiracy liability were correct.” (See Def.’s Mot. 3-5; PL.’s Opp. at 3-5.)